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0 


D 


This  Kern  Is  f  ilnwd  at  the  reduction  ratio  chaclcsd  iMlow  / 

Ca  documant  aat  film*  au  taux  da  rMuetion  indlqu*  cMiassous. 


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Th«  copy  fHm«d  h«r«  hai  b««n  raproduetd  thanki 
to  the  s*n«rotity  of: 

Library  of  thi  National 
Archival  of  Canada 

Tho  imagM  •ppoarlng  horo  aro  tho  »>•«  qu.lUy 
postibi*  eonaidoring  tho  condition  and  laglbillty 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  kaoping  with  tha 
filming  contract  apaclficationa. 

Original  eopiaa  In  printad  papor  covara  ara  fllmad 
baginning  with  tha  front  eovar  and  anding  on 
tha  iaat  paga  with  a  printad  or  llluatratad  imP'M- 
aion.  or  tha  back  covar  whan  appropriata.  All 
othar  original  coplaa  ara  fllmad  baginning  on  tha 
first  paga  whh  a  printad  or  llluatratad  impraa- 
sion.  and  anding  on  tha  last  paga  vthh  a  printad 
or  llluatratad  Imprasaion. 


Tha  last  racordad  frama  on  aach  microflcha 
shall  contain  tha  symbol  -^  '"'••"'"«  "SS-m 
TINUEO").  or  tha  symbol  ▼  (moaning    END  ». 
whichavar  applias. 

Mapa.  plataa.  charts,  ate.  may  ba  fllmad  at 
diffarant  raduction  ratios.  Thosa  too  larga  to  ba 
antiraly  Ineludad  in  ona  axpoaura  ara  film  »d 
baginning  in  tha  uppar  laft  hand  cornar,  laft  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  framas  as 
raquirad.  Tha  following  diagrams  lllustrata  tha 
mathod: 


L'axamplaira  filmi  fut  raproduit  grica  A  la 
ginArosit*  da: 

La  bibliothkiua  das  Archivt* 
nationaia*  du  Canada 

Las  imagas  suivantas  ont  it*  raproduitos  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattat*  da  l'axamplaira  film*,  at  an 
conformit*  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
fllmaga. 

Laa  axamplalras  originaux  dont  la  couvartura  an 
paplar  aat  imprimia  sont  filmis  an  commancant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  an  tarminant  soit  par  (a 
darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraaaion  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  la  sacond 
plat,  aalon  la  caa.  Toua  las  autras  axamplairas 
originaux  aont  fllm4s  an  commanpant  par  la 
pramlira  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraaaion  ou  d'illustration  at  an  tarminant  par 
la  darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  taiia 
amprainta. 

Un  daa  aymbolaa  auivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
darnlAra  imaga  da  chaqua  microficha.  salon  la 
cas:  la  symbols  -♦  signifia  "A  SUIVRE",  la 
aymbola  V  aignifia  "FIN". 

Laa  cartas,  planchaa,  tablaaux.  ate,  pauvant  «tra 
fllmte  i  daa  taux  da  reduction  diff*rants. 
Lorsqua  la  documant  ast  trop  grand  pour  *tra 
raproduit  an  un  aaul  cllch*,  il  ast  film*  *  partir 
da  I'angia  suoAriaur  gaucha,  da  gaucha  *  droits. 
at  da  haut  an  baa.  an  pranant  la  nombra 
d'imagaa  nicassaira.  Las  diagrammas  suivants 
illuatrant  la  mAthoda. 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

MICtOCOfV   RESOIUTION   TEST   CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TLST  CHART  No.  2) 


150 


*-     u 


12^ 

1.8 


13^ 
140 


j^     /APPLIED  irvHGE 


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a 
1 


TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN   EDITION 

•  * 
• 

VOLUME  «4 

THE  CHRO^ ICLES 

OP  AMERICA  SERIES 

ALLEN  JOHNSON 

EDITOR 

GKRHARD   II.   LOMKR 

CHARLKS  W.  JEFFERYS 

ASSISTANT  EDITORS 


I 


2 

3 


T 


TEXAS  AND 
FHE  MEXICAN  WAR 

A  CHRONICLE  OF 

THE  WINNING  OF  THE  SOUTHWEST 

BY  NATHANIEL  W.  STEPHENSON 


LVXET 


NEW  HAVEN:  YALE   UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

TORONTO:   GLASGOW.    BROOK  &   CO 

LONDON:  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

OXFORD   UNIVERSITY   PRESS 

19x1 


Copyright,  1921,  by  Yale  University  Press 


To 


HENRY  MASSINGBIRD  TUCKER 


-3 


CONTENTS 


I. 

II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 

XI. 

XII. 

XIII. 

XIV. 


THE  EMPRESARros 

THE  TLR.VING  I'OI.NT 

THE  I.VrO.MPATIBLES 

TEXAS  SECEDES 

HECOGMTIOX 

THE  MEXK  AN  SHADOW 

ENGLAND  AS  PEA(  E.MAKER 

THE  INTER.VATIONAL  C  FUSIS  OF  \BH 

THE  DOMESTIC  CRISIS  OF  1844 

AN  ADVEXTIRE  IN  I.MPERI/.i.ISM 

"THE  HERO  OK  BIEXA  VI.STA" 

THE  STROKE  KRO.M  THE  EAST 

THE  PIVOTAL  A(  TION 

THE  CONQIERED  PEACE 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

INDEX 


Pi»«r      I 
'      17 
'       !»* 
'       fl.J 
87 
110 

i«n 

140 
168 
177 

ins 

21A 
i3:^ 
248 
259 
263 


'  i' 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


SAM  HOrSTON 

Kni{ravinf<  from  a  ilagucrreotype. 

ANTOMO  LOPE^  DK  SANTA  ANNA 

\Vo.)(J  pngravir.g.  after  a  pholo„'r.  f  h.    In  the 
Print  Department  of  the  New  Vork  Public 


Fronti»pi(fe 


Library. 

DAVID  CROCKETT 

EnKraving  in  tae  collection  of  the  New  York 
IliMtoricul  Society.  •< 

THE  ALAMO 

Drawing  from  a  photograph.  " 

JOHN  tyli:r 

Painting  by  G.  P.  A.  Ilealy.    In  the  National 
Museum,  Washington.  •• 

JAMES  K.  POLK 

DaKucrrootype.  In  the  collection  of  L.  C. 
Handy,  Washington.  " 

ZACHARY  TAYLOR 

Painting  by  G.  P.  A.  Healy,  after  Amans. 
In  the  Corcoran  Gallery  of  Art,  Washington.    " 

WINFIELD  SCOTT 

Engraving  after  a  daguerreotype  taken  at 
the  time  of  the  Mexican  War.  In  the  Print 
Department  oftheNewYork  Public  Library.     " 

xi 


tacing  page   $2 


«i 


SO 


Hi 


ICO 


200 


208 


XII 


ILLLSTR  VTIONS 


COHKKT  E.  I,F,F;.  AT  TUB  TIMK  OF  TIIK 
MKXICAN  WAR 

Kiii.'r.tvinKfroniiiiiiiKUcrrent.vpf.  In  tlipcol- 
ic.-ti'>n  of  II.  I'.  Cook.  Hirhinomi,  Virnioia. 

I  LVSSKS  S.  GUANT.  ABOLT  IH».i 

TliP  I'urlipitt   pcirtrait  of  (irant.     Drawing 

frotu   ail    •■nKrnviiiK    after  n  ituttuerreutypc-, 

liubli.ihctl  in  (irunt'v  Memniri.  Facing  page   22i 

VIKW  OP  CHAIM  LTKPK(  AM)  MOLINO 
DI'.L  UKY.  AKTKIl  THF.  RATTLK  OF.Si:!'- 
TKMUKK  8.  1S47. 

LithoKraph  by  X.  Currier,  after  a  iketrh  by 
H.  Meendi-x,  ta'tea  frt>ri  Cuia  <l«l  Mata.  In 
the  Print  Diparrment  of  the  Librar)  of 
Coogreu,  Wa»hini,'ton.  "  "     t^O 


TKX.VS  AND  KASTKKN  MFAf'O:  1H:I-|S4m 

Muli  by  W.  L.  li.  Jcert(.  Ami-rii-ao  Ijeogrjph- 
ical  Society. 


i5'} 


TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 


CHAPTER  I 


THK   EMPRE8ARIOH 


That  American  diplomat  known  to  his  contem* 
poraries  as  "the  eel-like  Monroe"  gave  Manifest 
Destiny  a  deep  offense  which  popular  memory  has 
let  slip.  He  bartered  away,  as  his  enemies  said, 
our  claim  to  the  country  between  the  Sabine  and 
the  Rio  Grande.  However  shadowy  that  claiti 
was,  there  were  patriotic  Americans  in  the  year 
1819  who  wanted  the  country.  The  shadowiness 
of  the  claim  was  not  worth  mentioning,  they 
thought.  Napoleon  sold  us  something  in  the 
Southwest  and  surely  we,  with  ]V[ttpifesi  Destiny 
on  our  side,  were  the  best  judges  of  what  old 
Louisiana  included.  Monroe  took  a  narrower 
view;  and  when  he  acouired  Florida  from  Spain 
and  rounded  out  the  eastern  coast  line,  but  stopped 


2        TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

at  the  Sabine  on  the  west,  there  was  wrath  in  many 
American  hearts,  and  some  bold  Americans  were 
ready  to  stake  their  heads  for  the  rectification  of 
their  government's  error. 

One  of  these  was  James  Long,  who  led  a  filibus- 
tering expedition  across  the  Mexican  line  in  1819. 
Long's  exploit  was  the  outcome  of  a  public  meeting 
of  the  citizens  of  Natchez,  inspired  by  indignation 
over  Monroe's  policy.    The  little  army  of  adven- 
turers who  followed  Long  and  captured  the  Mexi- 
can frontier  town  of  Nacogdoches  was  strangely 
composed  and  acted  from  a  variety  of  motives. 
A  noted  Mexican  refugee,  Bernardo  Gutierrez  de 
Lara,  was  associated  with  Long  in  setting  up  a 
ready-made  government  on  the  American  model  to 
preside  over  the  new  "Republic  of  Texas"  which 
the  invaders  proclaimed  at  Nacogdoches.     This 
Gutierrez  had  been  involved  in  earlier  attempts  to 
overthrow  the  kingdom  of  New  Spain.    Doubtless 
to  some  of  Long's  followers  the  invasion  was  but  a 
detail  in  the  revolution  against  Spain  of  which 
they  dreamed  in  their  vision  of  a  new  and  greater 
Mexico.    Thus,  it  may  be,  starts  a  delusion  which 
we  shall  find  all  through  Texan  history  —  the  de- 
lusion that  a  genuine  republican  inspiration  was 
struggling  in  Mexico  with  reactionary  monarchism. 


i' 


THE  EMPRESARIOS  8 

Long's  republic  was  short-lived.  During  its  few 
months,  its  founder  revealed  that  deadly  serious 
naivete  which  appeared  so  often  in  Americans  of 
that  time.  Looking  about  for  an  ally,  Long  be- 
thought himself  of  the  last  great  pirate  of  American 
waters,  Jean  Lafitte,  who  flew  the  Jolly  Roger  over 
Galveston  Island.  Lafitte  had  a  pirate  town  there, 
and  for  a  while  was  a  sovereign  over  the  freebooters 
of  the  sea.  To  him  Long  appealed.  It  was  while 
Long  was  absent  negotiating  with  Lafitte  that  the 
soldiers  of  New  Spain  fell  upon  Nacogdoches, 
abolished  the  infant  republic,  and  drove  its  sur- 
vivors, whether  American  adventurers  or  Mexican 
dreamers,  helter-skelter  across  the  border. 

After  such  an  invasion  one  would  expect  the 
jealous  and  sensitive  Spaniards  to  be  intolerant 
of  everything  American.  Yet  the  excitement  of 
Long's  adventure  had  hardly  subsided  when  Moses 
Austin,  a  Connecticut  Yankee,  was  granted  per- 
mission to  establish  a  colony  of  Americans  inside 
the  borders  of  New  Spain.  Why  did  the  royal 
authorities  thus  contradict  the  logic  of  events.'' 
Their  archives  have  not  yet  disclosed  the  answer. 
Guesses  have  been  made,  some  of  which  must  be 
considered.  Did  the  Viceroy  of  New  Spain  think 
there  was  a  population  in  our  Southern  States, 


4        TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

royalist  and  Catholic,  averse  to  becoming  Ameri- 
cans and  willing  to  be  lured  back  into  the  mon- 
archical fold?  Did  he  feel  that  monarchical  reen- 
forcements  were  needed  in  Mexico  as  a  bulwark 
against  revolution?  Or  was  there  no  deeper  mo- 
tive behind  his  action  than  mere  favoritism?  Was 
it,  in  the  blunt  modern  phrase,  only  a  case  of 
"pull"?  The  fact  that  Austin  had  a  powerful 
friend  at  court,  a  certain  Baron  de  Bastrop,  fav- 
ors this  unromantic  suggestion.  The  riddle  is 
still  unread.  But  one  fact  is  clear  and  full  of 
significance:  Mexico  evidently  had  no  intention 
of  fostering  an  ;iiien  civilization;  she  prescribed 
methods  of  government  for  the  newcomers  and 
laid  upon  all  the  obligation  to  be,  or  to  become, 
members  of  the  national  church. 

Though  Moses  Austin  —  citizen  of  Connecticut, 
wanderer,  pioneer,  subject  of  Spain  in  old  Louis- 
iana, citizen  of  the  United  States  again  after  1803, 
and  promoter  of  many  ventures  —  obtained  the 
grant  fi  iii  New  Spain,  his  death  intervened  soon 
after;  and  it  was  his  son,  Stephen  F.  Austin,  who 
was  the  real  founder  of  Anglo-American  Texas. 
It  was  he  who  planted  the  first  American  settle- 
ment, San  Felipe  de  Austin,  in  December,  1821. 
Meanwhile  the  revolution  had  begun  which  was  to 


n 


THE  EMPRESARIOS  5 

result  in  the  independence  of  Mexico.    The  revo- 
lution seems  to  have  given  a  new  turn  to  the  deal- 
ings of  Stephen  Austin  with  the  authorities  of  New 
Spain.    In  the  spring  of  1822,  Stephen  Austin, 
while  busy  with  his  scheme  of  colonization,  was 
commanded  to  proceed  to  Mexico  Cit  -  to  negotiate 
direct  with  the  Congress  of  independent  Mexico. 
At  the  capital,  Austin  met  other  Americans  seek- 
ing, like  himself,  concessions  from  the  Mexican 
Government.    Chief  among  them  stood  that  shifty 
General  Wilkinson  who  had  drawn  Spanish  pay 
while  a  great  oflBcial  of  the  United  States,  who  had 
left  h-    country  for  his  country's  good,  and  who 
was  now  on  a  hazard  of  new  fortunes  beyond  the 
Spanish  line.    There,  too,  was  Hayden  Edwards, 
destined  to  become  the  enemy  of  Austin  and  to 
play  a  strange  role  in  the  history  of  Texas,  perhaps 
even  a  deeply  significant  one.    Other  adventurers 
surrounded  these  conspicuous  figures.     All  were 
clamoring  for  grants  from  the  new  government. 
Among  the  Mexican  revolutionists  there  was  eager 
discussion  of  many  things,  ranging  from  the  prac- 
ticality of  the  schemes  of  the  adventurers  to  s>uch 
high  subjects  as  the  republican  ideal  and  the  merits 
and  demerits  of  slavery.    In  the  midst  of  this  tur- 
moil of  conflicting  interests  Austin  found  no  one  in 


if 

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6        TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

a  hurry  to  translate  his  informal  agreement  with 
the  old  authorities  into  a  formal  agreement  with 
the  new. 

While  Austin  waited  at  the  capital  a  second  revo- 
lution changed  the  new  republic  into  an  empire, 
and  General  Iturbide  became  the  Emperor  Agustin 
I.  But  Iturbide's  government  set  the  example  for 
so  many  later  governments  of  Mexico  by  quickly 
collapsing.  A  second  Mexican  republic  was  set 
up  and  in  1824  a  federal  constitution  was  adopted. 
The  old  Spanish  provinces  were  formed  into  states 
one  of  which  included  the  three  former  provinces, 
Texas,  Nuevo  Leon,  and  Coahuila.  Though 
Nuevo  Leon  was  soon  detached,  the  other  two 
remained  one  state  until  Texas  ceased  to  be  a  part 
of  Mexico. ' 

One  of  the  last  acts  of  the  reign  of  Iturbide  was 
a  decr<^e  granting  Austin  the  right  to  form  a  colony 
of  *  .uericans  in  Texas  and  prescribing  the  main 
imes  upon  which  the  new  community  was  to  be 
constructed  (February  18,  1823).    What  is  known 


•  See  the  accompanying  map.  The  state  was  divided  into  three 
districts,  those  of  Bexar,  Monclova,  and  Saltillo.  The  district  of 
Bexmr  had  the  boundaries  of  the  old  royal  province  of  Texas. 
When  the  new  state  of  Coahuila-Texas  began,  its  legislature  con- 
tained eleven  members,  of  which  only  two  were  allotted  to  the 
district  of  Bexar. 


r 


THE  EMPRESARIOS  7 

as  the  Imperial  Colonization  Law  of  1823  had  been 
passed  a  few  weeks  before.  The  provisions  of  the 
law  and  of  the  decree,  so  far  as  Austin  was  afiFected, 
were  confirmed  by  the  Congress  of  the  republic 
when  Ittirbide  fell. 

The  imperial  decree  carrying  out  the  provisions 
of  the  colonization  law  instructed  the  Governor  of 
Texas  to  apportion  land  either  directly  among 
immigrant  families  or  indirectly  through  empre- 
sarios  who  should  agree  to  bring  in  not  less  than 
two  hundred  families.  Each  family  was  to  adopt 
as  its  occupation  either  farming  or  grazing.  Each 
farming  family  was  to  have  177  acres  of  land;  each 
grazing  family,  4428  acres.  Austin,  if  he  brought 
in  as  many  as  two  hundred  families,  was  to  have 
354  acres  of  farm  land  and  about  66,000  acres  of 
grazing  land.  All  his  immigrants  were  to  "prove 
that  they  are  Roman  Apostolic  Catholics,  and  of 
steady  habits,"  and  he  was  to  found  a  town,  or- 
ganize his  colonists  as  a  militia,  preserve  order,  and 
administer  justice. 

The  land  granted  to  Austin,  which  was  rapidly 
taken  up  by  his  colonists,  lay  between  the  San 
Jacinto  and  Lavaca  rivers,  on  the  Gulf  side  of  the 
one  Texan  highway,  the  trail  from  Nacogdoches 
to  San  Antonio.   His  capital  was  the  nev/  town,  on 


8        TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
the  Brazos  River,  San  Felipe  de  Austin.     For  the 
government  of  his  colony  Austin  himself  drew  up  a 
code  of  laws  almost  paternal  in  temper,  including  a 
prohibition  of  gambling  and  imprisonment  for  debt. 
In  1824  the  Mexican  Republic  enacted  a  coloni- 
zation law  similar  to  the  former  imperial  law,  but 
leaving  many  details  to  the  local  authorities.    Be- 
tween the  lines  of  this  law  we  glimpse  a  shadow  of 
uneasiness.     Mexico  reserved  the  right  to  "take 
such  precautionary  measures  as  it  may  deem  ex- 
pedient for  the  security  of  the  confederation,  in 
respect  to  the  foreigners  who  may  settle  within  it." 
The  question  whether  slavery  should  be  continued 
in  Mexico  had  already  been  raised.    The  national 
colonization  laws  were  silent  on  the  subject.    A 
state  colonization  law  of  Coahuila  and  Texas, 
enacted  in  1825,  provided  merely  that,  "in  regard 
to  the  introduction  of  slaves,  the  new  settlers  shall 
subject  themselves  to  the  laws  that  are  now,  and 
shall  be  hereafter  established  on  the  subject."    The 
newcomers  did  not  hesitate  to  bring  with  them 
their  slaves. 

The  Texas  that  was  the  consequence  of  these 
laws  was  a  mosaic.  Theoretically  a  Spanish  coun- 
try, it  was  dotted  with  colonies  of  foreigners. 
Each  colony  formed  a  tiny  state  embedded  in 


THE  EMPRESARIOS  9 

the  recognized  state  of  Coahuila  and  Texas.  To 
establish  the  colony  an  empresario  or  contractor 
was  empowered  to  bring  in  a  stated  number  of 
families  and  to  allot  to  each  family  a  specified 
amount  of  land  within  a  definite  area.  This  group 
was  given  local  rights  simi.ar  to  those  of  other 
Mexican  communities,  with  an  ayuntamiento  or 
local  council,  elected  by  the  people. 

The  purpose  of  the  Mexican  republicans  in  per- 
mitting the  creation  of  these  colonies  of  foreigners 
has  not  been  explained  any  more  than  have  the 
purposes  of  the  royalists  who  began  the  work  by 
encouraging  Austin.  The  Spanish  tradition  ran 
counter  to  such  a  policy.  If  circumstantial  evi- 
dence counts  for  anything,  the  Mexican  authorities 
had  some  vision  of  a  new  regime  which  Americans 
do  not  yet  understand.  One  thing  is  certain :  they 
had  no  intention  to  leave  the  colonies  permanently 
separate  from  the  rest  of  the  population.  Only  the 
Spanish  language  was  to  be  used  in  public  trans- 
actions. A  colonist  who  married  a  Mexican  was 
allowed  more  land  than  one  who  did  not.  All  the 
laws  repeated  or  implied  the  provision  of  the  origi- 
nal grant  to  Austin,  which  laid  down  as  "the  first 
and  priu^ipal  requisite  for  colonists  that  of  being 
Catholics  or  agreeing  to  become  so." 


10      TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

It  was  under  these  laws  thai  Americans  crowded 
into  Texas  from  1822  forv  9r-J.  Here  appears  one 
of  the  shadowy  places  in  Texan  history.  How  ex- 
act was  their  knowledge  of  the  situatio-  "  What 
was  their  conception  of  the  obligat'  .he  laws 
required  them  to  assume?  Did  all  of  tl.em,  did 
even  most  of  them,  know  they  were  supposed  to 
join  the  Church  of  Rome?  The  old  style  historian, 
with  his  eyes  fixed  on  slavery  and  on  constitutional 
issues,  ignored  these  questions  and  the  new  his- 
torians have  not  yet  answered  them.  Why  Mexico, 
after  hedging  these  aliens  about  with  such  stringent 
regulations,  left  them  for  a  number  of  years  to  their 
own  devices,  letting  them  come  as  they  chose  with- 
out enforcing  the  restrictive  laws  —  all  this  still 
awaits  research. 

Whatever  motive  may  have  guided  them,  thou- 
sands of  Americans  felt  an  irresistible  desire  to 
pitch  their  tents  in  the  sunset.  From  every  section, 
from  every  class,  pilgrims  were  drawn  to  Texas, 
the  very  seat  of  fortune  in  the  American  mind 
during  the  twenties.  Its  noble  woods,  its  great 
prairies,  the  land  that  could  be  had  for  next  to 
nothing  —  these  were  potent  magnets.  Further- 
more, it  was  the  land  of  romance,  of  mystery.  It 
was  the  borderland  of  the  strange  Spanish  world. 


THE  EMPRESARIOS  H 

To  the  adventurous  soul,  it  called  in  the  deep  mur- 
mur of  the  forest,  in  the  wind  across  the  trackless 
prairie  —  "I  am  the  Unknown!"  To  the  dream- 
er of  democracy,  it  whispered  grimly  of  possible 
revolution,  of  the  last  death-struggle  between  the 
people  and  the  kings.  The  upholder  of  slavery 
saw  in  Texas  a  possible  new  lease  of  life  for  his 
peculiar  institution.  The  abolitionist  saw  in  it  the 
possibility  of  a  new  free  State.  The  patriot  of  sec- 
tionalism, if  a  Southerner,  dreamed  of  expand- 
ing his  section  by  the  addition  of  ae  Southwest. 
Another  sort  of  patriot,  believing  ardently  that 
Texas  had  been  filched  from  his  country  by  diplo- 
macy, turned  westward,  resolute  to  recover  it, 
whether  by  fair  means  or  by  foul.  Young  and  old, 
rich  and  poor,  wise  and  foolish,  a  great  host  of 
Americans  poured  into  the  colonies  of  Texas  in  the 
high  days  of  the  twenties. 

Out  of  the  crowd  of  empresarios,  the  leaders  of 
this  migration,  two  men  stand  forth  as  makers  of 
history.  These  were  the  younger  Austin  and 
Hayden  Edwards.  The  character  and  adventures 
of  Stephen  Austin  will  one  day  inform  a  biography 
of  singular  interest.  For  the  present  he  is  eclipsed, 
or  nearly  so,  by  that  bolder,  more  bulky  personality 
which  dominates  the  later  history  of  Texas,  Sam 


AMitaiHMi 


1«      TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Houston.  But  Austin  will  eventually  come  to  hia 
own.  A  resolute,  but  also  a  patient  man,  he  may 
not  have  equaled  Houston  in  driving  force;  but  in 
steadfastness  he  was  second  to  none.  From  the 
start  to  the  finish  he  was  true  to  his  conception  ol 
his  obligation  to  Mexico.  For  this  we  have  hia 
own  words,  and  he  was  a  man  of  principle  whose 
words  must  be  accepted.  But  just  what  his  con- 
ception was  it  is  not  easy  to  say.  Though  he  made 
a  hard  and  fast  religious  agreement  with  Mexico, 
he  did  not  live  up  to  it,  and  there  seems  little  doubt 
that  he  felt  free  to  disregard  it.  Strangely  enough, 
his  biographers,  apparently  indifferent  on  this 
point,  have  never  troubled  themselves  to  go  in 
search  of  his  own  defense;  their  lightly  sketched, 
half-articulate  explanations  leave  the  subject  dark. 
That  he  probably  considered  the  religious  agree- 
ment a  conventional  survival  of  the  old  order  which 
was,  as  he  thought,  perishing  in  Mexico  and  which 
he  believed  would  vanish  presently  along  with  last 
night's  darkness  —  that  he  interpreted  r.s  evidence 
of  this,  Mexico's  utter  failure  to  enforce  the  agree- 
ment —  is  at  present  a  plausible  hypothesis.  What 
is  definite,  what  sets  him  off  in  sharp  contrast  with 
Edwards,  is  his  resolute  attempt  to  become  part  of 
Mexico.    Neither  Austin  nor  Mexico  understood 


THE  EMPRESARIOS  18 

the  other.  Mexico  did  not  realize  that  it  was  under- 
mining itself  by  introducing  the  Americans.  Aus- 
tin saw  no  rv'ason  why  the  two  races  with  their 
differing  civilizations  should  not  occupy  the  .same 
territory,  and  though  with  the  simplicity  of  his 
period  he  understood  himself  as  little  as  Mexico 
did,  he  fought  hard  to  maintain  t.  .•  imfjossible  new 
condition  —  impossible  for  reasons  that  will  de- 
velop as  the  tale  proceeds  —  and  struck  hard  at 
the  first  head  reared  in  opposition. 

Edwards,  on  the  other  hand,  was  among  those 
who  looked  upon  the  Mexicans  a.s  the  real  intruders 
north  of  the  Rio  Grande,  upon  themselves  as  the 
rightful  owners  of  the  soil,  and  upon  the  possession 
of  it  as  their  chief  aim  in  life.  His  previous  history 
is  obscure.  Henry  Yoakum,  the  early  historian  of 
Texas,  calls  him  "a  wealthy  and  intelligent  gen- 
tleman." His  enemy,  Austin,  accused  him  of  hav- 
ing been  a  professional  gambler  at  Mexico  City. 
He  was  one  of  the  adventurers  who  surrounded  the 
sinister  figure  of  Wilkinson  during  the  intrigues 
there  in  1823.  He  had  succeeded  in  getting  himself 
made  an  empresario  and  had  fixed  the  site  of  his 
colony — perhaps  by  design,  perhaps  by  accident — 
as  close  as  possible  to  the  bou.idary  of  Louisiana 
and  near  to  Nacogdoches,  which  had  been  the  seat 


14      TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

of  Long's  short-lived  republic.   That  Edwards  had 

I   ng'n  adventure  in  mind  is  not  unlikely. 

On  the  face  of  the  record  the  revolt  of  ITayden 
Edwards  and  his  followers  against  the  RepubUe 
of  Mexico,  which  followed,  grew  out  of  the  ques- 
tion of  land  titles.     The  region  in  which  Edwards'a 
colony  was  situated  had  suffered  for  twenty  yean 
from  others  besides  Long.     Many  of  the  native 
landowners  had  fled  from  their  homes.     Neverthe- 
less, their  lands  still  belonged  to  them.   In  selecting 
land  for  his  colonists,  Edwards  was  naturally  re- 
quired to  avoid  the  holdings  of  these  absentees. 
But  he  did  not  do  so.    AVas  it  merely  because  he 
was  a  rough  man  with  a  high  temper?    This  easy 
explanation  is  not  wholly  satisfactory.     In  the 
minds  of  most  of  the  Americans  who  went  to  Texas 
was  fixed  the  idea  that  the  earth  belongs  to  him 
who  gives  it  value.    Edwards  and  his  associates 
looked  upon  themselves  as  the  sole  creators  of  land- 
value  in  their  colony,  and  the  return  of  Mexicans 
who  had  failed  to  hold  their  own  was  to  them  as 
the  red  rag  that  inflames  the  bull.     Finally,  many 
honestly  believed  that  the  soil  belonged  to  the 
United  States,  that  all  good  Americans  thought  so, 
and  that  any  one  who  did  not  was  a  poltroon.  Now 
and  then  in  history  a  bold  adventurer  has  risked 


THE  EMPRESARIOft  M 

his  head  in  nn  attempt  to  commit  his  country  to 
an  extreme  course.  He  puts  his  life  on  the  hazard, 
believing  his  countrymen,  whatever  their  attitude 
hitherto,  will  be  so  wrought  upon  by  his  daring 
that  they  will  take  up  his  battle  cry  and  spring  to 
ami»  It  will  up[)eur  in  a  moment  that  Edwards 
conceivably  was  one  of  these  great  gamblers. 

A  decree  of  the  Governor  of  the  slate  canceled 
Edwards's  contract  and  ordered  him  out  of  the 
country.  Edwards  demanded  the  privilege  of  ap- 
peal to  the  Federal  Government.  The  Governor 
replied  that  he  might  do  what  he  pleased  hereafter, 
but  now  he  must  go.  Edwards's  first  thought  seems 
to  hove  been  that  all  Americans  in  all  the  colonies 
would  stand  by  him.  He  sent  posthaste  to  Austin 
for  assistance,  which  was  instantly  refused.  There- 
upon Edwards  put  his  head  on  the  hazard.  With  a 
mere  handful  of  followers  he  seized  the  town  of 
Nacogdoches  and  proclaimed  an  independent  re- 
public which  he  styled  l"'redonia.  For  assistance 
against  Mexico,  he  appealed  to  Americans  every- 
where and  even  contracted  an  alliance  with  the 
Cherokee  Indians.  He  succeeded  in  raising  an 
army  of  two  hundred  men.  Or.  December  21, 1826, 
the  Republic  of  Fredonia,  in  true  American  style, 
adopted  a  complete  constitution. 


ill 


16       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

The  revolt  was  quickly  put  down.  Not  only  did 
the  colonists  fail  to  respond  to  Edwards's  appeal, 
but  Austin  helped  to  raise  a  considerable  force  that 
joined  the  Mexicans  in  an  attack  on  Nacogdoches. 
Edwards  at  that  moment  was  seeking  aid  across 
the  near  border,  in  Louisiana.  But  before  the 
end  of  January  all  was  over.  The  former  empre- 
sario  was  a  landless  man  on  the  east  side  of  the  Sa- 
bine and  his  handful  of  followers  were  dispersed 
or  prisoners. 

And  yet  Hayden  Edwards  had  made  history. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE   TURNING   POINT 


The  Fredonian  revolt  was  the  sensation  of  the 
hour  both  in  the  United  States  and  in  Mexico. 
American  newspapers  in  1827  teemed  with  reports 
of  the  "Fredonian  War"  —  the  war  of  two  hun- 
dred men  against  a  nation  —  and  with  expressions 
of  sympathy  with  the  Fredonians.  The  American 
people,  having  in  them  the  egoistic  passion  of  the 
Lord's  Anointed,  saw  nothing  of  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Mexicans.  Democracy,  freedom  of  the  in- 
dividual, as  Americans  conceived  it,  was  for  them 
the  supreme  law.  No  delicate  questions  of  legal 
right  or  of  the  political  duty  of  the  revolters  were 
allowed  to  color  the  main  theme.  In  sharpest 
black  and  white  the  ardent  Americans  of  1827  pic- 
tured their  kinsmen  defeated  in  Mexico  as  apostles 
of  democracy  crushed  by  an  alien  civilization. 

Mexico  took  alarm.     A  startled  consciousness 
seized  the  Mexican  leaders  that  their  colonizing 

a  17 


18       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
policy  had  overshot  the  mark.    In  their  eflFort  to 
get  a  hardy  new  population  they  had  created  a 
power  that  now  threatened  to  turn  and  rend  them. 
It  was  the  story  of  Frankenstein  translated  into 
terms  of  politics.    Immediately  there  was  proposed 
the  simple  but  now  dangerous  course  of  revers- 
ing the  colonization  policy  and  prohibiting  further 
immigration  from  the  United  States.     Obregon 
the  Mexican  Minister  at  Washington,  reporting  to 
his   Government   the   widespread   sympathy   for 
Fredonia  in  the  United  States,  gave  as  the  only 
solution  the  closing  of  the  Mexican  frontier  against 
Americans.    In  the  Mexican  Congress  the  Wash- 
mgton   Government   was   bluntly   charged   with 
complicity  in  the  Fredonian  war.     A  powerful 
newspaper  at  Mexico  City,  El  Sol,  put  the  accusa- 
tion mto  public  print.    The  President  of  Mexico 
told  the  American  Minister,  Joel  R.  Poinsett,  he 
did  not  believe  the  charge  but  said  he  hoped  the 
President  of  the  United  States  would  publicly 
deny  it. 

As  early  as  February.  1827,  indeed,  Obregon  had 
interviewed  Henry  Clay,  Secretary  of  State,  hoping 
for  such  a  denial.  He  wished  to  be  reassured  that 
he  was  right  in  thinking  that  the  United  States 
Government  had  no  official  connection  with  the 


V 

I 


THE  TURNING  POINT  19 

Fredonian  revolt.  Clay  in  perfect  sincerity  gave 
him  "the  assurance  .  .  .  that  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  has  not  given  the  slightest  coun- 
tenance or  encouragement  to  these  disturbances." 
The  Minister  wrote  home  that  he  believed  Clay. 
But  he  knew  something  of  American  history.  He 
knew  that  immigrants  from  the  United  States, 
settled  in  Spanish  territory,  had  in  tijies  past 
stirred  up  revolts,  and  that  those  revolts  had  in- 
creased the  international  tension  which  finally  led 
to  the  American  occupation  of  the  Floridas.  What- 
ever the  Government  of  the  United  States  might 
do  or  not  do,  the  people  wanted  Texas,  just  as  they 
had  wanted  Florida;  their  hearts  were  with  their 
kinsmen  beyond  the  Sabine;  and  Mexico  must  put 
herself  on  guard. 

At  this  juncture  the  Administration  at  Wash- 
ington made  a  bad  blunder.  For  all  their  imposing 
talents,  n  John  Quincy  Adams  at  the  White 

House  nor.  Clay  in  the  Department  of  State, 

had  the  essential  qualities  of  the  diplomat.  They 
were  both  racial  egoists,  unable  to  understand  an 
alien  race.  Unfortunately  the  Minister  at  Mexico 
shared  their  limitation.  He  had  misunderstood 
the  Mexican  character  so  thoroughly  that  his  dis- 
patches to  C      created  at  Washington  the  false 


20       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

impression  on  which  Adams  and  Clay  now  decided 
to  act.  Nearly  two  years  earlier  Poinsett  had 
written  to  Clay  that,  in  spite  of  intense  contrary 
feeling,  Mexico  would  soon  find  Texas  such  a 
thorny  problem  that  she  would  consent  to  part 
with  it.  Clay  apparently  reasoned  that  all  Mexico 
had  needed  was  a  demonstration  of  her  diflficulties 
in  Texas,  which  he  thought  she  now  had,  "Im- 
pressed with  these  views,"  he  wrote  to  Poinsett, 
"the  President  has  thought  that  the  present  might 
be  an  auspicious  period  for  urging  a  negotiation 
at  Mexico,  to  settle  the  boundaries  between  the 
two  republics." 

This  proposal  sounds  innocent  enough,  but  the 
conditions  of  the  moment  gave  it  a  sinister  mean- 
ing. Once  the  United  States  had  claimed  the  Rio 
Grande  as  the  boundary  of  Louisiana.  The  with- 
drawal to  the  river  Sabine,  and  the  acceptance  of 
that  line  in  the  treaty  of  1819  had  been  bitter- 
ly denounced  in  the  United  States.  Thousands 
of  Americans  believed  that  they  were  entitled  to 
"recover"  the  territory  between  the  Sabine  and 
the  Rio  Grande.  On  the  other  hand,  when  Poin- 
sett first  began  sounding  the  Mexican  Government 
on  the  subject,  he  found  a  very  different  idea.  The 
Mexicans  made  an  astonishing  claim.    They  held 


iV 


THE  TURNING  POINT  il 

that  the  King  of  Spain  never  had  authority  to 
alienate  any  part  of  the  Spanish  domain  in  America, 
that  the  treaty  of  1819  was  therefore  null  and  not 
binding  on  Mexico;  and  it  was  even  intimated  that 
the  true  boundary  between  the  two  countries  was 
the  old  line  of  the  treaty  of  1795  which  would  ex- 
tend Mexico  to  the  Mississippi.  There  were  still 
other  considerations.  The  story  of  Poinsett  in 
Mexico  is  a  strange  and  obscure  tale.  He  was 
accused  of  taking  part  in  Mexican  politics.  In 
1827  rumors  about  his  political  improprieties  were 
a  floating  scandal  at  Mexico  City.  That  there  was 
foundation  for  them  he  himself  confessed  in  a  letter 
to  President  Adams.  He  told  of  his  attempt  to 
rally  and  consolidate  the  friends  of  "our  Republi- 
can principles"  in  Mexico  by  drawing  them  into  a 
grand  lodge  of  York  Freemasons  that  was  to  rival 
the  older  Mexican  foundation  of  Scottish  Rite 
Freemasons.  The  branches  of  the  Masonic  body 
thus  arrayed  against  each  other  became  the  bases 
of  two  political  parties.  No  wonder  Poinsett's 
most  careful  critic  calls  his  course  "amazingly 
imprudent." 

In  the  spring  of  1827  Mexico  still  withheld 
its  endorsement  from  the  treaty  of  1819  and  ^he 
United  States  had  not  accepted  a  commercial 


22       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

treaty  negotiated  by  Poinsett  the  year  before;  and 
the  bitterness  over  Fredonia  still  charged  the  air 
when  President  Adams,  through  Clay,  directed 
Poinsett  to  offer  Mexico  in  return  for  all  the  Texan 
country  to  the  banks  of  the  Rio  Grande  the 
princely  sum  of  one  million  dollars.  But  opinion 
in  Mexico  with  regard  to  the  boundary  had  crys- 
tallized;  to  meet  the  United  States  at  the  Sabine 
and  fight  it  out  there  became  the  accepted  policy. 
In  April  the  Mexican  Congress  resolved  that  it 
would  not  complete  the  commercial  treaty  unless 
the  United  States  pledged  itself  to  accept  the  Sa- 
bine as  a  boundary.  In  the  following  month  Poin- 
sett began  sounding  the  minds  of  the  Mexican 
statesmen  on  the  subject  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and 
was  soon  convinced  that  the  project  was  hopeless 
—  at  least  for  the  present  —  and  then,  he  wrote 
Clay,  he  "abandoned  it  altogether."  A  premature 
statement,  as  we  shall  see. 

So  lacking  in  diplomatic  prescience  were  all  three 
of  the  American  managers  that  they  saw  nothing 
suspicious  in  the  next  move  made  by  Mexico.  A 
Mexican  commission  started  northward  in  the 
autumn  of  1827  to  examine  the  country  along  the 
proposed  boundary.  Nothing  suspicious  in  this! 
Yet  at  that  very  time  Poinsett  wTote  that  the  only 


THE  TURNING  POINT  «S 

thing  to  do  was  to  accept  the  Hne  of  the  Sabine  and 
complete  the  pending  commercial  treaty  on  that 
understanding.  Early  in  18-28,  Mexico  met  Poin- 
sett on  his  new  ground,  accepted  his  proposition, 
agreed  to  the  revised  commercial  treaty  and  to 
another,  destined  to  be  known  as  the  Treaty  of 
Limits,  fi.Jng  the  boundary  at  the  Sabine. 

This  action,  however,  did  not  turn  the  course  of 
the  Mexican  boundary  commissioner,  Don  Man- 
uel de  Mier  y  Teran,  a  learned  and  able  man, 
devotedly  patriotic.  lie  continued  his  leisurely 
journey  through  Texas  to  Nacogdoches  where  in 
1827  a  small  Mexican  force  commanded  by  Colonel 
Piedras  had  been  stationed.  This  officer  was  often 
involved  unpleasantly  with  the  colonists  of  that 
region,  who  wanted  to  know  why  his  garrison  was 
there.  It  may  have  been  this  that  moved  the 
Mexican  authorities  to  instruct  Teran  as  follows: 
"Further,  the  Government  desires  that  Your  Ex- 
cellency in  passing  beyond  the  frontiers  which  we 
actually  hold,  will  report  whether  or  not  there  is 
any  necessity  for  fortifying  any  jioints  along  the 
same  for  the  necessity  of  the  interior,  once  the 
exact  boundary  is  established."  About  the  mid- 
dle of  the  next  year,  having  finished  his  "geo- 
graphical investigation,"  Teran  sent  to  Mexico 


1 


24       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

a  long  and  interesting  description  of  the  Texan 
community. 

As  one  covers  the  distance  from  B^jar  to  this  town 
[Nacogdoches],  he  will  note  that  Mexican  influence  is 
proportionately  diminished  until  on  arriving  at  this 
place  he  will  see  that  it  is  almost  nothing.  .  .  .  The 
ratio  of  Mexicans  to  foreigners  is  one  to  ten.  .  .  . 
The  Mexicans  of  this  town  comprising  .  ,  .  the  low- 
est class.  .  .  .  The  naturalized  North  Americans  in 
the  town  maintain  an  English  school,  and  send  their 
children  north  for  further  education.  .  .  .  Thus  I 
tell  myself  that  it  could  not  be  otherwise  than  that 
from  such  a  state  of  affairs  should  arise  an  antago- 
nism between  the  Mexicans  and  the  foreigners  which 
is  not  the  least  of  the  smouldering  fires  I  have  dis- 
covered. Therefore,  I  now  warn  you  to  take  timely 
measures.  Texas  could  throw  the  whole  nation  into 
revolution.  .  .  . 

The  wealthy  Americans  of  Louisiana  and  other 
Western  states  are  anxious  to  secure  land  in  Texas  for 
speculation  but  they  are  restrained  by  the  laws  pro- 
hibiting slavery.  If  these  laws  should  be  repealed  — 
which  God  forbid  —  in  a  few  years  Texas  would  be  a 
powerful  state  which  could  compete  in  wealth  and  pro- 
ductions with  Louisiana.  The  repeal  of  these  laws  is  a 
point  toward  which  the  colonists  are  directing  their 
efforts.  They  have  already  succeeded  in  getting  from 
the  Congress  of  Coahuila  a  law  very  favorable  to  their 
prosperity;  the  state  government  has  declared  that  it 
will  recognize  contracts  made  with  servants  before 
coming  to  this  country,  and  the  colonists  are  thus 


iN 


THE  TURNING  POINT 


«3 


assured  of  ample  labor  which  can  be  secured  at  a  very 
low  price  in  the  United  States. 

Among  the  ideas  which  were  taking  form  in  the 
alert  mind  of  Teran,  here  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant.   The  Texans  had  a  great  economic  ad- 
vantage over  the  rest  of  Mexico  in  their  possession 
of  slaves.    And  they  were  holding  slaves  in  defiance 
of  Mexican  national      v.    Local  laws  also  in  theory 
had  abolished  slaver        The  state  constitution  of 
Coahuila  and  Texas,  adopted  in  1827,  emancipated 
all  future  children  of  slaves  and  forbade  bringing 
in ' '  ^"'s  after  six  months.    But  the  influence  of  the 
Texaus  had  brought  about  the  other  slavery  law 
to  which  Teran  refers.     This  piece  of  legislation 
was  not  two  months  old,  when  Teran  singled  it 
out  as  dangerous.    Under  this  law,  the  newcomer 
from  the  United  States  just  before  crossing  the 
border  made  a  contract  with   his  slaves,  which 
the  State  of  Coahuila  would  respect.    Thus  slave- 
holding  settlers  continued  to  come  in.    Teran  saw 
the  difference  in  prosperity  between  Texas  and 
Mexico  and  fixed  on  the  labor  supply  as  the  prime, 
though  not  the  only,  cause;  and  to  destroy  the 
supply  of  slave  labor  in  Texas  became  henceforth 
one  of  his  chief  designs. 

In  the  spring  of  1829  Teran  left  Texas.    He  and 


n 


«fl   TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Austin  hud  become  frionds.  That  his  visit  had 
made  history,  and  that  it  was  the  beginning  of  the 
end  of  their  peace,  had  prol)ab!y  not  entered  the 
minds  of  any  of  the  Texans  who  had  been  the  hosts 
of  this  aeeomphshed  and  delightful  gentleman. 

The  year  18i2f)  was  eventful  in  the  history  of 
Texas,  Mexico,  and  the  United  States.  In  that 
year  Spain  made  an  attempt  to  reconquer  Mexico 
—  a  wholly  foolish  endeavor  that  began  in  July  and 
collapsed  in  September  at  Tampico,  without  ap- 
parent result  except  a  great  reputation  for  the 
Mexican  general,  Santa  Anna.  Second  in  com- 
mand against  the  invaders  was  Teran.  The  re- 
pulse of  the  Spaniards  left  him  a  conspicuous  fig- 
ure as  commandante  general  of  the  Eastern  States 
of  Mexico. 

!  vas  while  the  Spanish  fiasco  was  in  progress 
that  a  momentous  interview  took  place  at  Wash- 
ington. Andrew  Jackson,  now  six  months  Presi- 
dent, gave  audience  to  an  adventurer  named  An- 
thony Butler  and  was  wholly  persuaded  by  him. 
Butler  had  been  in  Texas.  He  was  confident  that 
all  Adams  had  failed  to  do  two  years  before  could 
yet  be  done  —  only  the  price  must  be  raised.  Give 
him  five  million  dollars  instead  of  one  million,  and 
he  would  deliver  Texas  into  Jackson  .,  hands. 


THE  TURNING  POINT  «7 

A  critic  has  written  of  Butlor  l..at  "he  lacked 

moral  character  and  fitness  for  any  position  of 

trust"  an-1  "was  charged  with  being  a  speculator 

in  Texan  lands,  u  gambler,  a  drunkard,  and  a  liar." 

Jackson  himself  finally  flubbe<l  IJutler  a  liar;  but 

that  was  after  they  had  fallen  out .    In  lH'i\)  Butler 

convinced  both  Jackson  and  his  Secretary  of  State, 

Martin  Van  Buren.    Now  followed  a  repetition  of 

the  diplomatic  blunder  of  1827.    Just  as  Adams 

and  Clay  at  precisely  the  wrong  moment  followed 

up  the  vagaries  of  Poinsett,  so  now,  at  an  even 

n\ore  critical  time,  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  became 

fatuous  disciples  of  a  commercial-diplomatic  soldier 

of  fortune.    To  Poinsett,  still  at  Mexico  City,  they 

addressed  instructions,  which  Butler  was  to  deliver, 

to  try  again  to  purchase  Texas. 

During  the  two  years  since  Poinsett  "aban- 
doned" the  scheme,  while  the  gracious  spy  Teran 
was  in  Texas,  the  relations  between  Washington 
and  Mexico  had  again  become  strained.  A  scries  of 
small  filibustering  expeditions,  all  starting  cither 
from  or  near  New  Orleans,  had  irritated  the  Mexi- 
can authorities.  Within  a  month  of  the  conference 
between  Jackson  and  Butler,  the  Mexican  authori- 
ties complained  that  recruits  for  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment were  being  gathered  at  New  Orleans  and 


rVi 


88  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
that  there  were  suspicious  military  preparaMons 
at  other  places  in  the  United  States.  Poinsett 
vigorously  denied  that  these  reports  were  well 
founded.  But,  the  (juarrel  between  him  and  the 
^'exican  authorities  had  now  run  its  venomous 
course  to  an  irreconcilable  is.sue.  While  Butler 
was  on  his  way  to  Mexico,  President  Guerrero 
demanded  Poinsett's  recall.  Jackson  immediately 
complied  and  appointed  Butler  in  his  place. 

Another  cause  of  friction  between  the  repub- 
lics was  the  treatment  of  the  two  treaties  nego- 
tiated by  Poinsett.    President  Adams,  accepting 
the  second  thought  of  Poinsett,  had  dropped  the 
matter  of  the  Texas  purchase,  and  submitted  his 
treaties  to  the  Senate.    The  treaties  provided  that 
ratifications  should  be  exchanged  at  Washington 
within  four  months  of  the  close  of  negotiations  at 
Mexico  City,  which  would  be  May  12,  1828.    The 
Senate  promptly  authorized  ratification,  but  the 
Mexicans  were  so  slow  that  their  ratification  did 
not  reach  Washington  until  August,  after  the  Sen- 
ate had  adjourned.    Negotiation  could  be  revived 
only  by  submitting  the  treaties  to  the  next  ses- 
sion of  Congress.  Before  then,  the  presidential  elec- 
tion took  place,  Jackson  triumphed  over  Adams, 
and  the  latter  determined  to  hand  over  the  Texan 


J I 


THR  TURNING  POINT  «9 

question  in  all  its  thornine!4.<«  to  hi:*  Muccc«sful  rival. 
When  Jackson's  strange  ministor,  Anthony  Butler, 
succeeded  Poinsett  late  in  1829,  he  found  himself 
in  the  same  situation  as  his  predecessor  two  years 
before.  Two  treaties  were  hanging  fire;  both  coun- 
tries carried  chips  on  their  shoulders;  the  United 
States,  though  innocent  of  any  hostile  act  toward 
Mexico,  was  scheming  to  profit  by  her  distress. 
At  \V  "shington  there  was  no  comprehension  of  the 
out-at-elbows  pride  of  the  average  Mexican,  his 
vanity,  and  his  fierce  dreaminess;  nor  of  the  exist- 
ence of  shrewd  and  experienced  men  of  the  world 
such  as  Terun  south  of  the  Rio  (Jrande.  Mean- 
while at  Mexico  City,  President  (luerrero  and  his 
cabinet  were  laying  a  plan  for  the  "saving  of 
Texas."    This  takes  us  back  to  Teran. 

In  the  latter  half  of  IS^l),  while  Jackson  and  But- 
ler were  maturing  their  five-million  dollar  scheme, 
Teran,  the  commander  for  the  Eastern  States, 
made  Texas  the  constant  theme  of  his  reports 
to  the  Mexican  War  Department.  A  crisis  was 
approaching.  "He  who  consents  to,  or  does  not 
oppose  the  loss  of  Texas,"  wrote  Teran  to  the 
Minister  of  War  "is  an  execrable  traitor."  To  his 
plan  of  shutting  off  the  Texan  labor  supply,  he 
now  added  two  other  schemes:  the  country  must 


. 


im 


1 1 


30       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
be  occupied  by  military  garrisons;  and  colonies  of 
Mexicans  should  be  formed  to  counterbalance  the 
existing  colonies  of  Americans. 

At  first  glance  Teran  seems  to  have  been  defeat- 
ing his  own  ends  during  these  later  months  of  1829. 
By  this  time  he  was  not  alone  in  his  belief  that 
Texas  could  be  struck  hard  by  the  enforcement  of 
the  anti-slavery  laws.    On  September  15,  1829,  a 
decree  of  President  (Juerrero  aimed  to  make  effec- 
tive the  abolition  of  slavery  throughout  Mexico. 
But  strangelj  enough  this  decree  never  went  into 
effect  in  Texas.    There  was  instantaneous  protest 
from  the  colonies.    Led  by  Austin,  they  prevailed 
on  the  Governor  of  Coahuila  to  intervene  with  the 
President.    Teran  now  appears  in  a  curious  r6le. 
While  Austin  and  the  colonists  were  protesting, 
and  before  it  was  known  what  Guerrero  would  do, 
Teran  from  his  headquarters  at  Tampico  wrote  to 
Austin  that  Guerrero  had  authorized  him  to  except 
Texas  from  the  main  provisions  of  the  decree.    He 
added  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  publish  the 
decree  in  Texas.    In  December  Guerrero  formally 
confirmed  Teran's  promise.    What  had  happened 
behind  the  scenes  at  Mexico  City?    There  is  a 
letter  from  Austin  to  Teran  thanking  him  for  his 
intervention.     But  this  would  only  increase  the 


THE  TURNING  POINT  SI 

mystery,  were  it  not  for  the  following  sentence  in 
a  famous  Mexican  state  paper,  the  Imciatua  of 
Lucas  Alaman:  "Such  is  the  independence  en- 
joyed by  the  North  American  colonists  and  to  such 
a  point  have  the  privileges  accorded  them  home 
fruit  that  when  the  decree  of  September  15  ... 
abolishing  slave*  was  issued  .  .  .  the  commander 
of  the  frontier  of  that  State  said  he  could  not  hope 
to  see  such  a  decree  obeyed  unless  it  should  be  en- 
forced by  a  larger  military-  force  than  he  then  had." 
In  short,  the  Government  had  been  premature,  for 
Teran's  military  preparations  were  not  complete. 
To  make  sure  that  the  Government  fully  under- 
stood the  situation,  Teran  sent  early  in  January 
an  extensive  report  describing  in  detail  his  plan 
for  "saving  Mexico,"  including  his  military  and 
colonization  plans.  Meanwhile  Butler  had  arrived. 
He  had  come  through  Texas,  and  apparently  had 
talked  along  the  way,  for  three  days  after  Teran's 
report  came  in.  El  Sol  was  shouting  at  the  United 
States.  "A  few  days  after  the  departure  of  Mr. 
Poinsett  from  this  capitol,"  said  that  newspaper, 
"the  American  Colonel  Butler  arrived  here  com- 
missioned, as  it  is  said  by  th'j  Government  at 
Washington,  to  negotiate  with  ours  for  the  cession 
of  the  province  of  Texas  for  the  sum  of  five  millions 


Ml 


p  i 


82       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

of  dollars.  As  we  are  not  infonned  that,  so  far.  the 
Colonel  has  made  any  overtures  on  the  subject,  we 
presume  that  he  does  the  .  .  .  administration  the 
justice  to  suppose  it  incapable  of  lending  itself  to  a 
transaction  as  prejudicial  and  degrading  to  the 
republic  as  it  would  be  disgraceful  to  the  minister 
who  would  subscribe  to  it." 

This  outburst  in  El  Sol  was  not  the  only  protest. 
The  flood  gates  were  opened.    As  in  1827,  so  now 
the  proposal  to  buy  Texas  roused  to  fever  heat 
Mexican  distrust  of  the  United  States.    Here  was 
the  arch  enemy  at  his  old  tricks  seeking  to  dis- 
member Mexico.     American  newspapers,  it  was 
said,  were  urging  Jackson  to  -«ze  Texas.    Butler 
like  Poinsett  fell  into  a  panic,        d  about,  revived 
the  dormant  treaties,  and  fel    b-    k  upon  the  line 
of  the  Sabine.    On  those  tei.        ae  two  treaties 
were  eventually  accepted  by  Jackson,  who  saw, 
even  before  his  agent,  that  he  had  stumbled  into 
a  horneta'  nest. 

The  fate  of  Texas  was  thus  in  part  decided  by 
the  indiscretion  of  the  American  president  and  his 
minister;  still  more  by  the  resource  and  determina- 
tion of  Teran;  lastly  by  the  Mexican  minister  of 
foreign  relations,  Lucas  Alaman.  Building  upon 
Ter4n's  report,  while  that  enterprising  ofllcial  went 


tj 


v;       .        ANTOmO  LOPEZ  DE  SANTA   ANNA 

Wood  ABgrmTii^  after  a  photograph.    In  the  Print  Department 
of  the  New  York  Public  LilMrary. 


^ 


m^ 


THE  TURNING  POINT  88 

on  with  his  military  preparations,  Alaman  drew  up 
his  Iniciativa,  or  project,  on  which  was  based  the 
fateful  decree  issued  by  the  Mexican  Congress  on 
April  6,  1830.  Though  closely  'ollowing  Terdn, 
Alaman  had  added  a  history-making  provision  of 
his  own.  In  Article  Eleven  of  the  famous  decree 
"it  is  prohibited  that  emigrants  from  nations  bor- 
dering on  this  Republic  shall  settle  in  the  states  or 
territory  adjacent  to  their  own  nation." 

When  the  decree  was  passed,  Terdn  was  at  Mat- 
amoras,  where  he  had  begun  to  concentrate  his 
army  several  weeks  before.  As  suave  and  adroit 
as  he  was  resolute,  he  spent  April  and  May  com- 
municating with  prominent  Texans,  especially  Aus- 
tin, in  an  effort  to  reconcile  them  to  the  decree, 
but  without  success.  In  the  summer  of  1830  Te- 
rdn  led  his  army  across  the  Nueces  River.  The 
struggle  of  the  two  races  for  Texas  had  begun. 


I 
t 

I:. 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  INCOMPATIBLE8 

From  the  Rio  Grande  one  preat  highway  crossed 
Texas  to  Bexar  (San  Antonio),  and  thence  ran  in 
nearly  a  straight  line  northeastward  to  Nacog- 
doches  and  the  frontier.    Along  this  road  in  the 
hot  days  of  the  summer  Teran's  army  must  have 
marched.    From  the  main  road,  along  the  leafy 
byways  that  did  service  as  minor  roads,  little 
bodies  of  Mexican  soldiers  —  disreputable  men  in 
the  main,  some  of  them  former  convicts  —  van- 
ished into  the  forests  or  struck  across  bits  of  prairie 
to  appear  presently  at  various  little  towns  where 
they  established  garrisons.   Having  distributed  his 
men  in  a  dozen  or  more  cantonments,  Terdn  fixed 
his  headquarters  at  Matamoras. 

During  the  next  eighteen  months  these  soldiers 
were  the  absorbing  topic  of  conversation  in  Texas. 
There  was  no  regular  mail  system,  and  news  was 
circulated  largely  by  mounted  traders,  who,  singly 

34 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  SA 

or  in  caravans,  moved  across  the  landscape,  in  and 
out  of  the  Rrcat  belts  of  sliadowy  forest.  Ihrouj,'!. 
the  burning  glare  of  the  open  spaces,  and  told  the 
little  wooden  towns  of  Texas  what  they  had  seen. 
And  of  these  things  the  keen-eyed,  hard-muscle<!, 
restless  newcomers  from  "the  United  States  of 
the  North"  talked  together  at  street  corners,  on 
hot  summer  evenings.  They  discussed  the  in- 
solent Mexican  "invasion,"  their  own  rights,  and 
the  possibility  of  getting  aid  from  their  kinsmen 
beyond  the  Sabine. 

Just  how  did  these  Americans  reason  about  their 
own  relation  to  IMexican  law?  Just  how  did  they 
excuse  to  themselves  their  serene  indifference  to 
their  pledge  to  become  Catholics  and  justify  their 
intrusion  of  American  ideals  into  Mexican  civili- 
zation? All  this  is  obscure.  But  that  they  felt 
entirely  justified  before  their  own  conscience  is 
beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt.  Two  things  with 
regard  to  them  and  their  frame  of  mind  are  clear. 
They  looked  on  all  life  with  that  curious,  boister- 
ous jollity  —  that  preoccupation  with  the  moment 
—  which  has  come  to  be  labeled  American  humor. 
They  held  unswervingly  to  the  idea  of  "the  tools 
to  him  that  can  use  them."  Subsequently  Aus- 
tin argued  the  Texas  cause  in  the  United  States 


86       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

clearly  and  ably,  basing  his  abstract  argument  on 
the  idea  that  no  natural  right  to  the  soil  exists  — 
that  only  as  man  cultivates  the  soil  does  a  right 
to  it  come  into  being. 

In  addition   to  the  social  philosophy  of  the 
Texans  —  which  was  the  American  political  philo- 
sophy of  tha"  day  —  the  sense  of  humor  of  these 
people  must  never  be  fo. gotten.    It  was  u  very 
limited  form  of  humor,  to  be  sure,  but  very  real. 
It  informs  one  of  the  most  interesting  of  the  Texan 
documents,  the  Reminiscences  of  a  certain  Henry 
Smith,  whom  we  shall  meet  presently  as  one  of  the 
chief  movers  in  the  secession  from  Mexico.    Never 
was  this  peculiar  humor  displayed  more  fully  than 
in  a  story  told  in  the  recollections  of  the  family  of 
Adolpbus  Sterne,  one  of  the  Fredonians  captured 
by  the  Mexicans  in  January,  1827,  who  spent  some 
time  in  prison. 


He  .  .  .  wore  loose  boots  which  he  could  easily  draw 
off  and  on  his  feet,  and  his  chaii  as  locked  about 
them.  One  night,  his  guards  lo  ,d  the  door  of  his 
room,  and  went  to  a  fandango.  L  ft  alone  he  drew  the 
boot  off  his  chained  leg,  and  the  chain  with  it.  Then 
he  raised  a  sash,  went  out  through  a  window,  pro- 
ceeded to  his  store,  dressed  himself  properly,  and  made 
his  way  also  to  thp  fandango.  There  he  found  his 
guards  vbo  were  much  startled  by  his  arrival;  but  he 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  S7 

and  they  promised  not  to  inform  against  coch  other 
and  all  were  easy.  One  of  his  friends  in  surprise  said 
to  him: 

"Why,  Sterne,  how  came  you  here?" 

"I  walked,"  wos  the  reply. 

"But  why  are  you  here?" 

"To  dunce,  of  course." 

And  dance  he  did.    In  good  time,  he  returned  to  his 
store,  resumed  his  prison  garb,  went  back  to  his  prison, 
reentered  it  through  the  window,  and  drew  on  his  boot 
and  the  chain  with  it.     When  his  guards  returned, 
they  found  him  as  they  had  left  him. 

If  we  remember  the  unswerving  belief  of  the 
Americans  in  Te.xas,  that  the  earth  beIong.s  to  him 
whose  labor  gives  it  value,  and  their  humorous 
attitude  towards  things  Spanish  or  Mexican,  and 
add  to  these  a  certain  rough  cleanness  of  heart 
and  a  contempt  for  intrigue,  we  can  at  least  part- 
ly understand  their  view  of  the  decadent  Latins 
of  Mexico. 

The  Texans  being  what  they  were,  the  Mexicans 
and  their  convict  soldiers  being  what  they  were,  the 
remarkable  aspect  of  the  matter  is  that  more  than 
eighteen  months  went  by  before  a  serious  clash  oc- 
curred. Bickerings  there  were,  of  course,  without 
number.  During  the  latter  part  of  1830  and  the 
whole  of  1831  the  colonists  and  these  men  whom 
they  regarded  as  unscrupulous  invaders  became 


I 


18       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

fteaiiily  more  and  moro  exuspt-rated.    The  chief 
borr  of  contention  was  a  question  of  customs 
duti.  s.     By  the  laws  of  1823  the  colonl^its  were 
exempt'  (f  from  duties  for  a  period  of  seven  years. 
Tei  '»'  ^. .  vasion  came  just  at  the  end  of  this  period. 
The  i"\f  "Xi  an  tariff  that  now  became  binding  on 
til      >'  n;    s  prohibited  the  importation  of  n  long 
lis   oi  <.i  i'^ary  ne.tvssities  of  an  agruultural  com- 
muit  ♦,      id  the  n"9"cst  Mexican  trading  centers 
were    'Tsirtt    '      .,..i  the  Texan  colonies  by  hun- 
ditn  ,  oi   «.i      oi  what  was  then  considered  desert, 
whee  the  !'       s  constant  danger  of  Indian  raids. 
The  dilhcultifs  A  such  trading  were  great  as  com- 
pared with  the  easy  trade  by  sea  from  New  Orleans. 
The  colonists  received  little  satisfacf  ion  from  a  con- 
cession of  the  Government  allowing  free  importa- 
tion of  certain  necessities  for  a  period  of  two  years, 
but  only  through  two  ports,  one  of  which  was 
Andhuac  at  the  head  of  Galveston  Bay. 

Terdn  made  a  great  blunder  by  placing  in  com- 
mand at  Andhuac  John  Davis  Bradburn,  a  soldier 
of  fortune  from  the  United  States.  Even  if  Brad- 
burn's  harshness  has  been  exaggerated  in  Texan 
tradition,  there  seems  no  doubt  that  he  was  a 
hard,  fierce  man,  quite  unsuited  to  the  complex 
situation  over  which  he  was  expected  to  play  the 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  39 

Olympian.     Chief  in  n  wries  of  clashes  bet  wren 
Bradburn  and  the  Texans  was  a  dirrct  drfianco  of 
his  authority  ns  collcrtor  of  rustoins.    This  ♦•pisodc 
took  place  at  Rrazoria.    By  a  somewhat  informal 
arrangement,  Tcran  had  permitted  the  landing  of 
goods  at  the  mouth  of  the  Brazos  River  under 
the  oversight  of  Bradburn.    The  arrangement  was 
not  satisfactory,  and  the  Government  soon  accused 
the  shippers  of  extensive  smuggling,  especially  of 
arms  and  ammunition      \Mien  th-  ;  -ews  of  three 
schooners  set  the  customs  officers  j.'  defianre  in 
December,  1831,  the  people  of  the  neighborhood 
sided  with  the  sailors  and  joined  in  a  demonstra- 
tion very  like  »  riot.    The  sailors  made  their  escape; 
but  Terdn  put  them  under  ban,  by  announcing 
that  if  any  of  them  returned  to  Mexico  they  would 
be  seized  and  tried  forthwith.    Nevertheless  one 
of  the  schooners,  the  Sabine,  came  back  the  next 
month  and,  in  defiance  of  the  authorities,  delivered 
two  cannon  to  the  people  of  Brazoria.    This  time 
there  was  a  real  riot  which  so  terrifier!  the  cus 
toms  officers  that  they  fled  to  the  woods  and  left 
Brazoria  to  its  own  devices. 

Meanwhile  at  Anahuac  things  had  pone  from 
bad  to  worse.  The  quarrel  between  Bradburn  and 
his  subjects  has  become  so  entangled  with  legend 


I 


40       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
that  it  is  now  difficult  to  separate  fact  from  tradi- 
tion.   But  this  much,  at  least,  stands  forth  grimly 
definite;  in  May,  1832,  Bradburn  arrested  several 
prominent  colonists  on  the  ground  that  they  were 
obstructing  his  rule.    This  action  was  the  signal 
for  a  revolt.     Bradburn  found  himself  suddenly 
surrounded  in  his  fort  at  Andhuac  by  a  force  of 
enraged  enemies,  more  numerous  than  his  garrison. 
He  had  the  advantage,  however,  of  being  sheltered 
by  the  fort,  and  the  early  skirmishing  was  rather  in 
his  favor.    Then  the  colonists,  bethinking  them- 
selves of  the  cannon  at  Brazoria,  sent  off  for  the 
two  pieces  and  sat  down  to  besiege  Bradburn. 

During  these  same  days,  destiny  was  at  work  in 
Mexico.    That  Santa  Anna  who  had  been  Teran's 
commanding  officer  against  the  Spaniards  was  now 
expanded  to  a  great  figure.    He  and  Teran,  in  the 
three  years  since  their  close  association  at  Tampico, 
had  drifted  in  opposite  directions.     Santa  Anna 
had  gone  the  way  of  all  flesh  in  Mexico  and  had 
started  a  revolution  against  the  rule  of  Bustamante 
who  in  his  time  had  overthrown  Guerrero.    Terdn, 
relatively  a  conservative,  sympathized  with  the 
existing  Government,  and  was  being  supported  in 
Texas  by  that  Government.    Santa  Anna,  a  the- 
atrical statesman  with  a  shifty  conscience,  had 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  41 

struck  the  attitude  of  liberalism  and  accused  the 
Government  of  tyranny.    His  headquarters  were 
at  Vera  Cruz,  where  lately  government  forces  had 
besieged  him,  but  on  May  13,  1832,  they  were  re- 
pulsed.   This  reverse  proved  to  be  the  beginning  of 
the  end  for  Bustamante.    Simultaneously  Teran, 
defending  the  old  Government  in  the  north,  also 
suffered  a  defeat.    He  had  marched  upon  Tampico, 
where  the  local  <ommander  had  declared  for  San- 
ta Anna,  and  had  been  repulsed.     Thereafter,  the 
"liberals"  advanced  in  power  with  giant  strides. 
Though  Teran  was  watching  this  great  revolt 
in  the  south  and  was  despairing  of  his  country, 
he  found  time  to  order  Colonel  Piedras  to  go  to 
AnAhuac  from  his  own  garrison  town  of  Nacog- 
doches and  "pacif;  the  disturbances."    That  was 
toward  the  end  of  May.    June  was  almos'  gone  be- 
fore Piedras  started.    The  Texans  —  still  without 
the  cannon  of  Brazoria  —  were  waiting  for  him. 
They  captured  him,  made  him  promise  to  have 
all  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  Bradburn  released, 
and  sent  him  on  his  way.    Piedras  kept  his  word. 
The  first  week  of  July  he  spent  at  Andhuac,  re- 
leasing the  prisoners  and  reorganizing  the  garrison, 
for  Bradburn  sullenly  refused  to  continue  in  com- 
mand.   Piedras  then  posted  back  to  his  own  town. 


42       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

By  this  time  Santa  Anna  and  his  party  were 
carrying  everything  before  them.  Terdn  had  lost 
heart  beyond  recovery.  His  death,  at  the  opening 
of  July,  is  accounted  for  by  some  as  suicide,  by 
others  as  assassination.  Either  is  possible.  Assas- 
sination has  always  been  a  respectable  device  in 
Mexican  politics.  The  acute  and  farsighted  Terdn, 
however,  may  have  seen  only  disaster  for  all  his 
hopes  in  the  success  of  Santa  Anna  and  despaired 
of  the  future.  Remembering  his  Latin  tradition, 
it  is  easy  to  believe  that  he  fell  on  his  own  sword. 

While  stern  events  were  hurrying  toward  catas- 
trophe farther  south,  the  first  real  battle  between 
Texans  and  Mexicans  was  fought.   The  grimly  hu- 
morous Henry  Smith  was  district  commissioner 
at  Brazoria.    When  the  news  came  that  cannon 
were  needed  at  An&huac,  he  and  others  saw  that 
the  only  way  to  take  them  there  was  by  sea.    But 
at  the  mouth  of  the  river  Brazos  stood  the  fort  of 
Velasco  well  garrisoned.    If  the  cannon  were  to  go 
to  Andhuac  this  fort  must  first  be  reduced.    In 
his  Reminiscences  Smith  has  told  how  it  was  done. 
There  was  fierce  battle.    One  cannot  read  Smith's 
plain,  unboastful  tale  without  a  thrill  or  without 
thinking  him  justified  when  he  adds  that  "take 
this  battle  altogether  ...  the  number  engaged. 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  4S 

the  hurry  in  which  they  were  called,  totally  undis- 
ciplined ...  to  march  up  coolly  and  deliberately 
within  thirty  paces  of  a  strong  fortress  of  disci- 
plined troops  .  .  .  really  seems  to  savor  more  of 
reckless  hardihood  than  of  true  courage." 

But  the  need  of  cannon  at  Anahuac  had  passed. 
The  capture  of  Piedras  had  changed  everything. 
Furthermore,  the  feeling  in  favor  of  Santa  Anna 
had  made  its  way  even  to  Anahuac.  The  insurgent 
colonists  had  declared  themselves  for  the  "liberal" 
movement.  Perhaps  that  was  one  reason  why 
Piedras  had  been  in  a  hurry  to  go  home.  He  was 
no  lover  of  Santa  Anna.  While  he  was  hurry- 
ing through  the  business  and  then  taking  himself 
off,  another  man  of  war  was  approaching  Anahuac 
from  the  opposite  direction.  This  was  Colonel 
Mejfa,  sent  northward  by  the  followers  of  Santa 
Anna  lo  spread  the  "liberal"  gospel  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet.  While  Smith  and  his  associates, 
far  up  the  coast,  were  storming  Velasco,  Mejia 
occupied  Matamoras.  This  may  hav<«  been  the 
last  straw  that  broke  Teran's  courage.  A  few 
days  after  Terdn's  death,  Mejia  set  out  by  sea  to 
pacify  Texas  and  by  mid-July  had  his  army  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Brazos.  He  brought  with  him  no  less 
a  person  than  Austin,  who,  having  been  absent 


il 


44       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

from  his  colony  attending  in  the  legislature  during 
the  AnAhuac  troubles,  was  now  returning  home 
and  had  joined  Mejfa  at  Matamoras.    Shrewd  and 
cautious,  Austin  had,  as  he  thought,  perceived 
which  way  the  wind  was  blowing  for  Texas.    His 
prompt  fraternizing  with  Mejia  furnishes  the  key 
to  his  policy.    Still  loyal  to  the  Mexican  connec- 
tion,  but  opposed  to  the  party  of  Terdn,  Austin 
aimed  to  reconcile  Texans  to  the  rule  of  the  liberals, 
represented  by  Santa  Anna.     Sailing  northward 
with  Santa  Anna's  general,  he  passed  the  depleted 
garrison  of  Velasco  marching  southward  on  their 
retreat  from  Texas.    He  was,  as  it  were,  the  surety 
for  Mejia,  when  the  enthusiastic  people  of  Brazoria 
gave  them  a  public  dinner,  poured  out  fiery  elo- 
quence, and  endorsed  the  "liberal"  movement  of 
the  glorious  Santa  Anna. 

About  the  same  time  the  spread  of  Santa-Anna- 
ism  infected  the  garrison  at  Anahuac.  Drawn  ir- 
resistibly by  the  lure  of  revolution  they  had  only 
one  thought  and  that  was  to  hasten  southward  to 
the  scene  of  commotion.  Some  made  their  way 
overland.  Bradburn  in  disguise  escaped  from  the 
country.  The  majority  of  the  garrison  packed 
themselves  into  schooners  and  put  out  to  sea.  As 
they  reached  the  blue  water  beyond  Galveston  bar. 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  45 

they  were  met  by  the  flotilla  of  Mejia  bringing  his 
army  to  Andhuac.  Both  parties  being  now  on  the 
same  side,  they  joined  forces.  Away  they  went 
southward,  Mejia  leading,  to  join  Santa  Anna. 

By  this  time  the  Texans  had  everywhere  taken 
their  cue  from  circumstance.    Not  yet  prepared 
to  secede,  they  saw  in  Santa  Anna  the  less  of  two 
evils.    While  Mejia  was  at  Brazoria,  a  conference 
of  delegates  from  neighboring  ajuntamientos  had 
passed  resolutions  denouncing  the  late  "militaris- 
tic" government  of  Teran,  declaring  their  loyal- 
ty  to  Mexico,  and  praising  Santa  Anna.     Now, 
though  Mejia  had  gone,  the  work  he  had  come  to 
do  was  not  quite  complete.    To  be  sure,  the  ex- 
ample of  the  Anahuac  garrison  had  proved  con- 
tagious.   Garrison  after  garrison  threw  their  hats 
in  the  air,  shouted  their  devotion  to  the  new  lord 
of  misrule,  abandoned  their  posts,  and  set  out  on 
hurried  marches  to  join  his  army.    But  there  was 
one  notable  exception  —  Piedras.    With  Piedras, 
the  colonists  resolved  to  deal.    Determined  to  be 
taken  seriously  as  followers  of  Santa  Anna,  a  force 
of  Texans,  led  by  Colonel  John  W.  Bullock  and 
Colonel  James  W.  Bowie,  attacked  Piedras  in  his 
garrison  town  of  Nacogdoches     There  was  sharp 
fighting  with  deaths  on  both  sides.    Piedras  then 


t 


I      ii 


I       I 


46       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

resigned  his  command,  his  major  declared  for 
Santa  Anna,  and  the  soldiers  were  permitted  to 
follow  their  heart's  desire  southward  to  the  field 
of  loot  and  rapine  and  Santa  Anna. 

Two  years  were  now  flown  since  Terdn  with  his 
army  had  entered  Texas,  TerAn  was  in  his  grave 
and  his  army  was  gone.  To  the  impressionistic 
Texans  these  years  apparently  had  not  seemed 
critical.  Scattered  over  their  enormous  country, 
they  did  not  find  that  their  lives  either  on  their 
farms  or  in  their  little  towns  had  been  seriously 
affected.  The  main  area  of  the  civil  war  was  a  long 
way  off.  General  knowledge  of  the  various  local 
disturbances  passed  but  slowly  over  the  sparsely 
settled  country,  along  the  bridle-paths  diverging 
from  the  one  great  road.  We  have  some  vivid 
pictures  of  life  in  Texas  in  this  year  of  crisis.  None 
of  these,  perhaps,  has  more  curious  interest  today 
than  the  account  in  the  Reminiscences  of  Henry 
Smith  of  what  life  was  like  at  Brazoria  in  that 
space  of  deceptive  quiet  between  the  episode  of 
the  Sabine  and  the  storming  of  Fort  Velasco. 

It  may  be  well  to  remark  here,  that  the  colonists  were 
presumed  to  be  Roman  Catholics,  or  bound  to  become 
such,  as  that  v as  one  of  the  necessary  prerequisites  to  be- 
come a  citizen — and  no  marriage  could  be  consummated 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  47 

by  law  without  the  presence  and  permission  of  a  Priest 
and  none  as  yet  had  thought  proper  to  reside  amongst 
us,  and  as  necessity  is  the  mother  of  invention,  the 
system  of  provisional  marriages  by  bonding  was  in- 
troduced, requiring  the  judicial  officers  who  were  by 
law  Notary  Publics,  to  take  the  acknowledgment  of 
the  parties  to  a  bond  conditional  on  a  sufficient  penalty 
to  be  married  by  a  Roman  Catholic  priest  as  soon  as  an 
opportunity  might  offer.  .  .  . 

The  Government  having  determined  to  put  the 
colonists  to  every  possible  test,  about  this  time,  sent 
all  the  way  from  the  City  of  Mexico,  a  Priest  to  reside 
among  us  and  administer  to  our  necessities,  ...    His 
sage  appearance  and  seemingly  good  manners  caused 
him  to  be  kindly  received  by  the  colonists  as  a  kind  of 
necessary  evil  they  could  not  well  avoid.    Every  cour- 
tesy and  attention  was  paid  to  him  and  for  a  time  he 
and  his  parishioners  got  on  very  well  together.     He 
never  troubled  them  with  church  service?,  but  con- 
fined his  duties  to  baptism  and  marriage  ceremonies. 
...    He  immediately  issued  his  edict  forbidding  pro- 
visional marriages.  .  .  .     Immediately  after  his  arriv- 
al a  number  of  these  old  married  people  determined 
to  save  trouble  by  having  one  grand  wedding  and  give 
the  Padra  an  opportunity  to  do  a  whole  sale  business. 
.  .  .     Every  preparation  was  made  and  a  splendid 
barbecue  prepared,  with  all  the  necessary  exhilerating 
libations  abundantly  provided,  so  as  to  make  it  a  day 
of  rural  felicity.  .  .  .     The  sight  of  a  Roman  Catholic 
Priest  was  a  rare  show  in  Texas  —  a  thing  of  which 
they  had  long  heard  but  never  seen.  .  .  .     I  was  called 
on  to  act  as  a  kind  of  precurser  .  .  .  and  take  down 
the  names  of  the  candidates  for  matrimony  .  .  .  and 


t  • 


1-, 


48       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

make  out  a  roll  of  the  names  of  all  the  candidates  for 
baptism.  Now  the  test  was  to  be  made;  though  no 
religious  societies  were  tolerated  in  Texas,  yet  pre- 
judices deep  rooted  by  early  education  rose  up  in 
strong  opposition,  and  with  many  the  idea  of  being 
baptised  by  a  Roman  Catholic  Priest  carried  with 
it  an  everlasting  stigma  and  disgrace.  ...  I  had 
never  been  baptised  myself  and  as  such  was  a  willing 
candidate  because  necessity  required  it  .  .  .  but  .  .  . 
I  only  succeeded  in  procuring  a  list  of  about  forty  out 
of  a  company  of  two  hundred.  ...  I  reported  my 
list  and  told  the  Padra  that  I  had  probably  enrolled 
as  many  as  he  could  conveniently  get  through  with 
that  evening.  ...  I  did  not  wish  to  let  him  know 
that  any  persisted  in  refusing.  ...  I  was  requested 
to  muster  my  forces.  Immediately  issued  orders  for  a 
general  parade.  .  .  .  They  were  marched  up  in  solid 
column  and  formed  in  hollow  square  around  the 
Priest's  table.  .  .  . 

This  curious  bit  of  historical  humor  must  not, 
however,  color  one's  entire  impression  of  Texas 
in  1832.  Back  of  the  volatile  Texan  amiability, 
things  were  brewing.  Sam  Houston,  whose  amaz- 
ing Odyssey  had  now  included  Texas,  wrote  to 
Jackson,  in  1832,  that  the  country  was  ripe  for 
appropriation  by  the  United  States.  At  Mexico 
City  there  was  a  renewal  of  the  old  suspicion  of 
American  intentions.  Butler,  with  his  infallible 
sense  for  the  wrong  moment,  had  resumed  the 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  49 

discussion  of  a  possible  American  purchase.    It  was 
firmly  declined.    And  when  he  made  a  journey  to 
Texas  in  the  spring  of  1832,  watchful  Mexicans 
drew  their  own  inferences.     Unfortunately,  the 
troubles  at  Andhuac  culminated  just  as  Butler  was 
returning  to  Mexico.    One  high  official  in  Mexico 
wrote  to  another  that  this  coincidence  revealed  a 
general  plan  to  annex  Texas  to  the  United  States 
and  that  the  discontent  then  active  in  the  State 
of  South  Carolina  had  some  relation  with  the 
revolutionary  movement  in  Texas. 

That  the  Nullificationists  had  any  direct  connec- 
ti.,u  with  the  Texan  revolt  or  that  Jackson  was 
even  remotely  at  the  back  of  it  is  now  regarded  as 
pure  myth.    But  doubtless  this  belief  was  accept- 
ed as  fact  at  Mexico  in  the  autumn  of  1832  and 
it  is  very  probable  that  Mexicans  saw  what  now 
happened  in  Texas  distorted  by  misapprehension. 
But  the  Texans,  unaware  of  this  fixed  illusion  in 
the  Mexican  mind  —  due  largely  to  the  provincial- 
ism  of  the  Government  at  Washington  —  thought 
their  own  conduct  in  the  autumn  of  1832  and  the 
spring  of  1833  above  suspicion.    By  this  time  a 
general  Texan  sentiment  had  been  crystallized.   It 
was  expressed  in  two  conventions,  both  represen- 
tative  of  the  whole  body  of  Anglo-Americans 


as 


f 


'I 


i!i 


if- 


-tW 


W 


80      TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  \ 

they  called  themselves  —  held  in  October,  1M«, 
and  in  April,  18S3.  April  opened  the  reign  —  so 
we  may  call  it  —  of  Santa  Anna  as  President  of 
Mexico,  for  his  party  had  now  prevailed  through- 
out most  of  the  Mexican  States  and  was  in  posses- 
sion of  the  capitol.  To  him  and  to  the  Mexican 
Congress  the  Texans  appealed  for  reform  of  the 
customs  laws,  for  the  rescinding  of  Article  Eleven 
of  the  decree  of  April  6,  1830,  prohibiting  emigra- 
tion from  the  United  States,  and  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  their  region  as  a  separate  State.  The  second 
convention  went  so  far  as  to  draw  up  a  proposed 
Texas  constitution,  a  copy  virtually  of  an  American 
State  constitution,  setting  up  the  English  common 
law  as  the  law  of  the  land.  To  present  these  ap- 
peals to  Santa  Anna,  Austin,  as  representative  of 
the  people  of  Texas,  set  out  Icr  Mexico  City  and 
arrived  there  in  July,  1833. 

Until  this  time  Austin  had  not  wavered  in  his 
fidelity  to  Mexico.  He  seems  also  to  have  believed 
the  professions  of  Santa  Anna.  Seeing  the  situa- 
tion from  the  Texan  angle,  without  realizing  how 
events  at  Washington  had  affected  Mexico,  he 
entered  the  capital  confident  that  the  so-called 
"liberals"  would  be  prompt  to  acknowledge  the 
"Anglo-Americans"  as  their  allies  and  would  make 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  ai 

haste  to  give  them  a  state  of  their  own.  For  even 
then  Austin  wus  cJeterrnined  to  have  a  Texan  com- 
monwealth separate  from  Coahuila.  "  If  our  apph'- 
cation  is  refused."  he  wrote  home  a  few  days  after 
his  arrival,  •*!  shall  be  in  favor  of  organizing  uuth- 
out  it  —  I  see  no  other  way  of  saving  the  country 
from  total  anarchy  and  ruin  —  I  am  totally  done 
with  conciliatory  measures,  and  for  the  future  shall 
be  uncompromising  as  (to)  Texas," 

Austin  was  to  be  bitterly  disappointed.    More 
than  two  years  were  to  pass  before  he  again  set 
foot  in  Texas.    Of  that  lime  the  first  six  months 
were  spent  in  negotiations  resulting  in  a  suave 
promise  from  Santa  Anna  that  all  the  Texan  de- 
mands would  be  granted  except  the  separation  from 
Coahuila  and  this  last  would  be  granted  at  the  earli- 
est possible  moment .    Still  trustful  of  Mexico.  Aus- 
tin  started  back.    But  on  the  way  he  was  arrested, 
brought  back  to  Mexico,  and  thrown  into  prison. 
The  cause  of  Austin's  arrest  needs  explanation. 
In  the  autumn  of  1833.  before  Santa  Anna  took  up 
the  note  of  conciliation,  Austin,  in  a  gloomy  mood 
over  his  negotiation,  had  written  a  letter  (October 
2,  1833)  to  the  authorities  of  the  town  of  Bexar 
(San  Antonio)  "stating  his  belief  that  no  reforms 
were  to  be  gained  from  the  government  and  urging 


IJ 


H. 


52       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

it  to  take  the  lead  in  declaring  Texas  a  separate 
State.  He  appears  to  have  thought  on  the  one 
hand  that  the  Tcxans,  if  left  to  themselves,  might 
go  even  further  than  that,  and  on  the  other  that  a 
movement  begun  by  the  Mexican  population  of 
B^xar  would  encounter  less  resistance  from  the 
government. " '  Ordinarily  a  cheerful  and  prudent 
man,  Austin  soon  regained  his  more  characteristic 
mood.  In  November,  he  came  to  terms  with  Santa 
Anna.  In  December  he  started  home.  Ilis  arrest 
took  place  January  3,  1834,  at  Saltillo.  The  B6xar 
authorities,  more  timid  than  he  supposed,  had  been 
terrified  by  his  suggestion,  and  had  sent  his  letter 
to  the  central  Government.  We  lack,  as  yet,  the 
full  version  of  the  Mexican  end  of  the  story.  But 
one  cardinal  detail  is  known.  The  mole-like  diplo- 
mat,  Anthony  Butler,  spent  the  autumn  of  1833 
trying  to  bribe  his  way  toward  a  cession  of  Texas 
to  the  United  States.  His  cynicism  went  the 
length  of  offering  one  o£5cial  two  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars,  and  of  reporting  to  Jackson  that  he 
might  use  some  half  million  "of  the  sum  to  which 
you  have  limited  me,  in  purchasing  men,  and  the 

'  E.  C.  Barker.  Stephen  F.  Auitin  and  the  Independence  qf  Ttx- 
a*.  Quarterly  of  tite  Texas  State  Uiatohcal  Amociatiou.  vol.  xiii, 
p.  2<M. 


1 


THE  JNCOMPATIBLES  « 

remainder  in  purehasinj?  the  tountry."  It  is  to 
Jackson',  credit  that  this  performance  caused  a 
burst  of  indifemation  at  the  White  House,  and  led 
to  Butler's  recall.  But  Butler's  shameful  activities 
were  the  background  against  which  the  Mexican 
Government  looked  upon  the  B^xar  letter. 

The  arrest  of  Austin  marked  the  beginning  of  a 
gradual  collapse  of  the  Texa.i  f«ith  in  Santa  Anna. 
Though  Austin,  from  prison,  wrote  a  number  of 
letters   urging  Texans  \o  continue  their   fidelity 
to  Mexico,  a  party  of  resistance  began  to  form. 
And  in  May.  H34.  Sanf a   \nna  gave  it  aniple  jus- 
tification.    All  along  hi-s   liheralisn.  was  a  mere 
blind.    Now  he  dropped  the  .ui.k.    lie  threw  him- 
self into  the  arms  of  the  most  reactionary  party 
in  Mexican  politics,  suppressed  the  Congress,  and 
became  dictator. 

A  new  storm  center  now  developed.  The  State 
Government  of  Coahuila  plunged  into  the  whirl- 
pool of  Mexican  internal  conflict.  Most  of  its  mad 
performances  —  such  as  a  furious  contention  over 
the  location  of  the  capitol.  and  the  formation  of 
two  parties,  one  standing  for  the  town  of  Mont- 
clova,  one  for  Saltillo  -  need  not  be  described  here. 
Eventually  both  factions  accepted  the  supremacy 
of  Santa  Anna,  whose  general,  Martin  Perfecto  de 


54       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Cos,  with  an  army  at  his  back,  loomed  high  on  the 
Texan  horizon.  The  autumn  of  1834  saw  Santa 
Anna's  influence  established  in  the  legislature  of 
Coahuila.  That  same  autumn  appeared  a  pam- 
phlet entitled  Security  Jor  Texas,  written  by  Henry 
Smith,  now  a  confessed  leader  of  the  war  party, 
that  favored  an  open  defiance  to  Mexico.  But  even 
at  this  eleventh  hour  the  Mexican  party  among  the 
Anglo-Americans,  to  whom  Austin  from  his  Mexi- 
can prison  was  writing  conciliatory  letters,  opposed 
a  revolt.  Smith  was  answered  in  a  publication 
of  the  Central  Committee  which  had  been  estab- 
lished by  the  convention  of  the  Anglo-Americans 
to  keep  general  oversight  of  the  political  situation. 
Smith's  time  had  not  come.  He  failed  to  rouse  a 
war  furor.  In  spite  of  the  imprisonment  of  Austin, 
in  spite  of  the  apostasy  of  Santa  Anna,  in  spite  of 
Cos  and  his  army,  the  goodhumored,  easygoing 
Texans  were  still  content  to  trust  to  their  luck  and 
to  wait  for  the  situation  to  mend.  One  reason  for 
this  excessive  optimism  was  a  series  of  refon..  :> 
passed  by  the  erratic  legislature  of  Coahuila. 
There  was  to  be  freedom  of  worship;  English  was 
to  be  permitted  in  transacting  public  business;  a 
new  judicial  system  was  provided  for;  and  new 
laws  were  enacted  for  the  disposal  of  public  land. 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  85 

These  state  reforms  of  Coahuila,  however  pacific 
for  the  moment,  turned  out  nevertheless  to  be  just 
what  was  needed  to  reopen  strife.  By  this  time 
Santa  Anna  was  frankly  a  reactionary.  His  plans 
included  a  strongly  centralized  government  and 
the  restoration  of  clerical  influence,  lately  near  its 
overthrow.  The  grant  of  freedom  of  worship  by 
the  legislature  of  Coahuila  was,  of  course,  like  the 
proverbial  red  rag  to  the  Mexican  clericals.  The 
failure  of  the  Anglo-Americans  to  become  genuine 
members  of  the  Mexican  church  was  doubtless 
well  known.  The  reign  of  the  good  "Padra"  of 
Smith's  narrative  had  been  short,  and  Smith  inti- 
mates that  he  was  forced  to  retire.  What  tales  of 
the  barbarous  strangers  did  this  priest  carry  back 
to  Mexico?  Here  was  a  good  cause  for  the  most 
influential  of  Santa  Anna's  following  to  distrust  the 
alien  inhabitants  of  Coahuila. 

A  more  vulgar  bone  of  contention  was  aflTorded 
by  the  operation  of  the  land  laws.  Land  specula- 
tion is  an  obscure  and  apparently  evil  force  moving 
in  the  darkness  behind  the  politics  of  this  time. 
Land  companies  which  had  been  formed  to  buy 
up  the  claims  of  needy  empresarios  often  practiced 
fraud.  One  unsavory  detail  of  the  career  of  An- 
thony Butler  was  his  alleged  connection  with  Texas 


56      TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

land  speculation.    The  Galveston  Bay  and  Texas 
Land  Company  of  New  York,  which  bought  out 
a  number  of  empresarios  and  boldly  cheated  a 
greater  number  of  American  immigrants,  is  noto- 
rious.   Butler's  visit  to  Texas  in  1832  was  in  com- 
pany with  the  agent  of  this  unscrupulous  concern. 
Smith  describes  these  speculators  as  unprincipled 
men  who  "ruled  elections  and  had  all  appointments 
made  to  suit  and  be  subservient  to  their  own  pur- 
poses."    Into  the  hands  of  these  interests  Coa- 
huila  apparently  saw  fit  to  play.    It  was  a  shwl- 
sightcd  piece  of  chicanery.     The  Texans  had  a 
serious  quarrel   with   the   speculators  and   were 
quickly  alienated  by  the  vicious  policy  upon  which 
Coahuila  soon  embarked.    Santa  Anna's  Govern- 
ment, suflBciently  distrustful  of  Coahuila  on  gen- 
eral grounds,  took  further  alarm  when  the  state 
began  a  reckless  alienation  of  public  lands.     A 
crisis  was  reached  in  the  spring  of  1835,  when  enw- 
mous  areas  were  virtually  given  away.    Once  more 
—  for  the  last  time,  as  it  proved  —  Mexico  briefly 
rehabilitated  herself  in  Texan  opinion  by  inter- 
fering to  stop  this  abuse.    In  April  the  Mexican 
Congress  suppressed  the  worst  of  the  Coahuila 
land  laws. 
The  next  incident  in  this  singular  kaleidoscope 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  57 

of  events  illustrates  again  that  amazing  combina- 
tion of  wrathfulness  and  good  humor  which  was  so 
typically  Texan  and  so  incomprehensible  to  Mexi- 
cans. While  Mexican  rule  was  thus  recovering 
some  measure  of  popularity  in  the  spring  of  1835, 
Captain  Antonio  Tenorio,  a  young  officer  uniler 
orders  from  General  Cos,  was  trying  to  reestablish 
an  orderly  custom  house  at  Anahuuc.  He  had  his 
troubles,  for  Anahuac  had  not  forgotten  its  old 
hatred  of  customs  officers.  Furthermore,  the  men 
of  Anihuac  had  a  quicker  sense  of  the  ridiculous 
than  Captain  Tenorio  and  played  practical  jokes  on 
him.  A  certain  Mr.  Briscoe,  as  Tenorio  officially 
reported,  "took  from  his  house  a  box  and  went  to 
the  seashore  to  embark  it";  Tenorio  fell  into  the 
trap,  for  such  it  was,  and  attempted  to  arrest  Bris- 
coe and  his  friends.  When  they  resisted,  he  "shot 
and  wounded"  one  of  the  soldiers.  Briscoe  was 
simply  playing  a  joke  upon  the  collector,  for  when 
the  box  was  opened  it  was  found  to  contain  nothing 
but  rubbish. 

Tenorio,  uneasy  in  his  post,  had  written  in  June 
for  reenforcements.  These  Cos  promised  to  send. 
The  American  love  of  a  powwow  was  fully  de- 
veloped in  Texas,  and  on  the  2Cd  of  June  a  great 
convention,  or  mass  meeting,  was  to  meet  at  San 


wm 


58      TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
Felipe.    The  subject  to  be  discussed  was  a  recent 
action  of  General  Cos.   Not  content  with  annulling 
the  Coahuila  land  laws,  he  had  paid  off  an  old  score 
by  seizing  Agustin  Viesca,  the  President  of  Coa- 
huila,  and  throwing  him  into  prison.    Upon  this 
matter  the  Texans  were  in  two  minds.    They  did 
not  warm  to  Viesca  because  he  had  been  closely 
identified  with  the  recent  obnoxious  land  laws.    On 
the  other  hand,  were  not  their  own  liberties  in 
danger  if  Cos  had  arrested  Viesca  illegally?    The 
true  American  passion  for  constitutionality  joined 
with  the  American  love  of  debate  and  inspired 
the  convocation  at  San  Felipe.     The  meeting  was 
greeted  with  a  surprise.    The  day  before,  some  im- 
pulsive gentlemen,  indulging  their  curiosity,  after 
the  manner  of  Briscoe  and  his  box  of  rubbish,  had 
stopped  a  government  courier  and  gone  through  his 
dispatches.   They  laid  before  the  meeting  the  letter 
from  Cos  to  Tenorio  promising  reenforcements. 

Thereupon  there  was  big  talk  in  a  high  key  at 
San  Felipe.  But  in  the  end  the  prudent  men  of 
the  "peace  party"  got  control  of  the  meeting,  with 
the  result  that  no  action  was  taken.  This  outcome 
did  not  suit  the  hot-heads  —  especially  William  B. 
Travis,  one  of  the  men  whom  Bradburn  had  im- 
prisoned three  years  before,  who  was  resolved  upon 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  50 

vengeance.  Travis  set  out  with  forty  of  like  mind 
to  capture  Tenorio.  With  the  best  grace  in  the 
world  Tenorio  promptly  surrendered  and  promised 
to  leave  Texas  with  all  his  men.  The  little  squall 
having  thus  blown  over,  the  goodhumored  Texans 
made  a  lion  of  Tenorio  and  took  him  and  all  his 
men  to  a  grand  barbecue  on  the  Fourth  of  July. 
There,  as  a  participant  has  recorded,  "Captain 
Tenorio  walked  among  the  people  shaking  hands 
with  the  men  and  acting  as  if  he  was  the  hero  of 
the  occasion." 

The  "war  party"  led  by  Smith  attempted  to 
make  capital  out  of  the  incident.  Cos  fatuously 
played  straight  into  their  hands.  Under  orders 
from  the  Mexican  Minister  of  War,  he  issued  a 
demand  for  the  surrender  to  the  military  of  six 
men — five  ringleaders  in  the  capture  of  Tenorio  and 
Don  Lorenzo  de  Zavala,  a  Mexican  politician  and 
an  enemy  of  Santa  Anna,  who  had  recently  taken 
refuge  in  Texas.  Cos  sent  orders  to  Colonel  Ugar- 
techea,  now  stationed  at  Bexar  (San  Antonio),  to  go 
in  search  of  the  accused  men  with  a  force  of  cavalry. 

Instantly  the  Texan  blood  was  up.  Since  the 
disappearance  of  Teran's  army,  Texas  had  been 
virtually  empty  of  soldiers,  and  the  peace  party 
had  succeeded  in  keeping  the  Anglo-Americans 


•11 


60  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
quiet.  But  the  orders  of  General  Cos  worked  a 
revolution  in  popular  sentiment.  There  was  gen- 
eral approval  of  a  sehemc  to  hold  a  "consultation  " 
of  all  the  Texans,  and  the  assembly  was  called 
for  the  15th  of  October.  When  it  was  reported 
that  Mexican  soldiers  were  on  the  march,  Travis 
wrote  jubilantly,  "We  shall  give  them  hell  if  they 
come  here." 

At  this  moment  of  crisis  Austin  returned  to 
Texas.    He  had  been  a  prisoner  in  Mexico  eighteen 
months,  and  he  had  passed  part  of  this  time  in 
the  old  dungeons  of  the  Inquisition.     Yet  he  came 
home  with  the  hope  that  the  situation  might  still 
be  saved,  war  averted,  and  that  the  connection 
with  Mexico  might  be  made  propitious.    He  found 
that  the  world  had  changed.    His  Texas  of  1833, 
faithful  to  Mexico,  had  given  place  to  a  fiercely  re- 
bellious Texas,  bent  on  revolution.    The  new  state 
of  things  struck  him  with  despair.    The  whole  night 
following  his  arrival  he  "walked  the  beach,  his 
mind  oppressed  with  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
forecasting  the  troubles  ahead  for  Texas."   A  week 
later  in  an  address  which  he  made  at  Brazoria  he 
dwelt  upon  the  gravity  of  the  hour  and  strong- 
ly approved  the  proposed  consultation.     In  the 
middle  of  September  he  was  at  San  Felipe,  where 


I 


I 


THE  INCOMPATIBLES  61 

he  was  made  the  chairman  of  a  Committee  of 
Safety.  The  Texans  failed  in  an  attempt  to  treat 
with  Cos,  for  he  only  repeated  his  demand  for 
the  proscribed  men  and  gave  v/aming  that  Texas 
must  submit  to  any  readjustment  of  its  affairs  de- 
cided upon  by  the  central  Government.  The  Com- 
mittee of  Safety  thereupon  issued  an  address  to 
the  people  and  advised  the  immediate  formation 
of  volunteer  companies,  since  war  was  now  their 
"only  resource." 

And  now  Colonel  Ugartechea  at  B6xar  (San 
Antonio)  made  a  move  that  was  fraught  with  des- 
tiny. The  little  town  of  Gonzales  —  sixty-four 
miles  east  of  Bexar  and  one  of  the  southernmost  of 
the  Anglo-American  towns  — had  a  six-pounder 
brass  cannon,  to  get  which,  Ugartechea  sent  a 
corporal  and  four  men  with  a  cart.  Andrew  Pon- 
ton, the  alcalde  of  Gonzales,  .sent  them  back  with- 
out the  gun  and  with  only  a  letter  full  of  reasons. 
Then  the  men  of  Gonzales  removed  the  gun,  took 
their  women  and  children  to  a  place  of  safety,  and 
sent  out  a  call  for  help. 

It  was  Lexington  and  Concord  over  again.  All 
up  and  down  the  valleys  of  the  Colorado  and  Bra- 
zos flew  the  hurry  call  for  aid.  In  homestead  after 
homestead  the  man  took  down  his  rifle  and  set  out, 


«       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
on  foot  or  on  horseback,  for  Goneales.    On  the 
lat  of  October  a  hundred  and  sixty  Texans  as- 
sembled at  Gonzales.   There  they  learned  that  Don 
Francisco  Cartafieda,  a  lieutenant  of  Ugartechea, 
had  come  up  with  a  Mexican  force  of  eighty  men 
when  only  eighteen  Texans  were  holding  the  village, 
but  hearing  of  the  approach  of  reinforcements,  he 
had  retreated,  without  attempting  tc.  take  the  place. 
The  rescuing  forces  paused  long  enough  to  elect 
a  colonel  and  a  lieutenant  colonel.    Then,  crossing 
the  river,  they  gave  chase  to  the  Mexicans,  and 
overtook  them  early  the  next  morning.    The  Mexi- 
cans held  a  "commanding  position,"  but  after  a 
short  fight  the  Americans  scattered  them.    One 
Mexican  was  killed  and  one  Texan  was  wounded. 
On  this  same  day,  October  1,  1885.  General  Cos 
with  his  main  army,  on  the  march  from  Matamoras, 
reached  the  town  of  Goliad,  where  he  heard  of  the 
"  battle  "  of  Gonzales.    The  skirmish  was  a  trifle  in 
itself,  hut  it  marked  the  opening  of  a  war  of  in- 
dependence.   The  Texans  had  thrown  down  the 
glove;  Cos  accepted  it.    He  went  forward  with  his 
army  to  Bexar  (San  Antonio),  where  he  wa.«i  con- 
fronted by  a  motley  array  of  Texans  under  the 
command  of  Austin.    The  two  armies  were  within 
striking  distance  and  a  battle  was  imminent. 


I; 


CHAPTER  IV 


T£XAH   H£C£0£8 


When  the  Consultation  began  in  November,  the 
question  of  the  hour  was  not  whether  I'exas  should 
strike  for  independence,  nor  whether  the  Mexi- 
can government  was  legitimate,  but  whether  Texas 
should  be  governed  by  Mexican  military  authori- 
ties and  military  nu  thods.     Ever  since  Terdn's 
show  of  force,  pronouncements  of  real  weight  in 
Texas  had  coupled  two  id(>as.  fidelity  to  Mexico  and 
determination  not  to  be  ruled  by  a  military  organ- 
ization.    At  Gonzales,  shortly  before  the  fighting 
began,  an  agent  of  Santa  Anna  "found  the  people 
still  desirous  of  maintaining  peace  with .  lexico,  yet 
equally  determined  to  resist  with  energy  the  en- 
trance of  troops  into  their  (ountry."    Thi.  agent 
obtained  a  statement  from  Ugartechea  assuring 
the  Anglo-Americans  tljat  he  would  not  send  troops 
against  them.    The  delightc-d  c(.lonists  were  indus- 
triously circulating  liis  letter  when,  like  a  bolt  from 


mi 


64       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

the  blue,  the  soldiers  arrived  demanding  their  can- 
non. Tlv-  revulsion  of  fueling  was  instantaneous. 

Furthermore,  the Mexirun  Congress,  reorganized 
in  complete  subservience  to  Santa  Anna,  had 
enacted  a  series  of  laws  abolishing  the  federal 
runstitution  of  \HU  and  setting  up  a  strongly 
centralized  systenj  Finally  a  new  constitution 
was  drawn  vhich  al  olished  the  existing  state 
governments. 

The  three  <ounts  winrh  in  the  later  months  of 
1835  made  up  the  Texan  infli.  tment  of  Mexico 
were:  first,  the  destruction  of  the  constitution  of 
1824;  second,  the  use  of  military  pow.r  to  tyran- 
nize a  state;  and  third,  duplicity  of  conduct.   Upon 
this  basis  the  Consultation  drew  up  a  Declara- 
tion of  causes  for  taking  up  arms  against  Mexico. 
Though  some  phrases  savored  of  independence, 
the  heart  of  this  manifesto  v.as  the  statement  that 
Texas  would  "continue  faithful  to  Mexico,  so  long 
tis  that  nation  is  governed  by  the  constitution  and 
laws  that  were  framed  for  the  government  of  the 
political  association."    The  Consultation  offered  to 
combine  with  those  Mexicans  who  stood  by  the 
constitution  of  1824  and  whose  rights,  like  the'  s, 
were  "threatened  by  encroachments  of  military 
despots."    A  motion  to  secede  was  voted  down  by 


fe-r 


DAVID  CROCKETT 
Enr-viof  in  th«  edbctioB  of  th«  New  York  Hi.toric.l  Society. 


^1 


Miaocorv  resoiution  tist  chaut 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


^  rfPPUEDjVMBE 

^S^  1653  EosI   Mam   Street 

5""^  Rochester.   Ne»  York        usno       nc. 

■^  (716)   «82  -  0300  -  Phone  "^ 

S^  (716)   288 -5989 -Fa, 


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n 


II 


-^EXAS  SECEDES  es 

a  large  majority.     Rut  it  was  significant  of  the 
temper  of  the  assembly  that  for  president  of  the 
provisional  go^•'?rnm(>^t  which  was  now  set  up, 
Henry  Smith  was  elected  by  a  vot*  of  31  as  against 
22  for  Austin.    The  organization  of  an  army  was 
provided  for,  and  Sam  Houston  was  made  its 
commander.     A  council   was  created,   with  one 
representative  from  each  municipality,  to  cooper- 
ate  with  the  governor.    The  common  law  of  Eng- 
land was  made  the  law  of  the  land.    A  more  formal 
convention  was  called  for  March  1,  1836.    Three 
commissioners,    Stephen    F.    Austin,    Branch    T. 
Archer,  and  William  H.  Wharton,  were  instructed 
to  proceed  at  once  to  the  United  States,  there  to 
enlist  sympathy  and  to  borrow  money.     Having 
accomplished  so  much,  the  Consultation  adjourned 
on  November  14,  1835. 

On  hearing  that  Austin  had  retired  from  its  com- 
mand, the  army  before  Bexar  (San  Antonio)  at 
once  elected  a  new  general.  Their  action,  disre- 
garding the  new  commander-in-chief  appointed  by 
the  Consultation,  typified  both  their  temper  and 
their  organization.  The  volunteers  who  had  as- 
sembled at  Goliad  resolved:  "We  claim,  and  can 
never  surrender  but  with  life,  the  right  to  elect 
freely  our  immediate  commander."    The  several 


66      TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

brilliant  skiiinishes  that  took  place  in  October  were 
thoroughly  decentralized.  Austin  had  made  no 
attempt  to  check  the  tendency.  This  spirit  ruled 
the  tumultuous  councils  befo'-e  Bexar  where  Cos 
was  besieged.  Should  he  be  attacked  with  what- 
ever advantage  the  Texans  now  had,  or  should 
they  fall  back  and  wait  for  reorganization  under 
the  new  regime?  A  council  of  war  early  in  De- 
cember decided  to  raise  the  siege  and  go  into 
winter  quarters. 

Before  this  decision  could  be  put  into  effect 
reports  reached  the  camp  that  "the  garrison  [in 
Bexar]  was  in  a  tumult  and  much  dissatisfied." 
There  was  immediately  a  call  for  volunteers  to 
attack  the  city.    The  story  goes  that  Benjamin  R. 
Milam,  a  daring  and  picturesque  personality,  ap- 
peared among  the  men  calling  out,  "Who  will  go 
with  old  Ben  Milam  into  San  Antonio?"    A  shout 
of  acquiescen/e,  and  the  assault  had  been  deter- 
mined upon.    A  rush  by  storming  parties  before 
dawn  on  December  5, 1835,  established  the  Texans 
in  the  outer  parts  of  the  city.    There  lollowed  five 
days  of  slow  fighting  while  the  Texans  gnawed 
their  way  into  the  heart  of  the  city.     It  was  a 
strange  battle^  for  the  soldiers  avoided  the  streets 
and  did  their  firing  chiefly  from  housetops.    How 


r^ 


TEXAS  SECEDES  67 

the  Americans  burst  through  from  liouse  to  house 
is  thus  described  by  a  participant  in  the  engage- 
nint:  "We  went  through  the  old  adobe  and  picket 
houses  of  the  Mexicans,  using  battering  rams  made 
out  of  logs  ten  or  twelve  feet  long.    The  stout  men 
would  take  hold  of  the  logs  and  swing  them  a  while 
and  let  drive  endwise,  punching  holes  in  the  walls 
through  which  we  passed.    How  the  women  and 
children  would  yell  when  we  knocked  the  holes  in 
the  walls  and  went  in."    After  five  days  of  such 
fighting  the  army  of  Cos  coiled  itself  like  a  gigantic 
worm  —  to  use  the  simile  of  a  great  writer,  of  a 
much  greater  battle  —  writhed  its  way  out  of  the 
city,  and  reassembled  at  the  Alamo,  a  fortified 
mission  building  on  the  far  side  of  San  Antonio 
River.    This  was  a  poor  position  for  defense,  for  it 
was  commanded  by  Texan  rifle  fire  and  crowded 
with  women  and  children.  Cos  opened  negotiations 
and  presently  surrendered.     He  was  permitted  to 
withdraw  his  entire  force  to  Mexico. 

The  next  two  months  form  a  span  of  chaos  in 
Texan  history.  Innumerable  views  and  a  jumble 
of  resolute  purposes  created  a  Babel  in  the  councils 
of  the  provisional  government.  First  of  ;  »  there 
was  an  irreconcilable  diflference  between  Governor 
Smith  and  the  Council.    Smith,  possessed  by  the 


Ilr 


08       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
desire  for  independence,  wanted  to  organize  Texaa 
for  a  defensive  war.    The  Council,  believing  that 
there  existed  u  Mexican  faction  that  would  fight 
for  the  old  constitution,  wanted  to  send  an  army 
southward  to  find  and  assist  those  hypothetical 
liberals.      In    consequence,    both    Governor   and 
Council  tried  to  control  the  army,  and  for  the 
moment  Houston  found  his  command  but  a  name. 
The  quarrel  finally  came  to  a  head  over  a  scheme 
to  march  southward  against  Alatamoras,  across 
the  Rio  Grande  in  IVIexico.    The  army  at  San  An- 
tonio entirely  on  its  own  responsibility  decided 
upon  this  move  as  a  flanking  blow  at  a  Mexican 
army  which  was  reported  to  be  on  the  march  for 
Texas.    The  San  Antonio  soldiers  divided  them- 
selves into  three  groups:  a  few  remained  as  a  garri- 
son ;  some  withdrew  to  their  homes;  the  rest  set  out 
for  Matamoras.    The  expedition  was  led  by  Frank 
W.  Johnson.    With  him  was  Dr.  James  Grant,  a 
Scotch  adventurer  who  had  been  one  of  the  gre  i 
beneficiaries  under  the  obnoxious  land  laws  of  IS'* 
A  somewhat  sinister  figure  in  the  tragedy  of  t. 
time  is  this  Scotch  p..ysician.   His  interests  were 
opposed  both  to  an  independent  Texas  and  to 
a  centralized  Mexico.    Perhaps  he  was  working 
simply  for  his  own  advantage.    How  he  destroyed 


TEXAS  M.CEDES  fio 

himself  and  very  n-arly  destroy«il  Toxus  remains 
to  be  seen. 

While  Johnson  and  Grnnt  were  starting  on  their 
unauthorized  expedition,  the  Council,  ignorant  of 
what  these  adventurers  were  about,  made  a  similar 
plan.    A  flank  attack  on  the  advancing  Mexicans 
through  Matamoras  became  the  watchword  of  the 
Council.    Though  Houston  protested  against  this 
move,  the  Council  not  only  gave  its  official  sanc- 
tion to  Johnson's  expedition,  when  its  destination 
became  known,  but  even  authorized  one  of  its  own 
against  Matamoras  which  was  to  be  organized  and 
commanded  by  James  W.  Fannin.    In  all  these  ar- 
rangements Houston  and  the  (lovernor  were  ig- 
nored.    Governor    Smith,    rightly    or    wrongly, 
thought  he  saw  therein  the  hand  of  those  old  ene- 
mies of  his,  the  land  speculators,  the  men  who  were 
typified  by  Grant ,    He  flew  into  a  rage  and  de- 
nounced the  Council  as  a  pack  of  wolves  and  trai- 
tors, whereupon  the  Council  passed  a  resolution 
deposing  him,  and  that  was  the  end  of  relations 
between  them. 

The  military  situation  in  the  latter  part  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1836,  had  four  points  of  focus.  At  San 
Antonio  there  was  still  a  garrison,  though  Grant 
and  Johnson  had  carried  off  most  of  its  supplies. 


70       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
Toward  the  south  near  the  coast  the  army  of  Grant 
and  Johnson  occupied  the  town  of  San  Patricio,  for, 
hearing  that  Matamoras  had  been  strongly  rein- 
forced they  had  lost  hearl  'or  their  v-'ture  and 
knew  not  which  way  to  turn.    In  the  third  place, 
Fannin  with  his  expedition  was  at  Goliad  near 
Johnson  and  Grant.    And  Houston,  the  nominal 
commander  of  them  all,  was  vainly  trying  to  call 
back  the  Matamoras  expeditions  and  to  strength- 
en the  garrison  jit  San  Antonio,  where  William  B. 
Travis  waj  now  in  command.     As  for  the  Mexi- 
cans, they  were  close  at  hand.    On  the  24th  of  Feb- 
ruary, Travis,  whose  force  was  concentrated  at  the 
Alamo,  reported  that  Mexicans  had  occupied  San 
Antonio  across  the  river.     The  invaders  at  San 
Antonio  proved  to  oe  thr  main  Mexican  army 
under  command  of  Santa  Anna  in  person.    Three 
thousand  Mexicans '  were  closing  around  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  Texans.    But  so  unfaltering  was  the 
attitude  of  the  Texans  that  o'^e  cm  sympathize 
with  a  great  scholar  of  Texas  Wi..en  he  calls  "the 
letter  in  which  Travis  announced  the  opening  of 
the  siege  the  most  heroic  document  among  Amer- 
ican historical  records." 

■  The  number  is  disputed.     As  this  is  the  estimate  of  Professor 
E.  C.  Barker  it  may  be  considered  authoritative. 


TEXAS  SECEDES  71 

C0M1IAN0AN(  Y  OK  THK  AlMMO, 

nKJAit,  Fohy.  iilth.  ISJfl  — 

To  the  People  of  Tera.s  »(•  a//  Amrrirans  in  the  world: 

Fellow  Citizenh  &  Comi-athkh  .  -  I  am  Ik  >;  m-xi, 
by  a  thousand  or  more  of  the  Mexicuns  umlrp  Santa 
Anna  —  »  huve  sustained  a  continu.vl  B<.tnl»Hrdrnfnt 
&  cannonade  for  24  hours  &  huve  not  l.isl  a  man    - 
the  enemy  has  demanded  a  surrendrr  at  (li>^r<  ti.m. 
otherwise,  the  garrison  are  to  be  put  to  the  swonj.  if 
the  fort  IS  taken  -  I  have  answered  the  deniaiid  with 
a  cannon  shot.  &  our  flag  still  waves  proudly  from  the 
walls  —  /  shall  never  surrender  or  retreat.     Then,  I  call 
on  you  in  the  name  of  Liberty,  of  patriotism,  &  every- 
thing dear  to  the  American  character,  to  come  to  our 
aid,  with  all  despatch  —  The  enemy  is  receiving  rein- 
forcements daily  &  will  no  doubi  i.urease  to  three  or 
four  thousand  in  four  or  five  days.    If  this  call  is  neg- 
lected, I  am  determined  to  sustain  myself  as  long  as 
possible  &  die  like  a  soldier  who  never  forgets  what 
is  due  to  his  own  honor  &  that  of  his  country   - 
VICTORY  OR  DEATH. 

William  Barret  Travih 

Lt.  Col.  comdt. 

Of  the  three  bodies  of  Texan  .soldiers  -  at  San 
intonio,  at  Goliad,  and  at  San  Patricio  —  th*-  one 
farthest  south  was  the  first  to  meet  disaster.  If  a 
Mexican  column  on  the  24th  of  P" -bruary  had  its 
head  against  San  Antonio,  .onie  part  of  it  would 
probably  be  within  striking  distance  of  San  Patricio. 


H' 


Vf 


•i 


ji 


I 


5  ji 


74       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

But  the  Texans  lurked  adequate  information,  and 
Johnson  and  (Jrant  lingered  at  San  Patricio,  ap- 
parently  vithout  definite  purpose.  Suddenly  the 
Mexicans  fell  upon  them;  their  force  was  anni- 
hilated and  Grant  was  killed.  Though  news  of  this 
disaster  reached  Fannin  at  Goliad,  he  continued  to 
do  nothing  for  another  week.  The  Mexicans  for 
once  were  more  active  than  the  Americans. 

On  the  1st  of  March,  in  the  gray  of  the  dai*!!, 
n  little  band  of  heroic  men  from  (Jonzales  cut 
their  wa"  through  the  Mexican  lines  and  brought 
to  Travis  their  reenforcement.  That  same  day 
the  Texan  Convention  assembled  at  the  town  of 
Washington  and  was  soon  in  possession  of  Travis' 
appeal.  It  named  Houston  commander-in-chief 
and  urged  him  to  go  at  once  to  the  relief  of  Trav- 
is. On  the  7th  of  March,  Houston,  who  had  at- 
tended the  Convention,  started  for  the  front.  He 
sent  forward  a  dispatch  ordering  Fannin  to  join 
him  on  the  way;  but  even  then  it  was  too  late. 
The  defense  of  the  Alamo  is  now  one  of  the  classic 
episodes  of  American  history.  Before  beginning 
the  assault  Santa  Anna  said  to  one  of  his  gen- 
erals: "You  know  that  in  this  war  there  are  no 
prisoners."    One  hundred  and  eighty-eight  Anglo- 

mericans  fought  to  the  death  against  a  Mexican 


I 


TEXAS  SECEDES  73 

force  that  outnumbor(><]  thi-in  nixtwu  to  onr  Not 
one  of  the  Toxuhh  su.  vivcd  thf  storming.  It  was 
the  proud  Tfxun  hoaMt  in  after  days  that  "Ther- 
mopylm  had  its  messenger  of  fate;  t;ie  Alamo 
had  none." 

What  happened  insiue  the  enclosure  of  the  Al- 
amo, on  Sunchiy.  the  6th  of  March,  is  known  only 
from  accounts  of  Mexican  officers  who  took  part  i' 
the  storming,  from  the  ri>collections  of  one  Ame  ;- 
can  woman  who  spent  the  terrible  hour  of  the  com- 
bat in    "^.e  convent  church,  and  from  the  silent  but 
superb  eloquence  of  the  death  roll.    Among  many 
gallant  men  who  went  down  with  Travis  two  bore 
names  that  are  byworas  in  American  frontier  tra- 
dition.   James  Bowie,  brother  of  the  Bowie  who 
designed  the  perfect  hunting  knife,  lay  upon  a  cot, 
suffering  from  a  recent  injury,  when  the  Mexi- 
can trumpets  blew  the  signal,  "po  quari  r,"  that 
Sunday  morning.    Nevertheless^    ,  s  death  v.as  a 
costly  one  for  the  Mexican.    Da\  m  Crockett,  who 
had  come  from  his  native  Tennessee  to  throw  in 
his  lot  with  the  Tc.cans,  no  u  iiis  life  amid  the  last 
massacre  as  grimiy  as  a  Nors<'  Viking  in  an  Ice- 
landic .saga.    There  had  been  another  side  to  Crock- 
ett's heroism  in  the  stern  week  when  the  Mexican 
trap  was  closing.    He  had  the  gift  of  music.     His 


M 


•■•ni 


74       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
violin  was  the  consolation  of  those  men  devoted 
to  their  own  destruction  while  they  waited  for  the 
end.    Crockett,  the  dead  shot,  setting  down  his 
rifle,  and  smiting  with  his  bow  the  strings  of  his 
violin,  while  nearer  and  nearer  crept  the  encir- 
cling host  of  enemies  —  is  there  any  finer  instance 
of  that  figure  which  romance  loves,  the  warrior- 
minstrel  of  the  forlorn  hope!    The  one  woman  of 
the  garrison  was  the  wife  of  Lieutenant  Dickinson. 
With  her  little  daughter  she  took  refuge  in  the 
church  while  her  husband  fought  furiously  against 
the  horde  of  cutthroats  who  poured  in  waves  over 
the  walls  that  surrounded  the  enclosure  of  the 
Alamo.    Once,  for  an  instant,  he  joined  her,  but 
only  to  cry  out  that  the  enemy  were  within  the 
walls,  and  then  after  a  parting  kiss,  to  rush  back 
sword  in  hand  into  the  hopeless  slaughter.    "  Soon 
after  he  left  me,"  says  Mrs.  Dickinson,  "three  un- 
armi     gunners  came  into  the  church  and  were 
shot  down  by  my  side.    Just  then  a  Mexican  ofll- 
cer  came  in  and  asked  me  in  English:  'Are  you 
Mrs.  Dickinson  ? '   I  answered, '  Yes. '    '  Then,'  said 
he,  'if  you  wish  to  save  your  life,  follow  me.'     I 
followed  him,  and,  although  shot  at  and  wounded, 
was  spared." 
The  massacre  at  the  Alamo  intensified,  it  did  not 


TEXAS  SECEDES  75 

create,  a  resolve  for  independence.     Thus  under 
the  shadow  of  Santa  Anna's  approach  the  move- 
ment for  independence  reached  its  ch'max.    It  was 
the  outcome  of  two  diverse  influences.    During  the 
winter  the  faction  of  Grant  —  possibly  the  fac- 
tion of  the  speculators,  of  "tainted  money,"  as 
we  should  say  today  —  had  steadily  lost  ground. 
WTiether  the  tool  of  this  faction  or  not,  the  Council 
had  failed  to  lead  the  people.    The  Matamoras  de- 
lusion had  resulted  in  a  Texas  that  was  unprepared, 
with  Santa  Anna  at  its  very  gates.     Then,  too, 
there  was  another  potent  influence  at  work  —  the 
attitude  of  the  United  States,  or  rather  of  the 
people  and  of  the  money  lenders  of  the  United 
States.    As  to  the  people,  no  sooner  was  it  learned 
that  fighting  had  begun  in  Texas  than  volunteer 
companies  were  raised  and  started  for  the  seat  of 
war.    At  Cincinnati,  for  instance,  a  subscription 
was  taken  up  to  send  artillery  to  Texas.     Two 
cannon,  afterward  named  the  Twin  Sisters,  were 
cast  by  Miles  Greenwood,  a  noted  ironmaster  of 
those  days,  and  were  dispatched  to  Texas,  where 
they  arrived  in  time  to  participate  in  the  final 
victory  and  formed  the  whole  of  Houston's  artillery 
train  on  the  wild  day  of  San  Jacinto. 
But  the  Government  at  Washington  did  not 


I, I 


i^ 


76       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

commit  itself.  Though  it  is  probable  that  Houston 
kept  Jackson  informed,  the  Administration  pre- 
served a  careful  neutrality.  The  money  lenders 
followed  a  middle  course.  Austin  found  that  he 
could  borrow  money  for  a  prospective  Texan  re- 
public but  that  American  capital  was  cool  toward 
aiding  Texas  as  a  province  of  Mexico.  During  the 
winter  Austin  had  finally  joined  the  party  of  in- 
dependence. When  the  Convention  met,  virtually 
all  Texas  was  at  last  of  one  mind.  On  the  second 
day,  the  delegates  solemnly  and  by  unanimous 
vote  declared  Texas  a  free,  sovereign,  and  inde- 
pendent republic.  They  then  set  to  work  upon 
a  constitution  and  pending  its  adoption  brushed 
aside  Smith  and  tho  Council  and  established  a 
new  provisional  government  with  David  Burnet 
as  President. 

Five  days  after  the  fall  of  the  Alamo,  Hous- 
ton arrived  at  Gonzales  and,  because  of  the  ter- 
rible news  he  had  just  received  from  San  Antonio 
changed  his  orders  to  Fannin,  directing  him  to 
destroy  Goliad  and  retreat  to  Victoria.  Houston 
had  no  choice  but  to  follow  the  same  desperate 
course  at  Gonzales.  Owing  to  the  determination 
of  each  little  group  of  volunteers  to  do  what  it 
pleased,  such  forces  as  Texas  had  —  many  of  them 


Ji 


TEXAS  SECEDES  77 

newly  arrived  volunteers  from  beyond  the  Sabine 
—  were  scattered  far  apart.    To  order  all  to  retreat 
on  converging  lines;  not  to  attempt  a  stand  until 
all  were  massed  at  one  point;  to  choose  a  point 
far  enough  away  to  preserve  the  start  any  group 
possessed  in  the  race  with  Santa  Anna  —  such,  as 
any  layman  could  see,  was  Houston's  only  chance 
to  assemble  an  army  worth  the  name.    To  a  born 
soldier  like  Houston,  no  other  course  deserved  a 
minute's  thought.    During  the  next  few  weeks  the 
various  Texan  lines  of  retreat  resembled  roughly 
the  ribs  of  a  fan  along  each  of  which  a  little  Texan 
force  was  falling  back  toward  the  northeast.    Into 
the  midst  of  the  fan  a  considerable  Mexican  army 
was  hurrying  forward,  intending  to  shatter  the 
portions  and  thus  render  insignificant   the  Tex- 
an army  that  would  ultimately  reach  the  point  of 
concentration. 

It  is  reported  that  President  Jackson  at  Wash- 
ington, following  with  keen  interest  the  Texan 
retreat  with  the  map  of  Texas  before  him,  put  his 
finger  on  the  spot  that  became  the  battlefield  of 
San  Jacinto  and  said,  "Here's  the  place.  If  Sam 
Houston's  worth  one  bawbee,  he'll  ste  nd  here  and 
give  'em  a  fight." 

Houston  proved  himself  "worth  one  bawbee" 


78       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

and  something  more.   Before  the  day  of  his  success 

arrived,  however,  he  had  to  overcome  difficulties 

scarcely  to  be  measured.   What  colored  everything 

else  in  those  weeks  was  the  flight  of  the  whole 

population  eastward  before  Santa  Anna,  started  by 

Houston  himself  when  he  burned  Gonzales.   At  his 

orders  its  people  fled  in  any  fashion  they  could 

their  way  lighted  by  the  flames  of  their  homes! 

The  narrative  of  a  woman  who  took  part  in  this 

flight  is  worth  all  the  retold  accounts  put  together: 

We  camped  the  first  night  near  Harrisburg.  Next  day 
we  crossed  Vince's  Bridge  and  arrived  at  the  San 
Jacinto  m  the  night.  There  were  fully  five  thousand 
people  at  the  ferry.  The  planters  from  Brazoria  and 
Columbia  with  their  slaves  were  crossing.  We  waited 
three  days  before  we  crossed.  .  .  .  Every  one  was 
trying  to  cross  first,  and  it  was  almost  a  riot 

We  got  over  on  the  third  day.  and  after  traveling  a 
few  miles  came  to  a  big  prairie.    It  was  about  twelve 
miles  farther  to  the  next  timber  and  water,  and  some 
of  our  party  wanted  to  camp;  but  others  said  the 
Irinity  river  was  rising  and  if  we  delayed  we  might 
not  get  across.    So  we  hurried  on.    When  we  got  about 
half  way  across  the  prairie.  Uncle  Ned's  wagon  bogged. 
The  negro  men  driving  the  carts  tried  to  go  round  the 
big  wagon  one  at  a  time  until  the  four  carts  were  fast 
m  the  mud.    Mother  was  the  only  white  woman  that 
rode  in  a  cart ;  the  others  traveled  on  horseback.    Mrs. 
Bell  s  four  children,  Mrs.  Dyer's  three,  and  Mother's 


TEXAS  SECEDES  79 

four  rode  in  the  carts.  .  ,  .  The  negro  men  put  all 
the  oxen  to  the  wagon,  but  could  not  move  it^  so  they 
had  to  stay  there  until  niorning.  Mother  gathered  the 
white  children  in  our  curt,  .  .  . 

Mother  with  all  the  negro  women  and  children 
walked  six  miles  to  the  timber  and  found  our  friends 
in  trouble.  .  .  .  The  wagons  and  carts  didn't  get  to 
the  timber  till  night.  They  had  to  be  unloaded  and 
pulled  out. 

At  the  Trinity  River  men  from  the  army  began  to 
join  their  families.  I  knov  they  have  been  blamed  for 
this  but  what  else  could  they  have  done?  The  Texas 
army  was  retreating  and  the  Mexicans  were  cross- 
ing the  Colorado.  Colonel  Fannin  and  his  men  were 
prisoners,  there  were  more  negroes  than  whites  cmong 
us  and  many  of  them  were  wild  Africans,  there  was  a 
large  tribe  of  Indians  on  the  Trinity  as  well  as  the 
Cherokee  Indians  in  Eastern  Texas  at  Nacogdoches, 
and  there  were  tones,  both  Mexicans  and  Americans,' 
in  V,e  country." 


While  Houston  was  shepherding  the  now  home- 
less Texans  out  of  Gonzales,  Fannin  lost  his  final 
opportunity  to  serve  his  country.  He  had  procras- 
tinated and  found  excuses  for  not  going  to  the 
Alamo,  and  now  continued  to  defer  action.  He 
had  not  proper  means  of  transport.  He  had 
sent  out  an  office-  with  soldiers  to  gather  in  the 

■  Reminiacenccs  of  Mrs.  Dilue  Harris,  in  the  Quarterly  „f  the 
Texas  State  Historical  Association,  vol.  iv.  pp.  163-lfi4. 


ji 


U  '  - 


80       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

population  of  the  vicinity.  He  could  not  leave  hin 
behind  and  must  send  another  force  to  hurry  hin 
up.  There  were  other  delays.  The  end  of  this 
trifling  with  responsibility  w.  s  the  destruction  ol 
all  the  companies  in  Fannin's  jurisdiction.  Some 
the  Mexicans  surprised  and  massacred.  Others,  in- 
cluding Fannin,  simendered,  only  to  be  shot  in 
cold  blood. 

Meanwhile  Houston  amid  the  discontent  of  his 
men,  whose  families  were  Seeing  under  such  des- 
perate  conditions   continued    the   retreat.      The 
"terrain."  that  is,  the  lay  of  the  land,  in  eastern 
Texas  reminds  one  of  that  in  Venetia  —  a  series  of 
rivers  running  eastward  through  a  region  of  plain 
and  hill.    And  just  as  in  1918  we  were  all  wonder- 
ing at  which  river  the  Italians  would  stand  against 
the  inrushing  Austrians,  so  in  1836  the  question 
was  at  which  river  Santa  Anna  could  be  halted. 
Jackson  read  the  signs  correctly  when  he  fixed  upon 
the  San  Jacinto,  which  falls  into  a  great  indentation 
in  Galveston  Bay,  as  the  point  where  topography 
and  strategy  favored  a  stand. 

Santa  Anna  unwittingly  helped  on  the  inevitable 
by  jumping  to  the  conclusion  that  Texas  lay  at  hb 
mercy  and  by  detaching  parts  of  his  army.  His 
own  march  followed  approximately  the  retreat  of 


THE  ALAMO 
Drawiof  from  ■  photosnipb. 


I'il 


i 


u 


u 


TEXAS  SECEDES  gi 

Houston  d  immediato  coniniand  until  the  7th  of 
April  when  the  Mexicans  ontored  San  Fclipo  —  or 
its  ruins,  for  hy  this  time  the  town  had  he«'n  hurne«l. 
From  San  Feh^e  the  opposing  generals  follo^ved 
different  courses  as  far  as  Harrishurg  on  Buffalo 
Bayou,  which  ni.    _s  a  right  angle  ^ith  tlu    awer 
San  Jacinto.     The  provisional  government  was  sit- 
ting  for  the  moment  at  Harrishurg.    Thinking  he 
might  destroy  this  town  at  a  blow,  Santa  Anna 
moved  .southward,  crossed  what  must  have  .seemed 
to  him  his  last  serious  obstacle,  the  Brazos  River, 
and  then  moved  northeast  upon  Harrishurg.    On 
the  15th  of  April  he  reached  an  empty  town.    Re- 
ports differ  as  to  whether  it  was  then  on  fire  or 
was  burned  later  on  by  Santa  Anna.     V.'hat  had 
become  of  the  Texnn  government.'    And  where 
was  Houston.' 

Santa  Anna  believed  that  Houston  had  taken  a 
more  circuitous  route  —  as  he  had  —  but  that  he 
also  had  aimed  at  Harrishurg,  and  that  his  purpo.se 
was  to  pass  through  the  town,  follow  Buffalo  Ba- 
you, then  to  cross  the  San  Jacinto  at  Lynch 's 
Ferry  and  continue  eastward.  In  a  word.  Santa 
Anna  thought  he  had  beaten  Houston  in  the  race 
for  Harrishurg  and  that  all  he  now  had  to  do  was  to 
push  on,  seize  the  San  Jacinto  ferry,  and  then  turn 


.  1 

r 
il 

I"    k 


h        i 


8S  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
•bout  and  destroy  Houston  at  his  leisure.  But  h< 
had  not  yet  learned  that  he  wns  deilinj?  with  « 
people  very  different  from  the  Mexienrs.  The  fierj 
Mexiean  was  unable  to  ^nge  the  energetic  Ameri- 
can .  The  so-enlled  fiery  t-mperament  forever  con- 
fuses impulse  and  energy.  Had  Houston  been  a 
Mexiean.  Santa  Anna  would  perhaps  not  have 
found  his  calculations  so  far  beside  the  mark.  He 
seems  also  to  have  thought  Houston's  army,  if  not 
already  broken  up,  feeble  enough  to  be  destroyed 
by  only  a  part  of  the  Mexican  forces. 

For  all  these  reasons  Santa  Anna  felt  safe  in 
making  the  reckless  move  that  was  to  prove  his 
undoing.  While  his  remainii  g  forces  were  iv^at- 
tered  in  several  directions,  he  pushed  o.i  with  only 
seven  hundred  and  fifty  men  toward  New  Wash- 
ington, a  village  on  Galveston  Bay  below  the 
mouth  of  the  San  Jacinto.  There  he  expected  to 
capture  the  fieeing  President  of  Texas,  .  d  yet 
to  have  plenty  of  time  to  reach  the  ferry  before 
Houston.  One  of  Santa  Anna's  outlying  detach- 
ments under  Genercl  Cos  was  also  moving  in  the 
same  direction  along  a  route  still  farther  south. 

WTiat  had  become  of  Houston  while  the  enemy 
was  thus  advancing?  He  had  abandoned  San 
Felipe  several  days  before  the  arrival  of  Santa 


.(; 


TEXAS  SECEDES  as 

Annu.    During  the  next  thr.v  wtrks  while  Santa 
Anna  wu.h  puusing  him  to  the  lustwunl  his  coiirjw 
presents  problems,  some  of  which  have  urotist>d 
iharp  discussion.    It  is  enough  h«'re  to  note  that 
during  this  time  he  was  swinging  round  a  large 
curve  northeast,  then  southeast,  contending  with 
the  reckh'ss  spirit  of  his  men.  improving  his  or- 
ganization. un<l  at  last  striking  the  line  of  Santa 
Anna's  march  on  the  Buffalo  Bayou  on  Monday, 
the  18th  of  April.    Santa  Anna  had  passed  by  the 
day  before  on  his  march  to  \ew  Washington. 
Thus  Santa  Anna's  miscalculations  began  to  work 
his  undoing,    rnsuspected,  the  enemy  whom  he 
thought  he  could  deal  with  at  his  leisure  was  close 
behind  him,  as  he  marched  on  in  high  spirits  to 
New  Washington.    Not  *inding  his  prey  at  New 
Washington,  he  amused  himself  by  burning  the 
town  and  then  resumed  his  se»ious  business  -   the 
trapping  of  Houston  by  the  seizure  of  the  San 
Jacinto  ferry. 

Meanwhile  Houston  had  captured  a  Mexican 
courier  and  thus  learned  of  Santa  Anna's  plans. 
He  determined  to  spring  a  trap  and  hurried  for- 
ward along  the  sou  In  shore  of  Buffalo  Bayou.  On 
the  morning  of  the  20th  of  April,  both  generals  were 
marching  on  the  same  point,  the  San  Jacinto  ferry. 


84       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Santa  Anna,  coming  up  from  New  Washington, 
was  moving  northward  with  his  seven  hundred  and 
fifty  men.     Houston,  with  about  seven  hundred 
and  eighty,  was  moving  eastward.     The  Texans 
reached  the  point  of  vantage  first  and  there  they 
encamped  in  a  live-oak  grove  and  waited.    At  their 
backs  was  the  bayou,  u  narrow  but  deep  stream 
that  joined  the  San  Jacinto  at  the  ferry  about  half 
a  mile  distant.    It  was  a  lovely  spot,  for  the  high 
banks  of  the  bayou  were  covered  with  oaks,  huge 
magnolias  eighty  feet  high,  and  great  masses  of 
laurel,  bay,  and  rhododendron.    Southward  of  the 
wood  where  the  Texans  camped  was  a  stretch  of 
prairie.    Watching  this  open  space,  the  hardy,  ad- 
venturous Texans,  each  a  dead  shot,  lay  beneath 
the  great  canopy  of  the  silvery  gray-green  live  oak 
boughs,  straining  their  eyes  into  the  sun-glare  of 
the  prairie,  counting  the  hours  before  the  Mexicans 
should  appear. 

Early  in  the  day  Santa  Anna's  scouts  informed 
him  that  Houston  had  already  arrived.  "It  was 
with  the  greatest  joy,"  says  Santa  Anna,  "that 
all  the  individuals  belonging  to  the  corps  then 
under  my  immediate  orders  heard  the  news  and 
they  continued  the  march,  already  begun  in  the 
best  spirit."   Skirmishing  later  in  the  day,  designed 


TEXAS  SECEDES  85 

to  draw  Houston  out  of  the  wood  into  the  open, 
failed  of  its  purpose.   Santa  Anna  therefore  pitched 
his  camp  on  an  eminence  about  a  thousand  yards 
from  the  wood  of  the  Texans.     There  he  con- 
structed breastworks.    Early  next  morning  Gen- 
eral Cos  joined  Santa  Anna,  increasing  his  force  to 
something  like  twelve  hundred  men.     Thursday, 
the  21st  of  April,  wore  on  without  a  demonstration 
from  either  side.    Fearing  that  more  Mexican  re- 
enforcements  were  on  their  way,  a  band  of  Texans 
led  by  "Deaf"  Smith,  a  figure  famous  in  Tex- 
an tradition,  destroyed  a  bridge  which  spanned 
Vince's  Creek,  a  tributary  of  the  San  Jacinto,  over 
which  additions  to  the  Mexican  force  would  almost 
certainly  pass.    Then  in  the  late  afternoon  Hous- 
ton's army,  screened  by  their  oak  trees,  began 
silently  to  prepare  for  battle.    Again  Santa  Anna 
underrated  his  opponents.     Still  unaware  of  the 
manner  of  man  he  Lad  to  deal  with,  the  Mexican 
general  went  to  sleep.    His  army  neglected  to  take 
the  most  obvious  precautions.    Their  horses  were 
unsaddled.     The  men  were  busy  cooking.     Sud- 
denly at  the  edge  of  the  grove  of  live  oaks,  a 
thousand  yards  away,  appeared  a  line  of  men.    A 
solitary  fife  struck  up,  "Will  you  come  to  the 
bower  I  have  shaded  for  you?"    Immediately  the 


n 


I 

ii 

■I 

I' 


p. I 


4, 


m 


86       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
Texan  battle  line  swept  out  into  the  open  and 
forward  on  the  run.     Now  they  were  shouting, 
"Remember  the  Alamo!"    All  the  fury  of  revenge 
nursed  during  the  terrible  days  of  the  retreat  rang 
in  those  fierce  shouts  and  in  the  tempest  of  rifle 
fire  that  followed.    A  few  Mexicans  stood  for  a 
moment  at  the  breastwork.    Then  all  broke  and 
fled,  while  the  Texans  shot  them  like  running  game. 
Thus  ended  Santa  Anna's  confident  expedition. 
The  Texan  loss  was  but  two  killed  and  twenty- 
three  wounded;  of  the  Mexican  army  scarcely  forty 
escaped  death,  wounds,  or  capture.    Houston  re- 
ported the  dead  alone  at  over  six  b     dred.    A 
miserable  fugitive  brought  in  the  next  uay  proved 
to  be  Santa  Anna. 


,( 


CHAPTER  V 


RECOGNITION 


The  war  which  began  at  Gonzales  in  1835  did  not 
end  until  the  Treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  thir- 
teen years  later.  It  forms  part  r^  the  background 
and  at  times  invades  the  foreground  of  American 
history  all  through  these  eventful  years.  It  was  an 
mtermittent  war,  it  is  true,  but  it  unifies  the  period 
of  thirteen  years  over  which  it  cast  its  shadow. 

The  details  of  Texan  experience  during  these 
years  —  the  constitution  making,  the  local  politics, 
the  financial  desperation  —  form  an  interesting  but 
not  a  unique  story,  and  hardly  have  a  place  on  the 
broad  page  of  American  history.  The  first  com- 
mission sent  by  Texas  to  the  Tnited  States  re- 
turned despondent,  with  the  report  that  the  Ameri- 
can Government  stood  neutral  and  tha:  money 
could  be  raised  only  by  pledging  Texas  land  at 
cruelly  low  figures.  A  second  and  third  commission 
were  sent  to  organize  American  sympathy.    But 

87 


I! 


1 


11 


l>, 


M 


I    ■ 


I*'  ;; 


il 


88       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

nothing  came  of  these  efforts  except  glowing  re- 
ports of  American  intentions  and  the  reiteration 
of  the  belief  of  the  commissioners  that  President 
Jackson  favored  the  cause  of  the  Texans.  The 
fact  that  this  bluntest  of  men  would  not  come 
out  frankly  on  the  subject  does  not  seem  to  have 
impressed  them. 

In  1336  the  scene  shifts  to  Washington,  where 
the  fate  of  Texas  was  ultimately  decided.   Jackson 
was  then  as  eager  to  extend  his  dominion  to  the 
Rio  Grande  as  he  had  been  in  1829  or  in  1835.   But 
it  was  a  bad  time  to  spring  new  issues  on  the  Ameri- 
can public.   Jackson  the  somewhat  mist,  .mperial- 
ist  might  relish  the  idea  of  presenting  to  his  coun- 
trymen a  great  domain  bought  and  paid  for  by  his 
astuteness  alone;  on  the  other  hand  Jackson  the 
p    .tici«n  was  very  cautious  about  involving  the 
country  in  war  on  the  eve  of  a  presidential  election. 
The  first  Texan  commission  had  evoked  from  him 
only  a  rhetorical  flourish  about  the  obligations  of 
the  United  States  to  Mexico.    During  1836  Jack- 
son's r61e  continued  to  be  that  of  a  strict  preserver 
of  neutrality.    And  yet  for  a  brief  time  during  that 
year  United  States  troops  were  on  Texan  soil  — 
or,  as  Mexico  maintained,  Mexican  soil.    General 
Gaines  had  beer,  ordered  southwest  to  see  that  no 


RECOGNITION  89 

militery  force,  either  Texan  or  Mexican,  violated 
the  neutral  territory  of  the  United  States.     For 
some  time  Gaines  lay  encamped  with  a  small  force 
on  the  east  bank  of  the  Sabine.    He  was  there  when 
the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  took  place,  and  an  old 
fiction,  now  obsolete,  explained  his  presence  at  that 
point  as  part  of  Jackson's  secret  support  of  the 
Texan  revolution.     But  while  Jackson  was  not 
actually  abetting  the  revolution,  no  one  with  any 
knowledge  of  his  character  can  doubt  that  events 
might  have  taken  place  in  which  —  presidential 
election  or  no  presidential  election  —  all  Jackson's 
political  opportunism  would  have  vanished,  and  he 
would  have  plunged  the  United  States  into  war. 
Had  the  battle  of  the  San  Jacinto  proved  a  rout 
for  the  Texans,  had  the  host  of  fleeing  non-com- 
batants reached  the  Sabine,  it  is  as  nearly  certain  as 
anything  unproven  ever  can  be  that  Jackson  would 
have  stalked  in  between  Santa  Anna  and  his  prey. 
It  was  partly,  we  may  believe,  to  protect  the 
fleeing  Texans  even  if  Santa  Anna  did  not  overtake 
them,  that  Gaines  and  his  army  were  at  the  Sabine. 
While  Houston  was  gathering  all  he  could  of  the 
man  power  of  Texas  for  his  stand  against  Santa 
Anna,  the  fleeing  settlers  we-e  exposed  to  the  alter- 
nate horror  of  attack  by  the  x  idians.    Gaines  was 


!' 


i 


^■f 


Bit  1 1 


90       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

instructed,  if  he  saw  danger  of  an  Indian  outbreak, 
tocross  theSabine  and  attack  thelndians.  Though 
he  did  not  advance  previous  to  Houston's  victory, 
a  report  that  the  Indians  were  rising  led  Gaines 
briefly  to  occupy  Nacogdoches  in  the  summer  of 
1836.  In  consequence  the  Mexican  Minister,  after 
a  sharp  controversy,  demanded  his  passport  and 
withdrew  from  Washington  in  October. 

In  the  six  months  since  Houston's  victory,  Jack- 
son had  been  studying  the  trend  of  events.    There 
was,  indeed,  much  to  think  upon  during  the  six 
months  which  ended   in  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Mexican  Minister.    First  of  all  there  were  the  de- 
bates in  Congress.    When  Senator  Thomas  Morris 
of  Ohio,  as  early  as  April,  presented  a  petition 
from  citizens  of  Cincinnati  "on  the  subject  of  the 
struggle  for  freedom  now  going  on  in  Texas,  and 
suggesting  the  expediency  of  acknowledging  the 
independence  of  that  country,"  he  stirred  up  a 
hornet's  nest.    All  the  great  leaders  of  the  day  took 
part  in  the  violent  discussion  which  followed.    Out 
of  the  turmoil  of  debate  at  least  one  fact  emerged 
unmistakably:  Congress  did  not  want  to  enter  the 
war.    John  C.  Calhoun  of  South  Carolina,  indeed, 
though  seeing  plainly  that  annexation  of  Texas 
meant  war,  pressed  not  only  for  recognition,  but 


i-     ■' 


r 


the 


RECOGNITION  91 

for  annexation.  But  many  politicians  anticipated 
the  position  which  Preston,  Calhoun's  colleague, 
took  a  year  later  when  he  said  that,  much  as  he 
wanted  Texas,  he  would  not  annex  it  until  its  in- 
dependence of  Mexico  was  past  dispute.  From 
the  latter  point  of  view  the  actions  of  Gaines  were 
suspicious  to  say  the  least.  John  Quincy  Adams, 
during  a  debate  in  May,  openly  charged  the  Ad- 
ministration with  having  sent  Gaines  to  the  border 
with  the  purpose  of  involving  the  United  States  in 
the  war. 

At  first,  the  discussion  did  not  reveal  either  sec- 
tional or  slavery  bias.    Senator  Morris  not  only 
presented  the  first  petition  for  recognizing  Texas 
but  soon  after  presented  various  anti-slavery  peti- 
tions.   The  only  State  whose  legislature  sent  in 
resolutions  favoring  recognition  was  Connecticut. 
Some  of  the  bitterest  of  the  early  opposition  to 
annexation  was  voiced  by  Senator  Porter  of  Louis- 
iana, who  maintained  that  the  war  was  ruining  the 
trade  of  his  State  with  Mexico  and  that,  if  Texas 
was  annexed,  Mexican  raids  would  soon  extend  to 
Louisiana.     "It  is  all  very  veil."  he  maintained, 
'lor  gentlemen  who  come  from  States  where  peace 
and  security  would  not  be  disturbed  by  hostilities 
to  indulge  in  aspirations  after  the  happiness  of  the 


V 

,ll 


':     I 


I '  T 


I  i- 


V^m 


I:   't 


••  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
human  race."  But  ii-  protested  against  their  do- 
ing  so  at  Louisiana's  expense.  The  upshot  of  this 
war  debate  was  a  report  by  the  C--  mittee  on  For- 
eign Relations  of  which  H'  Jlay  was  chair- 
man. The  document  was  bland'y  non-committal 
and  came  to  the  conclusion  "that  the  independ- 
ence of  Texas  ought  to  be  acknowledged  by  the 
United  States"  whenever  Texas  was  independent. 
This  smooth  evasion  of  the  crucial  point  was  quite 
like  Clay. 

The  keen  old  President  and  his  ring  of  astute 
advisers— "practical"    politicians    of    the    true 
blood  — saw  all  this  discussion  in  a  perspective 
that  is  sometimes  forgotten.    Jackson  was  only 
just  then  extricating  himself  from  a  serious  Euro- 
pean predicament  caused  by  too  hastily  joining 
issue  with  France,  on  the  assumption  that  the 
Americans  were  in  a  warlike  mood.    Throughout 
these  months  of  1836,  when  the  fate  of  the  politi- 
cians was  in  the  balance,  the  United  States  was 
without  a  minister  at  Paris,  and  there  was  no 
French  minister  at  Washington.    The  rupture  in 
diplomatic  relations  had  taken  place  in  the  pre- 
vious year.    In  attempting  to  make  an  end  of  those 
French  spoliation  claims  outstanding  since  Napo- 
leon, Jackson  had  tried  a  show  of  force  and  had 


RECOGNITION  99 

issued  mobilization  orders  to  the  American  navy. 
But  the  American  people  were  equi^'ocal,  to  say 
the  least,  in  their  attitude  on  the  subject     Clay 
had  got  a  unanimous  vote  in  the  Senate  for  resolu- 
tions to  the  effect  that  the  President  had  exceeded 
his  authority.    Calhoun  had  warned  the  country 
that  it  was  drifting  into  war  with  France  through 
the  haste  and  violence  of  the  President.    Late  in 
1835  Jackson's  advisers  we-*?  urging  him  to  draw  in 
his  horns.    A  circumstance  which  the  Texan  com- 
missioners in  the  first  half  of  1830  failed  to  note  was 
the  studied  attempt  of  the  Administration  to  with- 
draw from  the  belligerent  attitude  of  the  previous 
year.    The  American  people  were  quick  to  respond. 
It  was  the  new  tone  of  the  President's  dealing  with 
FYance  that  led  Washington  Irving  in  February, 
1836,  to  write  to  Van  Buren  expressing  his  de- 
light.   The  credit  for  the  change  Irving  attributed 
altogether  to  Van  Buren.    He  was  the  pacific  wiz- 
ard behind  the  throne.     It  was  he  upon  whom  the 
Tpxas  envoy  at  Washington  ultimately  laid  the 
blame  for  the  defeat  of  all  the  schemes  to  recog- 
nize Texas  in  1836.     "I  have  made  it  my  busi- 
ness to  unravel  the  mystery,"  he  wrote,  "and  I 

know  I  have  succeeded It  all  proceeds  from 

Mr.  Van  Buren's  party.  .  .  .     They  are  afraid  of 


k 


I 


I  ;, 


V. 


F! 


II 


W       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

throwing  Mr.  Van  Burcn  into  a  minority  in  ti 
next  Congress." 

When  regarded  in  the  perspective  of  the  politici 
campaign  of  183fi.  the  evasiveness  of  the  Adminis 
tration  ceases  to  be  mysterious.    "Old  Hickory 
had  always  admired  the  political  adroitness  of  Vai 
Buren  and  had  set  his  heart  .ipon  making  him  thi 
next  President.    But  there  were  obstacles  in  th( 
way.    The  first  half  of  1830  brought  the  climax  o 
Jackson's  financial  battle  in  the  distribution  of  th« 
surplus  among  the  States.    He  had  in  solid  arraj 
against  him  all  the  financial  interests  of  the  coun- 
try.   And  in  the  great  commonwealth  of  New  York, 
so  often  the  deciding  State  in  presidential  elections! 
factions  had  so  rent  the  party  that  promoters  of 
Van  Buren  were  greatly  alarmed.    And  now  there 
was  still  another  source  of  alarm.     Though  the 
Texas  question  entered  politics  witliout  a  sectional 
bias,  it  speedily  became  entangled  both  with  sec- 
tionalism and  with  slavery.     Senator  Morris  of 
Ohio,  the  anti-slavery  advocate  nho  was  its  spon- 
sor in  the  Senate,  before  long  began  to  cool.    The 
indomitable  John  Quincy  Adams  sounded  an  anti- 
slavery  rallying  cry.    On  the  25th  of  May  he  de- 
nounced the  Administration  as  conspiring  to  re- 
establish slavery  on  soil  where  it  had  been  abolished 


RECOGXITIOX  9,1 

and  as  scheming  to  force  the  United  States  into  the 
war  in  tJie  interest  of  the  shivehold.rs.    So  violent 
was  Adams  in  his  hinf,Miage  that,  in  {he  reaction  of 
the  next  day,  he  pronounced  his  spft'eh  "the  most 
hazardous  "  he  had  ever  nm  '• .    Hut  in  «  way  it  was 
less  hazardous  and  more  strategic  than  hes,ippoM.d. 
Later  he  wrote  in  his  diary  that  the  North  greeted 
it  with  "a  universal  shout  of  applause."    Through 
such  troubled  waters  the  ship  of  \  an  Buren's  po- 
litical fortune  -  •  with  Jackson  in  command,  if  not 
quite  at  the  holm  —  was  laboring  toward  a  perilous 
haven  beyond  the  November  election. 

It  had  been  reiterated  in  congressional  debates 
that  no  one  had  enough  certain  knowledge  about 
Texan  conditions  to  warrant  decisive  action.    Was 
it  to  forestall  any  complaint  by  friends  of  Texas 
that  ^ackson  sent  Henry  M.  Morfit  on  a  mission 
of  inquiry?    Did  he  hope  to  find  Texas  so  strong 
that  he  might  use  the  knowledge  as  a  trumj),  should 
the  cards  begin  to  run  against  \'an  Buren,  or  was 
lie  honestly  seeking  light  without  ulterior  purpose? 
The  biographers  of  Jackson  have  left  us  in  the  <lark 
as  to  his  motive.    Whatever  it  was,  Morfit  went  on 
his  mission,  and  in  August  and  September,  while  the 
American  voters  in  high  revel  took  their  fill  of  elec- 
tioneering, he  wrote  letter  after  letter  to  the  State 


i : 


■iO! 


if. 


\  Jl 


M       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
Department  de«oribing  Texas.    It  wan  a  discount 
mKpicturethalhepuinted.  Theam,^  wa«unaabl 
The  iwpulation  consisted  of  some  thirty  thousan 
Americans,  five  thousand  negroes,  and  thirtv-fi^ 
hundred  Mexicans,  us  well  as  twelve  or  fourth 
thousand  indep^-ndent  Indians.    Though  the  Texu 
leaders  had  meditated  conquering  ever^'thing  bt 
tween   them  and  the  Pacific,  they  had  di^idt^l  t 
make  the  Rio  (irande  their  western  boundarv  as  fa 
north  as  its  gource.  This  extension  would  give  thcr 
part  of  the  province  of  Xe  v  Mexicoand  fifteen  thou 
sand  additional  population.    But  New  Mexico  wa 
not  yet  conquered.    Financially  the  new  republi, 
presented  a  curious  spectacle.    It  wus  deep  in  debl 
and  yet  had  conducted  a  successful  war  with  "littU 
embarrassment  to  her  citizens  or  her  treasury" 
this  by  no  means  insignificant  accomplishment  was 
due  to  the  bountiful  .-afl  ..    of  donutions  from  the 
United  States.    Morfit  concluded  that  Texas  would 
be  httle  likely  to  maintain  its  independence  since 
'without  foreign  aid  her  future  security  must  de- 
pend more  upon  the  weakness  and  imbecility  of 
her  enemy  than  upon  her  own  strength." 

Morfit  probably  had  no  great  insight  into  men 
and  nations.  It  is  hard  to  say  what  weight  his 
reports  had.     A  personal  letter  from  Houston  to 


RECOGNITION  97 

Jackson  may  have  accomplijihrd  more.  Houston 
was  vvvn  mon-  pMMmis»ir  thrn  Morfit.  He  ac 
knowlodKod  that  iho  Texnn  situation  w«.i  drsrH-r- 
ate.  so  lonK  as  Mexico  hu.,  chtern.incd  to  continue 
*he  war.  and  he  iK'^^jed  his  old  frirn.l  J.ukM.n 
to  come  to  his  assistance.  But  in  IH.'lfl  Jackson 
had  other  fish  to  fry.  and  perhaf^  he  ha,|  .some 
real  faith  in  the  singular,  not  to  .say  grotesque, 
performance  of  Santa  Anna's  captors. 

The  majority  of  his  captors  wanted  to  give  Santa 
Anna  an  expeditious  hanging,  hut  Houston  and 
Burnet  managed  to  save  his  life.    Then  thev  made 
hmi  .sign  a  treaty  which  bound  him  not  to  take 
up  arms  against  Texas  "during  the  present  war 
of  mdependence."  bound  the  Mexican  forces  to 
withdraw  across  the  Rio  Grande,  and  provided 
that  Santa  Anna  himself  should  be  allowed  to 
return  to  Mexico.    A  secret  -article  promised  the 
recognition  of  the  indejH^ndence  of  IVxas  and  by 
implication  the  Rio  Grande  as  a  boundary. 

How  Burnet  and  Houston  could  have  taken  this 
so^alled  treaty  seriously  -  knowing  Santa  Anna 
as  they  did  -  is  a  mystery.  Later  Santa  Anna 
publicly  declared  his  part  of  the  negotiation  a  mere 
device  for  making  his  escape  from  Texas.  As  might 
have  been  expected.  Mexico  struck  the  bottom  out 


i 


II'   :' 


98       TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

of  the  treaty  by  enacting  that  any  agreement  made 
by  the  President  while  a  prisoner  should  "be  re- 
garded as  null,  void,  and  of  no  effect."  A  meeting 
of  Texan  soldiers  prevented  the  return  of  Santa 
Anna  to  his  own  country  and  very  nearly  put  an 
end  to  his  life.  Thereupon  Santa  Anna  was  in- 
duced to  write  to  Jackson  begging  him  to  employ 
his  influence  to  put  the  treaty  into  effect.  Jackson 
returned  an  answer  that  was  unimpeachable  from 
the  point  of  view  of  international  law  and  as  cool 
as  if  his  beloved  Texans  were  subjects  of  the  Em- 
peror of  Cathay.  He  deeply  regretted  that  the 
whole  affair  was  beyond  his  competence,  unless 
Mexico  should  officially  request  his  good  offices. 
This  was  in  September  and  the  presidential 
election  was  not  yet  won. 

During  that  same  month  the  first  regidar  elec- 
tion was  held  in  the  Republic  of  Texas.  Houston 
was  elected  President,  and  the  new  constitution 
drawn  up  by  the  convention  was  ratified  by  the 
people.  But  far  more  significant  was  the  plebiscite 
which  recorded  some  six  thousand  Texan  voters  in 
fa>'or  of  annexation  to  the  United  States  and  only 
ninety-three  opposed  toit.  One  of  the  early  act  s  of 
the  new  Government  was  tiie  dispatch  of  William 
F.  Wharton  from  the  still  unrecognized  republic 


H^\ 


■5 


RECOGNITION'  99 

as  Minister  to  the  United  States  and  the  ahnost 
simultaneous  release  of  Santa  Anna  so  that  he  too 
as  informal  ambassador  might  intercede  for  Texas. 

With  *ae  tJaiion  of  Van  Buren  to  the  presi- 
dency J  .ckson  ceast  •  to  be  the  leading  man  in 
the  trag  ^-omedy  of  .he  Texan  negotiations.  His 
course  for  the  next  two  months  is  far  from  clear, 
but  it  is  no  longer  of  chief  importance.  The  deal- 
ings with  Santa  Anna,  as  might  have  been  ex- 
pected, came  to  nothing.  The  only  person  who 
gained  anything  by  the  farce  was  Santa  Anna 
himself.  With  delicious  effrontery  he  asked  the 
President  for  a  warship  to  take  him  home,  and  it 
was  given  him!  Has  history  any  picture  more 
ironical  than  that  of  this  butcher  of  the  Alamo, 
protected  by  Texan  statesmen  from  the  wrath 
of  their  soldiers,  politely  released  from  the  coun- 
try, politely  bowing  himself  out  of  Washington, 
and  escorted  to  the  deck  of  an  American  war- 
ship, whereby  he  was  conveyed  in  safety  to  his 
native  land! 

At  Washington  the  center  of  gravity  in  the 
Texan  negotiation  now  changed  from  the  WTiite 
House  to  the  Capitol.  Apparently  Jackson's  aim 
was  to  shift  the  responsibility  for  Texas  upon 
Congress.    Ostentatiously  he  announced  that  he 


;    (I 

•  i  <    I 


iA 


il 


'M 


'1 


m. 


ri 


100     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

would  let  Congress  guide  him  in  this  great  matter. 
When  Jackson  consented  to  be  guided,  there  was 
always  a  reason  for  his  docility;  but  he  was  the 
last  man  in  such  a  situation  to  make  candid  con- 
fession of  his  reasons.    Perhaps  the  guesses  of  the 
Texan  Minister  are  as  safe  a  guide  as  any  to  Jack- 
son's wishes  and  purposes.    His  confidential  corre- 
spondence  with   his  government  shows  Jackson 
eager  for  annexation  but  unwilling  to  take  the  lead. 
He  intimates  that  the  President  encouraged  him 
to  make  an  extravagant  claim  to  all  northern 
Mexico,  even  to  the  Pacific,  so  as  to  give  annexa- 
tion a  national  rather  than  a  sectional  interest,  and 
he  concludes  that  Jackson's  main  purpose  in  all 
this  deviousness  was  to  avoid  making  enemies  for 
Van  Buren  in  the  next  Congress.   Be  that  as  it  may, 
the  iriends  of  Texas  in  the  Congress  which  met  for 
its  last  session  in  December,  that  month  of  good 
omen,  determined  to  bring  things  to  a  head.    In 
spite  of  all  the  talk  about  annexation,  they  decided 
to  reopen  the  fight  on  the  narrower  question  of  re- 
cognition.   A  Senate  resolution  that  the  Republic 
of  Texas  should  be  recognized  called  forth  the  elo- 
quent support  of  Calhoun  and  the  temporizing  op- 
position of  Clay.    On  March  1, 1837,  the  resolution 
was  adopted. 


RECOGNITION  loi 

A  more  practical  device  in  favor  of  Texas  was 
thr  work  of  Waddy  Thompson  of  South  Carolina 
in  the  House  of  Representatives.     He  moved  to 
amend  the  civil  and  diplomatic  appropriation  bill 
so  as  to  provide  for  "a  diplomatic  agent  to  be  sent 
to  the  independent  republic  of  Texas."    The  House 
struck  out  the  word   "independent"  and  made 
the  appointment  conditional  upon  the  President's 
receiving  "satisfactory  evidence  that  Texas  is  an 
independent  power."     In  this  form  both  Houses 
passed  the  recommendation  and  thereby  adroitly 
threw  back  upon  Jackson  the  responsibility  which 
he  had  tried  to  fix  on  them.    But  this  time  he  ac- 
cepted the  responsibility,  though  his  precise  motive 
remains  obscure.    He  sent  for  Wharton  and  some 
other  Texans  to  have  a  glass  of  wine  with  him 
on  the  n-ght  of  the  3d  of  March.    That  day,  he 
told  1  he  had  nominated  a  charge  d'affaires 

to  the  .(vublic  of  Texas.  He  had  said  to  Con- 
gress that  he  regarded  its  action  as  "a  virtual  de- 
cision of  the  question,"  and  that  it  was  his  duty 
to  acquiesce  therein. 

But  the  recognition  of  the  Republic  of  Texas 
was  only  the  prelude  to  the  real  play.  The  funda- 
mental ue  was  still  annexation.  A  breathing 
space,  however,  followed  the  recognition.    It  was 


{' 


^.  }\ 

.^ 

i; 

¥         1 

m 

( 


I?   t  il 


*:i, 

M 


I 


1 1 


I-:- 


102     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
now  plain  that  on  the  larger  issue  the  political  lines 
would  be  sharply  drawn.    Wharton  perceived  the 
coming  storm.    He  wrote  home  that  it  would  "  agi- 
tate  this  union  more  than  did  the  attempt  to  re- 
strict Mi.s.souri,  nullification,  and  abolitionism,  all 
combined."     An  ominous  sign  was  the  political 
composition  of  the  new  Congress.     Though  the 
Administration  had  a  majority  in  both  Houses,  the 
WTiigs,  in  opposition,  showed  a  dangerous  increase 
over  the  previous  Congress.    ^Vhen  James  K.  Polk, 
the  previous  Speaker  of  the  House,  was  reelected, 
it  was  by  a  margin  of  only  thirteen  votes. 

The  trial  of  strength  in  Congress  between  friends 
and  foes  of  annexation  was  postponed  by  the  ter- 
rible business  collapse  known  as  the  panic  of  1837. 
But  even  while  the  country  staggered  on  the  edge 
of  ruin,  while  Whigs  and  Democrats  were  defin- 
ing their  relation  to  a  catastrophe  of  the  first 
magnitude,  the  indefatigable  Texan  agents  went 
on  log-rolling  for  annexation.  Memucan  Hunt, 
who  had  succeeded  Wharton,  sought  in  vain  to 
enlist  the  support  of  the  Administration.  Presi- 
dent Van  Buren  refused  to  turn  aside  from  what  he 
deemed  the  larger  issues.  With  the  business  of 
the  country  prostrate,  the  danger  of  inciting  war 
with  Mexico  b^    annexing  Texas  could  not  be 


^ 


RECOGMTIOX  lOS 

incurred.  When  Hunt,  in  August,  made  a  formal 
application  to  the  State  Department  on  behalf  of 
Texas  for  permission  to  enter  the  Union,  the  Stx^re- 
tary  bluntly  told  him  that  he  was  invilinj,'  the 
United  States  to  enter  into  a  war.  "So  long  as 
Texas  shall  remain  at  war,  while  the  United  States 
are  at  peace  with  her  adversary,  the  proposition 
of  the  Texan  minister  plenipotentiary  necessarily 
involves  the  question  of  war  with  thai  ad'.ersary.'" 

Hunt  appears  to  have  considered  the  attitude  of 
the  Administration  as  political  chicanery.  He  did 
not  appreciate  the  reluctance  of  all  the  business  in- 
terests of  the  country  to  be  drawn  into  war  at  such 
a  time.  But  he  was  quite  right  in  seeing  the  whole 
episode  in  the  terms  of  politici,  especially  since 
friends  of  Texas  who  had  the  confidence  of  -'an 
Buren  assured  him  that  the  Democratic  leaders 
dared  not  "jeopardize  the  strength  of  the  party  in 
the  North  by  precipitate  action  on  the  subject." 

During  1837  two  events  took  place  in  the  United 
States  the  importance  of  which  the  Texans  did  not 
fully  realize.  In  the  first  place,  the  anti-slavery 
agitation  reached  a  point  of  acute  crisis.  In  the 
previous  year  John  Quincy  Adams  had  joined  the 
abolitionists  and  had  become  their  chief  voice  in 
Congress.    The  suppr'^^^ion  by  the  House  of  the 


'111 

;■  t 

I'' 


'ifjj 


iil 


":5 

-3 


9  ..V 


En 


III! 


ri' 


:/, 


104  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
right  of  petition  on  the  subject  of  slavery  had  made 
Congress  a  boiling  pot  with  the  hd  clamped  down. 
In  November,  1837,  one  of  the  great  tragedies  of 
the  anti-slavery  crusade  took  place.  The  aboli- 
tionist Lovejoy  was  murdered  by  a  mob  In  Illinois. 
The  cold  fury  aroused  in  men  like  Adams  by  this 
outrage  is  beyond  description.  They  set  out  to  be 
revenged  on  the  >vhole  party  of  slaveholders. 

In  this  year,  too,  abolitionists  reached  a  definite 
conviction  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  was  iden- 
tified with  the  interests  of  slavery.    The  idea  of  a 
conspiracy  of  slaveliolders  and  annexationists  orig- 
inated with  Benjamin  Lundy,  when  that  famous 
abolitionist  in  1832  devised  his  scheme  for  plant- 
ing free  colonies  in  Texas.    Had  his  plans  material- 
ized, Texas  would  have  been  —  like  Kansas  a  quar- 
ter century  later  —  a  labyrinth  of  hostile  colonies, 
some  free,  some  slave.     Although  the  plan  was 
never  carried  out,  Lundy  made  several  visits  to 
Texas  and  Mexico,  and  fell  in  with  a  notorious 
Colonel  Almonte,  the  bosom  friend  of  Santa  Anna, 
who  appears  to  have  filled  him  with  the  Mexican 
view  of  Texas.    Lundy  came  home  convinced  that 
Texas  was  a  den  of  thieves.    He  wrote  articles 
for  the  abolitionist  newspapers  and  published  two 
pamphlets,  The  Origin  and  True  Cause  of  the  Texas 


m 


(, 


RECOGNITION  105 

Insurrection  and  The  War  in  Texas,  in  which  the 
violence  of  his  language  was  matched  by  the  in- 
accuracy of  his  knowledge.  He  looked  upon  the 
war  as  an  "invasion  of  brigands  from  the  I'nited 
States"  who  had  the  "avowed  purpose  of  adding 
five  or  six  more  slaveholding  States  to  this  Union." 
Lundy's  views  were  taken  over  bodily  by  Adams. 
Remembering  that  these  were  largely  the  views  of 
Almonte  and  that  through  Adams  tlu-y  were  foisted 
upon  historians  for  half  a  century,  we  have  here 
one  more  instance  of  the  perversion  of  history  by 
uncritical  writers.  By  the  end  of  1«.'J7  stn-tional 
prejudice  and  anti-slavery  passion  had  produced  a 
new  political  force  hostile  to  Texas  and  fiercely 
uncompromising. 

In  December,  the  enemies  of  Texas  forced  the 
fighting.  The  moment  of  attack  was  well  chosen. 
The  dread  of  war,  with  American  business  still 
prostrate,  was  widespread.  Even  among  some  of 
the  slavery  champions  this  dread  outweighed  the 
desire  to  acquire  Texas.  It  had  inspired  Governor 
INIcDufl^e  of  South  Carolina,  in  the  most  singular 
act  of  his  life,  to  urge  the  South  Carolina  Legis- 
lature to  reconsider  their  "almost  unanimously 
expressed  desire"  for  the  admission  of  Texas,  giv- 
ing as  his  reason  that  it  would  promptly  involve 


''ill 

>  ii 

i. 

(  i 


li, 

■ 

1 

i 

I  , 

"f  f 

I- 


hlk 


^ 


111 


i»j 


106     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

the  United  States  in  the  war  and  would  lead  to 
servile  insurrections  in  Louisiana  and  the  neigh- 
boring States.    iVnother  strategic  feature  of  the 
moment  was  the  composition  of  Congress.  Though 
Texas  was  not  yet  definitely  a  party  issue,  the 
Whigs,  who  were  the  champions  of  business  against 
the  laissez-faire  policy  of  the  Administration,  could 
be  truste<l  to  stand  pat  against  war.    The  Adminis- 
tration forces,  with  their  narrow  majority  of  only 
thirteen  and  with  business  not  yet  restored,  would 
hardly  have  the  courage,  even  if  they  had  the  wish 
to  hold  together  on  a  policy  that  involved  war. 
Furthermore,  the  Administration  had  been  busy 
during  1837  seeking  to  adjust  a  long  list  of  claims  of 
American  citizens  against  Mexico.    At  the  close  of 
the  year  these  claims  were  in  sight  of  arbitration. 
Diplomatic  relations  had  been  resumed.    A  Mexi- 
can Minister  had  reached  Washington.    Annexa- 
tion and  war  would  throw  aside  the  hope  of  any 
profitable  settlement.    Instead  of  some  crumb  of 
financial  solace  in  Mexican  payments,  there  would 
be  that  necessity  of  all  wars  —  taxes.   The  enemies 
of  annexation  seemed  likely  at  this  critical  mo- 
ment to  score  a  moral  victory  by  squarely  meeting 
and  rejecting  the  project. 

The  issue  was  brought  before  Congress  when 


^i    i 


^ 


RECOGNITIOX  107 

Senator  Benjamin  Swift  of  Vfrniont  presented 
resolutions  by  his  State  Ix'gislature  rondemning 
the  proposal  to  annex  Texas.  Instantly  the  issue 
v\as  accepted  as  a  sectional  battle.  After  the  read- 
ing of  the  Vermont  resolutions,  Senator  William 
R.  King  nf  Alabama  pronounced  them  "an  in- 
famous !  I  and  insult  on  the  South."  Calhoun 
deemed  .le  present  moment  one  of  the  greatest 
importance;  a  great  step  had  l)een  taken  in  the 
progress  of  events;  he  had  long  foreseen  the  pres- 
ent state  of  things,  and  now  the  time  had  ac- 
tually come  when  it  was  to  be  determined  whether 
we  were  to  remain  longer  as  one  united  and  hap- 
py people,  or  whether  this  blessed  union  was  to 
be  dissolved  by  ^he  hand  of  violence;  Vermont 
had  struck  a  deep  and  dangerous  blow  into  the 
vitals  of  our  confederacy.  Swift  withdrew  the 
resolutions  for  that  day  but  gave  notice  that  he 
would  bring  them  up  again. 

Then  Calhoun  with  his  usual  courage,  believing 
that  an  issue  might  as  well  be  met  at  its  first  ap- 
pearance, accented  the  gage  of  battle.  On  the  27th 
of  December  he  gave  his  counterblast  to  the  Ver- 
mont resolutions.  Though  Texas  was  not  named, 
the  view  of  the  Union  and  of  the  situation  of  the 
moment,  as  shown  in  the  Calhoun  resolutions. 


1 


.1. 

i 

«  » 


U\ 


II 


I' 


m 


#1 

fi! 


:  r.  if 


108     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

made  the  nJ  tempt  to  exclude  Texas  seem  an  iniper- 
tinence.  not  to  say  a  treason.  On  January  4,  1838, 
his  colleague,  William  C.  Preston,  advanced  the 
discussion  to  its  permanent  form.  In  a  set  of 
resolutions  he  asked  the  Senate  to  denounce  the 
Treaty  of  1810  under  which  the  region  between  the 
Sahine  and  the  Rio  Grande  had  been  "surren- 
dered " ;  and  urged  that "  whenever  it  can  Iw  effected 
consistently  with  the  faith  and  treaty  stipulations 
of  the  United  States,  it  is  desirable  and  expedient 
to  annex  the  .said  Territory  to  the  United  States." 

Thus  the  Congressional  battle  began.  In  the 
course  of  the  struggle  which  raged  for  six  months, 
Preston  made  the  declaration  that  he  did  not  con- 
template annexation  until  Mexico  could  be  brought 
to  consent  and  that  he  was  not  trying  to  involv<'  the 
T'nited  States  in  war.  Perhaps  this  admi.saion  cut 
the  ground  from  under  him.  At  least  the  strate- 
gists of  the  attack  had  gaged  the  situation  cor- 
rectly. By  degrees  an  anti-Texas  coalition  was 
formed.    In  June  Preston's  resolutions  were  tabled. 

In  the  House  the  coalition  had  harder  work 
and  came  much  nearer  to  defeat.  Again  Waddy 
Thompson  was  the  pro-T  xan  leader.  The  coun- 
ter-attack was  directed  by  Adams.  He  fought  with 
all  the  controlled  fierceness  and  deadly  precision 


f 
t 


H 


REC()(..,ITIO\  109 

that  made  him  sct'orul  to  none  in  the  bitterness  of 
df'bato.  His  final  move  was  u  famous  piece  of  oh- 
struction.  During  three  ut-eks.  from  the  16th  of 
June  to  the  end  of  the  session,  he  held  the  fn-e  time 
of  the  House  in  a  continuing  spee<h.  Thus  Aclanis 
killed  a  resolution  fathered  by  Thompson  and  simi- 
lar in  character  to  the  resolutions  of  Preston.  This 
famous  "Texas  Speech,"  as  it  is  now  known,  was 
afterAvard  enlarged  an<l  published.  It  contained  a 
review  of  'I'exan  history  which  was  taken  up  by 
historians  and  has  endured  until  our  o^n  day. 


111 


If 


,t- 


m 


IM 


»  *  i  *  •f 
K  1     1 


■rm 


.1 


m 


CHAPTKH  VT 


THE    MEXK.W    NilADOW 


DuRiNo  ten  years  the  Hcpiihlic  which  was  f)ro- 
claimcd  at  Washington-on-thc-Brazos  on  March 
2,  ?836,  watched  with  trouhlefl  eyes  a  great  shadow 
upon  the  southern  horizon.    To  the  student  of  to- 
day the  shadow  seems  indeed  hut  a  shadow;  but  to 
the  men  of  that  day  it  was  not  yet  certain  that  the 
Mexican  peril  lacked  substance.    It  is  surprising 
that  the  danger  was  not  terribly  real.    Texas  was 
very  sparsely  settled.     Its  little  homesteads  and 
towns  were  separated  by  great  spaces.    It  was  just 
the  country  to  invite  raiders,  for  it  afforded  to  the 
predatory  horseman  rich  opportunity.    He  might 
choose  his  own  time  and  course  and  might  destro 
a  settlement,  even  far  within  the  border,  and  es- 
cape, with  only  ;i  handful  of  his  enemies  informed 
of  his  movements.    All  that  saved  Texas  in  these 
perilous  days  was  the  amazing  slowness  and  stupid- 
ity of  th(>  Mexicans.    Had  the  Texans  faced  rovers 


110 


^1 
'» ■ 


THE  MEXICAN'  SHADOW  m 

of  the  tj-pe  of  the  Tatars,  or  the  Six  \atlons.  their 
worst  nhirm  would  have  \wvn  justified. 

The  second  President  of  Texas.  Miraheau  Bona- 
parte  Lamar,   whose   extraordinary   name   fitted 
the  visionary  idealism  of  his  eharaeter.  wrnis  to 
have  had  in  him  enough  of  the  poet  to  spoil  the 
statesman.    In  Deeember.  IS.'JH.  Lamar  succeeded 
Houston  —  for  the  Texan  constitution  forbade  the 
President  to  succ.vd  himself  —  and  began  at  once 
the  ambitious  attempt   to  make  Texas  a  great 
independent   [wwer.      Taking  advantagi'  of  the 
natural  reaction  away  from  the  I'nited  States, 
Lamar  gave  free  scope  to  his  visionary  tempera- 
ment, and  for  a  time  Texas  followed  him.    Of  the 
various  ill-judged  measures  which  he  devised  only 
one  needs  to  be  mentioned  here.     That  one  the 
Texan  Congress  refused  to  sanction,  whereupon 
Lamar  put  it  through  on  his  own  responsibility. 
It  was  nothing  less  than  an  attempt  to  break  up  the 
trade  which  then  flourished  l)ctween  Mexico  and 
the  United  States  through  Santa  Fe  and  to  compel 
this  trade  to  take  a  new  course  southward  through 
Texas.    Neither  the  precise  rights  of  a  neutral  in 
trade  with  a  belligerent,  nor  the  nice  distinctions  of 
international  law  seem  to  have  occurred  to  this 
dreamer  President.    Even  had  his  mad  attempt 


') 


it 


'ill 

■'      'I- 


M, 


1'  n 


si  il 


I 


112     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

succeeded,  the  resulting  complications  with  the 
United  States  would  doubtless  have  confused  him; 
but  it  was  a  tragic  failure.  The  men  in  the  fee- 
ble expedition  which  he  sent  against  Santa  Fe  suf- 
fered frightful  hardship,  reached  New  I^Iexico  in  a 
starving  condition,  and  were  easily  overpowered 
and  taken  prisoner.  The  only  material  effect  of  this 
disastrous  foray  was  to  inflame  Mexico  and  assure 
renewal  of  the  war  at  the  earliest  opportunity. 

The  Santa  Fe  tragedy  destroyed  the  popularity 
of  Lamar,  and  Houston  was  acclaimed  as  his  suc- 
cessor.   What  Lamar  had  sown  Houston  now  had 
to  reap.    Coming  into  office  in  December,  1841, 
he  had  not  long  to  wait  for  the  Mexican  counter- 
stroke.    In  March,  1842,  a  ISIexican  army,  taking 
advantage  of  the  lay  of  the  land  to  make  a  secret 
advance,  suddenly  appeared  before  San  Antonio. 
Simultaneously   raiding  parties   swept   over   the 
southern  horizon  and  fell  upon  other  Texan  towns. 
But  this  first  onrush  was  not  an  invasion  in  force; 
loot  was  its  principal  object.    Having  seized  what 
they  could  carry  off,  the  Mexicans  vanished  as 
suddenly  as  they  had  appeared. 

Exaggerated  reports  of  the  raid  swept  over  Texas 
and  reached  the  United  States,  where  an  adven- 
turous sympathy  with  Texas  again  became  the 


4 


THE  MEXICAN  SHADOW  U3 

fashion  of  the  moment.    Vohmtccrs  set  out  for  the 
scene  of  danger,  and  a  mih'tia  force  assembled  in 
Texas.    But  Houston  had  no  mind  for  a  premature 
stroke  by  unorganized  forces  and  during  the  sum- 
mer the  "vMtia  melted  away.    In  September,  when 
the  ordiL^ry  routine  of  Hfe  was  going  on  at  San 
Antonio,  the  judge  of  the  district  holding  court, 
the  leading  members  of  the  bar  arguing  before  him,' 
a  Mexican  force  of  some  twelve  hundred  men,' 
under  General  Adrian  Woll, descended  on  the  town.' 
After  a  little  sharp  fighting,  these  Mexicans  swept 
away  southward,  carryingoff  a  number  of  prisoners, 
including  the  leading  members  of  the  San  Antonio 
bar  and  the  judge  himself. 

This  second  San  Antonio  raid  again  aroused  in 
Texas  fierce  discussions  of  what  ought  to  be  done. 
Again  volunteers  flocked  together  and  demanded 
a  counter  invasion  of  Mexico.  Again  Houston 
tried  to  prevent  a  premature  stroke  and  sought  to 
persuade  the  impatient  people  to  form  some  sort  of 
effective  military  organization.  But  neither  Presi- 
dent nor  people  would  accept  the  other's  plan,  and 
while  they  wrangled,  the  Texan  forces  again  began 
to  melt  away.  Thereupon  three  hundred  enthu- 
siasts resolved  to  take  things  into  their  own  hands. 
They  elected  a  commander,  made  their  way  across 


]i 


f 

(■ 


rl 


III 


t         1 


I 

If' 

m 


h  ^ '' 
1*1 


!! 


i 


114     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

the  Rio  Grande,  and  attacked  the  Mexican  town 
of  Mier  on  Christmas  Day,  1842.  It  so  happened 
that  Mier  was  at  that  moment  occupied  by  a  Mexi- 
can force  which  outnumbered  the  Texans  probably 
four  to  one.  Though  the  invaders  fought  furiously 
in  the  streets  of  Mier,  their  battle  was  hopeless 
from  the  beginning.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  next 
day  the  few  Texans  who  remained  surrendered 
upon  written  assurance  from  the  Mexican  com- 
mander that  they  should  be  treated  "with  the 
consideration  which  is  in  accordance  with  the 
magnanimous  Mexican  nation." 

While  on  the  march  the  Mexican  capital  in 
February,  1843,  these  I  prisoners  overpowered 
their  guard  and  made  t^  i"?  scape.  Seeking  safety 
in  the  neighboring  mounL...ns,  they  lost  their  way 
and  sutfered  horribly  for  want  of  food.  Some  died 
of  starvation,  and  those  who  survived  were  at  length 
recaptured.  As  a  punishment  for  their  hardihood, 
every  tenth  man  was  shot.  The  rest  were  sent 
to  the  dungeons  of  the  castle  of  Perote,  where 
many  died,  so  that  in  the  end  only  a  pitiful  handful 
remained  to  be  liberated. 

Such,  in  the  opening  months  of  1843,  was  the 
desperate  military  situation  in  which  Houston 
found  himself.   His  diplomatic  outlook  was  equally 


THE  MEXICAN  SHADOW  115 

dark.    Early  in  the  previous  fateful  year  Houston 
had  renewed  overtures  with  a  view  to  annexing 
Texas  to  the  United  States.    But  Daniel  Webster 
who  was  then  Secretary  of  State,  was  an  enemy  of 
Texas  and  gave  him  no  encouragement.    He  was 
scarcely  cordial  upon  the  subject  of  mediation  be- 
tween Texas  and  Mexico,  though  at  length  he  eon- 
sented  to  act  if  England  and  France  cooperated. 
When  he  heard  of  the  Mier  expedition,  however, 
he  told  the  Texan  Minister  at  Washington  that  he 
would  have  nothing  further  to  do  with  mediation. 
Meanwhile  a  strange  performance  on  the  part 
of  an  erratic  officer  of  the  Unued  States  Navy 
promised  for  a  moment  to  bring  Webster  over  to 
Houston's  side,  though  in  the  end  it  made  the 
breach  between  them  wider  than  ever.    We  .shall 
hear  later  of  certain  acrid  notes  that  passed  be- 
tween Washington  and  Mexico  City  btn^ause  W^eb- 
ster  persisted,  to  the  disgust  of  the  Mexicans,  in  an 
attitude  of  strict  neutrality.   To  the  Mexican  mind, 
as  to  the  later  German  mind,  neutrality  was  not 
a  legal  status  but  an  emotional  condition.    When 
Webster,   keeping  strictly  to   international   law 
would  not  play  the  hand  of  Mexico,  the  Mexi- 
can Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  issued  statements 
that  seemed  to  indicate  the  beginning  of  hostilities. 


n^ 


it 


^Il 


U-n 


1' 


J'     I 


116  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
These  remarks  came  to  the  ears  of  Commodore 
Jones,  who  commanded  a  small  squadron  of 
American  ships  then  off  the  coast  of  Peru,  and,  to- 
gether with  certain  absurd  and  groundless  rumors, 
aroused  his  patriotism  to  the  boiling  point.  Setting 
all  sail,  he  made  for  the  coast  of  Mexico,  confident 
that  before  he  sighted  its  shores  the  two  countries 
would  be  deep  in  a  great  war.  When  he  arrived 
before  Monterey,  California,  the  Commodore  did 
not  pause  to  question  the  basis  of  his  judgment  but 
at  once  invested  the  town.  Imagine  the  bewilder- 
ment of  the  inhabitants  who  \\  ere  thus  compelled 
to  produce  newspapers  and  various  other  evidence 
in  an  effort  to  persuade  this  strange  impetuous  man 
from  the  sea  that  Mexico  and  the  Unitod  States 
were  at  peace. 

This  amazing  farce  occurred  in  October  of  1842. 
It  became  known  at  Washington  in  January,  1843. 
Thereupon  John  Quincy  Adams,  the  most  relent- 
less of  the  enemies  of  Texas,  again  took  up  the 
cudgels  against  her.  It  had  leaked  out  t'  ~  -si- 
dent  Tyler  differed  from  his  Secretary  of  atav^  m 
desiring  a  revival  of  the  issue  of  Texan  annexation, 
which  had  become  increasingly  likely  during  the 
latter  part  of  1842.  Adams,  now  heart  and  soul 
the  anti-slavery  leader  and  always  on  the  qui  vive 


I        1-- 


THE  MEXICAN  SHADOW  in 

to  discover  a  Southern  plot  on  behalf  of  slavery, 
watched  every  item  of  news  with  a  bitter  and  preju- 
diced eye,  for  he  was  utterly  suspicious  of  Tyler. 
To  Adams  this  news  of  what  Jones  had  done  meant 
but  one  thing.     Somehow,  somewhere,  a  scheme 
was  on  foot  to  embroil  the  United  States  with 
Mexico  and  to  force  the  country  into  a  war  on 
behalf  of  slaveholding  Texas.     As  for  Jones,  he 
had  stupidly  bungled  the  matter.    Even  when  the 
Administration  promptly  recalled  Jones  and  dis- 
avowed his  action,  Adams  was  not  satisfied.    He 
wanted  Jones  disgraced.     Nothing  short  of  that 
would  prove  the  good  faith  of  the  Administration, 
though  Tyler  in  a  message  to  Congress  stated  that 
Jones  had  acted  "entirely  of  his  own  authority." 

So  lacking  in  temperate  judgment  were  Adams 
and  his  close  associates  that  they  presently  issued 
an  Address  to  the  People  of  the  Free  States.  This 
paper  revealed  the  same  absolute  satisfaction  with 
a  personal  sense  of  evidence  that  had  inspired  the 
conduct  of  the  erratic  Jones.  Its  thirteen  signers 
declared  positively  that  the  Southern  States  were 
conspiring  to  annex  Texas  in  order  that  "the  un- 
due ascendency  of  the  slaveholding  power  of  the 
Government  shall  be  secured  and  riveted  beyond 
all  redemption."    After  a  long  review  of  all  the 


5 

I 


H. 


♦:M-rt 


r 


^'Hf 


i  u  ^i 


?7 

Y 

I 

J.. 

; 

v. 


%^  \ 


lu 


118     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

charges  originally  inspired  by  Almonte  and  Lundy. 
the  Address  advanced  to  new  ground  in  an  auda- 
cious threat  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  would 
justify  the  free  States  in  dissolving  the  Union. 

The  Address  was  dated  March  3,  1843,  the  day 
on  which  Congress  adjourned.    On  the  same  day 
the  Senate  altered  a  Treaty  of  Commerce  and 
Amity  which  Webster  after  long  delays  had  con- 
sented to  negotiate  with  the  Texan  Republic.    The 
alterations  made  the  treaty  unacceptable  to  Tex- 
as.   Thus  in  the  spring  of  1843  Houston  came 
to  a  point  where  his  situation  appeared  desperate. 
Despite  the  rumors  of  a  new  movement  of  annexa- 
tion, the  United  States  Department  of  State  was 
still  in  the  hands  of  the  great  political  genius  who 
was  his  enemy.    The  implacable  Adams,  who  had 
once  defeated  annexation,  was  openly  moving  for 
an  anti-Texan  combination  that  should  stop  at 
nothing  before  its  goal.    The  military  events  since 
the  resumption  of  hostilities  were  all  in  favor  of 
Mexico.    The  tragedy  of  the  Mier  prisoners  was  in 
every  mind.    And  this  state  of  things  had  been 
brought  about  while  Santa  Anna,  again  the  hero  of 
Mexico,  was  engaged  in  a  civil  war  with  the  prov- 
inceof  Yucatan.    What  might  happen  should  Santa 
Anna  prevail,  or  should  a  compromise  be  effectt  J 


THE  MEXICAN  SHADOW  119 

with  Yucatan,  and  all  the  power  of  the  Mexican 
government  be  turned  against  Texas? 

There  was,  however,  still  one  card  in  Houston's 
hand  which  had  not  been  played.  We  must  turn 
now  to  his  relations  with  England. 


d'  '1 


'■  ii 

!2.     W' 


is 


I 


1  J 


\ 


^jij 

i: ;  ' 

[■ !  ■  >  ^ 

CHAPTER  VII 


I    I* 
p  i  i 


r  i 


I 


I 

Iff 


ENGLAND    AS    PEACEMAKER 

The  story  of  Texas  is  full  of  strange  historical  par- 
allels and  apparent  anticipations,  as  if  the  shadows 
of  coming  events  were  ominously  cast  before.    We 
have  seen  that  Benjamin  Lundy  in  Texas  would 
have  anticipated  John  Brown  in  Kansas.     Curi- 
ously, too,  the  same  boisterous  Palmerston  of  Eng- 
land, who  had  to  deal  with  the  question  of  recog- 
nition of  Texas,  was  embarrassed  twenty  years 
later  by  that  of  recognizing  the   Confederacy. 
Palmerston  was  probably  as   well   disposed   to- 
ward an  independent  Texas  as  he  was  toward 
the  Confederacy  in  the  later  years  when  the  ca- 
price of  fortune  had  again  inflicted  him  upon  the 
English  people.    But  he  had  no  more  intention  of 
pulling  some  one  else's  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  in 
the  one  case  than  in  the  other.   He  held  off,  waiting 
to  see  what  Texas  could  do  by  herself,  and  carried 
water  on  both  shoulders  by  agreeing  that  a  Texan 

120 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  i«i 

ship  might  go  into  "the  Ports  of  Great  Britain  as  a 
Mexican  ship,  according  to  the  stipulations  of  the 
Mexican  treaty,  notwithstanding  that  I  lie  Dotu- 
ments  used  for  such  ship  should  bear  u|)on  their 
face  that  they  were  the  avowed  act  of  a  govern- 
ment in  Texas,  assuming  the  style  of  a  Uepuhlie 
independent  of  Mexico." 

While  Palmerston  thus  held  off  from  an  honest 
nKiognition,  Texas  tried  without  success  to  borrow 
money  in  England  and  France.    The  failure  was 
due  to  various  influences.    The  gigantic  collapse 
of  American  business  in  the  panic  of  1837  was 
fiesh  in  every  mind,  and  Europe  was  still  wary  of 
all  transatlantic  investments.    Many  Englishmen 
had  already  burned  their  fingers  lending  money  to 
Mexico  and  they  feared  that  any  financial  support 
of  Texas  might  cause  a  further  dec-reuse  in  the 
value  of  their  Mexican  bonds.    Furthermore  —  a 
significant  fact  —  the  British  and  Foreign  Anti- 
slavery  Society  was  opposed  to  the  creation  of  a 
new  slaveholding  power.    Thus  early  the  slavery 
question  became  a  factor  in  Texan  diplomacy. 

It  was  the  slave  trade,  indeed,  which  in  part  at 
least  persuaded  Palmerston  to  recognize  Texas. 
The  British  people  were  eager  to  have  their  navv 
sweep  the  slaver  from  the  seas.    But  to  accomplish 


it 


'Ml 


\i 


,* 


I, 


iii 


I  hi 


y 


if  ^  ^ 


I, 


f 


I 

t  s 
f  3 


1««     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
this  end  it  was  nwessary  to  possess  r^  treaty-right 
to  visit,  if  not  to  search,  ships  flying  other  flags 
than  the  Union  Jack.    In  trying  to  persuade  the 
United  States  to  grant  such  a  right.  Pahnerston 
used  the  bullying  tone  natural  to  him  and  offended 
the  old  sensitiveness  of  Americans  over  the  right 
of  search.    The  American  ambassador  at  London. 
Andrew  Stevenson,  gave  Palmerston  as  good  as  he 
got  by  serving  notice  that,  in  the  absence  of  a 
definite  treaty  granting  it.  no  claim  to  the  right  of 
search  would  be  tolerated  at  Washington.    Then 
the  American  Secretary  of  State  informed   the 
British  Government  that  his  country  would  not 
accept  a  treaty  giving  right  of  search  to  British 
cruisers.    But  in  spite  of  this  opposition.  Palmer- 
ston turned  the  flank  of  the  United  States  by 
agreeing  in   1840  to  recognize  Texas  as  a  new 
republic  upon  the  condition  that  it  allow  a  mu- 
tual  right  of  search  by  cru      -s  of  the  two  pow- 
ers m  suppressing  the  slave   ^.de.    But  Texas  hesi- 
tated at  the  right  of  search,  and  for  two  years  the 
agreement  remained  unratified. 

Meanwhile  a  curious  coincidence  occurred.  Al- 
most at  the  same  time  the  administrations  changed 
in  Texas,  in  the  United  States,  in  Mexico,  and  in 
England.    In  1841.  Houston  became  President  of 


'    « 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  l«3 

Texas  a  second  time,  Webster  became  Secretary  of 
State  for  the  United  States,  Santa  Anna  returned 
to  power  in  Mexico,  and  in  London,  Palmerston 
was  succeeded  at  the  Foreign  Office  by  the  Earl 
of  Aberdeen. 

The  new  Foreign  Secretary  in  England  found  a 
transatlantic  situation  of  many  complications.    As 
to  Mexico,  there  were  the  clamorous  British  bond- 
holders ever  ready  to  denounce  him  should  he 
provoke  that  unstable  nation  into  a  frank  repudia- 
tion of  its  debts.    To  avoid  a  rui)ture  with  Mex- 
ico was  therefore  an  enforced  item  in  his  policy. 
The  quarrel  between  Maine  and  Canada  over  their 
boundary  line  had  culminated  in  recent  border  tu- 
mults now  called  the  "Aroostook  War"  and  for 
a  time  had  seemed  to  threaten  the  gravest  conse- 
quences.   To  settle  the  Maine-Canada  dispute  was 
a  pressing  part  of  Aberdeen's  American  policy. 
Moreover,  the  long  standing  Oregon  question  must 
not  longer  be  neglected.    Finally,  there  was  Texas. 
The  treaty  recognizing  its  independence,  condi- 
tional on  the  right  of  search  in  suppression  of  the 
slave  trade,  was  still  unratified. 

The  question  of  slavery  was  undoubtedly  close 
to  Aberdeen's  heart.  Before  the  close  of  1841, 
before  he  had  been  a  year  in  office,  he  negotiated 


I, 

11  r 


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If 


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f  r   II 


:ti 


li  i  ■■ 


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f        I 


1«4     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

the  now  famous  Quintuple  Treaty  under  which 
France,   England.   Russia.   Prussia,   and   Austria 
adopted  uniform  laws  with  regard  to  the  slave 
'     de  and  gave  to  one  another  a  limited  right  of 
v .  rch.    On  the  day  the  treaty  was  signed  Aber- 
•l«   M   wrote   to  Edward   Everett,   the  American 
Mi.ii»ter  at  London,  a  coneili..tory  letter,  phrased 
i-Mi.tless  .n  ih'sif^nvd  contrast  to  the  eorrespond- 
♦-nu  o.       '    .rston,  inviting  the  United  States  to 
k'l      h  ,1  he  called  "in  truth  a  holy  alliance."    At 
tht  s.,.      ii,„e  Aberdeen  informed  Everett  that  he 
wouid  s.  !id  a  special  minister  to  the  United  States 
to  effect  a  settlement  of  all  points  at  issue  between 
the  two  countries.    "  In  the  choice  of  the  individual 
for  the  mission,"  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  been 
"mainly  influenced  by  the  desire  to  select  a  person 
who  would  be  peculiarly  acceptable  to  the  United 
States  as  well  as  eminently  qualified  for  the  trust." 
So  in  April,  1842,  Alexander  Baring.  Lord  Ash- 
burton,  arrived  at  Washington.    A  long  and  stead- 
fast friend  of  America,  he  was  further  bound  to  the 
country  through  his  wife,  a  Philadelphia  beauty, 
the  daughter  of  William  Bingham,  who  had  sat  in 
the  Continental  Congress  and  had  been  a  Senator 
from  Pennsylvania. 
One  of  the  early  experiences  of  Ashburton  in 


»lave 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  m 

Washington  was  also  one  of  the  most  singular. 
The  distrust  of  Kngland  that  Palmorston  with  his 
bullying  policy  had  sown,  AlMTch-m  and  Ashhur- 
ton  now  had  to  reap.    Not  only  the  Iniled  Stati  s 
but  Texas  mistrusted  the  underlying  f.urfmw  of 
(Jreat  Britain.     As  a  matter  of  fact.  Palmerston 
had  made  overtures  to  Mexico  advising  the  recog- 
nit  ion  of  Texas;  but  there  were  persistent  rumors 
—  in  the  words  of  the  Texan  -  ,  resentative  at 
Washington  — "that  Great  BriliM.  was  furnish- 
ing money  and  supplies  to  Mexico  for  the  subjuga- 
tion  of  Texas."    To  get  at  the  truth  James  Reily. 
at  that  tim-  the  Texan  charge,  turned  to  Clay, 
a  Whig  like  Webster  but  temperamentally  more 
open  to  approach.    At  Reily 's  requ'  ;t  Clay  sought 
an  interview  with  Ashburton  and  asked  him  for  a 
plain  statement  of  p:ngland's  intentions.    In  reply 
he  received  unconditional  assurance,  subsequently 
confirmed  by  Aberdeen,  that  England  would  never 
interfere  in  favor  of  Mexico. 

Meanwhile  Texas  had  at  last  disr)atched  a  mins- 
ter to  England,  Ashbel  Smith,  by  whom  the  formal 
ratifications  of  the  British-Texan  treaties  were  pre- 
sented. But  in  Mexico  discont.-nt  bmke  out  again. 
This  new  development  was  due  to  the  explosions 
in  the  American  newspapers  over  the  capture  of 


¥    1 

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ii 


126     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

San  Antonio  in  March,  184^2.    Waddy  Thompson 
the  newly  arrived  United  States  minister  to  Mex- 
ico, encountered  bitter  complaints  in  Mexico  Citv 
to  the  effect  that  in  all  parts  of  the  United  State's 
no  voice  was  heard  but  that  of  war  with  Mex- 
ico and  of  aid  to  Texas."    At  the  end  of  May 
Bocenegra,  the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Re- 
atmns,  sent  a  circular  note  to  the  resident  dip- 
lomatic corps  denouncing  American  "violations" 
of  neutrality  and  virtually  intimating  war       His 
reasoning  was  precisely  that  with  which  Americans 
became  indignantly  familiar  seventy-five  years  la 
ter.    Thompson  replied  with  the  same  invocation 
of  common  sense  and  international  law  which  was 
afterward  and  in  almost  the  same  connection  ad- 
dressed to  the  no  less  obdurate  Germans.     The 
freedom  of  speech  tolerated  both  in  the  United 
States  and  in  England  forbade  government  inter- 
ference with  public  meetings.    Ample  illustrations 
of  this  freedom  of  speech  were  at  hand.     Almost 
coincident  with  a  pro-Texas  meeting  at  New  Or- 
leans which  had  given  great  offense  in  Mexico 
there  was  held  in  the  same  city  a  meeting  in  favor 
of  repealing  the  Irish  Union;  in  England,  without 
protests  from  the  United  States,  meetings  were 
held  "denouncing  a  large  portion  of  our  people  and 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  m 

I      our  institutions  in  language  in  comparison  with 
"      which  that  used  in  puhhc  meetings  towards  Mexico, 
is  the  language  of  compHment." 

The  discussion  continued.    Other  e(,ually  offen- 
sive notes  which  Bocenegra  issued  drew  from  Web- 
ster a  stern  reply.    In  July  he  wrote  to  'J'homp- 
son:  "You  will  write  a  note  to  M.  de  Bocenegra, 
in  which  you  will  say  .  .  .  that  the  President  of 
the  United  States  considers  the  language  and  tone 
of  that  letter  derogatory  to  the  character  of  the 
United  States  and  highly  offensive  .  .  .  that  the 
conduct  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  the  war 
between  Mexico  and  Texas,  having  been  always 
hitherto  governed  l)y  a  strict  and  impartial  regard 
to  its  neutral  ohii-ations,  will  not  be  changed  or 
altered  in  any  respect  or  in  any  .  I egree.    i  f  for  this, 
the  Government  of  Mexico  shall  set;  fit  to  change 
the  relations  existing  between  the  two  countries, 
the  responsibility  remains  with  herself." 

It  was  while  both  Bocenegra  and  Webster  were 
thus  threatening  war  that  Texas  made  an  ill-judged 
move.  Relying  on  the  friendly  attitude  of  Aber- 
deen toward  the  United  States,  the  Government 
of  Texas  instructed  its  minister,  Ashbel  Smith,  to 
ask  whether  England  and  France  would  not  join 
with  the  United  States  in  a  "triple  interposition" 


1  If 


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vn 

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N|: 


Im  ' 


128     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

between  Texas  and  Mexico.  Apparently  Houston 
and  his  advisers  did  not  understand  the  true  at- 
titudes of  the  neutral  powers  and  their  fixed  re- 
solve in  1842  not  to  be  drawn  into  the  Mexican 
War,  unless  it  might  be  in  their  own  quarrels. 
Ciuizot,  the  Minister  of  I^ouis  Philippe,  gave  the 
matter  a  polite  hearing  but  pointed  out  that  the 
strained  relations  between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States  made  the  scheme  a  very  doubtful  one. 
Aberdeen,  bent  entirely  upon  conciliatory  poli- 
eios,  was  more  outspoken,  frankly  disapproved  the 
.scheme,  and  thought  that  each  power  could  use  its 
good  offices  to  more  advantage  if  independent  of 
the  others.  Thus  the  proposed  triple  interposition 
came  to  nothing. 

Aberdeen  was  genuinely  desirous,  however,  for 
peace  between  Texas  and  Mexico.  Immediately 
upon  the  recognition  of  Texas  he  had  instructed 
the  British  Minister  in  Mexico  to  put  the  case 
as  forcibly  as  possible  before  the  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment. He  argued  that  it  was  impossible  for 
Mexico  ever  to  reconquer  Texas  and  that  it  was 
in  Mexico's  interest  to  create  a  buflPer  state  be- 
tween herself  and  the  United  States,  He  pomted 
out  that  were  a  Mexican  conquest  of  Texas  possible, 
the  United  States  would  doubtless  frustrate  it  by 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  129 

annexing  Texas.  Finally,  he  suggested  that  the 
Mexicans  "should  not  allow  themselves  to  suppose 
that  they  can  at  any  time  count  on  succour  from 
Great  Britain  in  their  struggles  with  Texas,  or  with 
the  United  States.  Great  Britain  is  determined  to 
remain  strictly  neutral."  So  unpromising  had  been 
Santa  Anna's  reception  of  these  overtures  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain  that  the  matter  was  dropped. 

Then  came  the  flare-up  of  the  war  in  the  au- 
tumn of  1842  with  WoU's  invasion  in  September 
and  his  raiding  of  San  Antonio.  In  October  oc- 
curred Jones's  fiasco  at  Monterey,  which  incensed 
the  Mexicans.  In  December  the  surrender  at  Mier 
took  place.  Early  in  1843  the  Mier  prisoners  were 
massacred.  But  just  when  the  outlook  for  Texas 
was  very  dark  things  began  to  mend  and  Aberdeen 
saw  ajiother  opportunity  to  play  the  mediator. 

Among  the  prisoners  carried  off  by  Woll  from 
San  Antonio  was  James  W.  Robinson,  once  Lieu- 
tenant Governor  of  Texas.  In  the  terrible  days 
when  the  Mier  prisoners  were  wandering  in  the 
mountains  or  starving  to  death,  Robinson  was  shut 
up  in  the  castle  of  Perote.  Thence  he  wrote  to 
Santa  Anna  saying  that  Texas  was  tired  of  the  war 
and  that  he  was  sure  he  could  negotiate  a  reunion 
with  Mexico.    Santa  Anna,  remembering  his  own 


y 


I '  i  H 


. 


':    I'  I 


^0\ 
1  il  Ml 


'I 


ISO     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

strategy  after  San  Jacinto,  was  not  quite  taken  in 
but  appears  to  have  reasoned  that  one  prisoner 
more  or  less  did  not  matter,  and  that  he  might  as 
well  take  the  risk.    He  therefore  released  Robinson, 
giving  him  a  signed  statement  of  his  terms  of  peace! 
From  the  Mexican  point  of  view  these  terms  con- 
tained a  real  concession:  if  Texas  would  acknowl- 
edge the  sovereignty  of  Mexico,  the  Texan  Govern- 
ment should  be  granted  so  large  a  measure  of  au- 
tonomy as  to  make  it  independent  in  all  but  name. 
In  April,  1843,  Robinson  laid  these  terms  before 
President  Houston.   By  this  time  the  British  Min- 
ister in  Texas,  Captain  Charles  Elliot,  R.  N.,  was 
deep  in  the  confidence  of  Houston  —  or  thought 
he  was.    The  object  of  Houston's  diplomatic  con- 
duct can  only  be  conjectured.    That  he  took  dif- 
ferent attitudes  at  different  times  toward  England 
and  toward  America  is  established,  but  his  inten- 
tions are  still  a  matter  of  debate.     Did  he  pass 
through  genuine  changes  in  point  of  view  or  was 
he,  as  some  will  have  it,  always  playing  one  game 
under  several  disguises?   Was  he,  when  he  posed  as 
a  lover  of  England  in  the  period  that  now  begins, 
really  championing  Texan  independence,  or  was  he 
scheming  to  frighten  the  United  States  into  offer- 
ing annexation?    These  questions  remain  as  yet 


If 


11 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  131 

unanswered.  What  we  do  know  is  that  in  1843 
Houston  appeared  to  turn  away  from  the  American 
affiUation  and  certainly  began  to  lean  heavily  on 
the  friendship  of  England.  At  his  request  Elliot, 
through  the  British  Minister  at  Mexico  City,  ar- 
ranged an  armistice.  Houston  by  proclamation 
suspended  hostilities.  As  might  have  been  expect- 
ed, nothing  came  of  the  ensuing  negotiations.  Tex- 
as would  not  acknowledge  Mexican  sovereignty. 
Mexico  would  not  recognize  Texan  independence. 
For  more  than  a  year,  however,  the  miserable 
Mexican  War  was  suspended. 

It  was  in  May,  1843,  that  Santa  Anna's  terms  of 
peace  with  Texas,  carried  by  the  released  prisoner 
Robinson,  were  communicated  to  Aberdeen.  He 
thought  they  were  not  of  "a  very  practical  descrip- 
tion." Nevertheless  he  WTote  to  Elliot  to  make 
every  effort  to  persuade  Texas  that  virtual  inde- 
pendence was  worth  the  "nominal  concession" 
demanded  by  Santa  Anna.  W'hat  he  probably 
thought  and  what  all  shrewd  observers  nmst  have 
thought  was  that  both  TexsiS  and  Mexico  were  for 
the  moment  exhausted  and  that  each  was  playing 
for  time  in  which  to  recuperate. 

Aberdeen,  true  to  his  conciliatory  impulse, 
would  have  liked  to  use  this  pause  in  the  war  to 


-  r 

'  ii ' 


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n 


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tl: 


!>' 


I 


1 


132     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
effect  a  permanent  peace.    In  the  early  summer  of 
1843  his  career  as  Foreign  Secretary  was  as  yet 
distinctly  bright.    The  difficult  task  of  undoing  the 
bad  effect  upon  America  of  Palmerston's  diplo- 
macy appeared  to  have  been  accomplished.    The 
Ashburton  mission  had  ended  brilliantly  in  a  treaty 
concluded  at  Washington  in  August,  1842.    If  the 
Oregon  question  was  still  open,  at  least  the  other 
vexatious  matters  concerning  the  Maine  boundary 
and  the  slave  trade  were  settled.    The  provisions  of 
the  Quintuple  Treaty  were  virtually  extended  to 
the  United  States.    The  complex  American  prob- 
lem had  thus  been  reduced  to  the  two  questions  of 
Oregon  and  Texas.    To  both  of  these  Aberdeen  was 
giving  careful  thought  in  the  early  summer  of  1843. 
Other  considerations  besides  rounding  out  his 
foreign  policy  were  pressing  Aberdeen  toward  a 
more  active  course  with  regard  to  Texas.    British 
bondholders  clamored  for  a  policy  that  would  give 
Mexico  peace,  prosperity,  and  a  chance  to  pay  its 
debts.     Moreover,  the  British  cotton  trade  was 
just  then  in  a  state  of  depression.'    Undoubtedly 

•  Certain  recent  historians  have  made  much,  perhaps  too  much, 
of  this  business  depression.  Aberdeen,  subsequent  to  the  summer 
of  184S,  ij  regarded  by  some  scholars  as  a  diplomatic  ogre  seeking 
to  devour  the  world  in  the  interests  of  British  business.  We  may 
dismiss  this  extreme  view.    There  is  no  denying  that  during  a  part 


\} 


i! 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  183 

Aberdeen  wanted  to  see  Texas,  Mexico,  and  the 
United  States,  all  at  peace,  all  prosperous,  all  with 
the  best  of  feeling  toward  England.  Incidentally 
he  may  have  thought  it  would  be  beneficial  to  Eng- 
land if  there  were  another  great  cotton  field  in  the 
world,  one  whose  rulers  inclined  toward  free  trade. 
Texas,  if  securely  independent,  would  be  such  a 
field.  He  believed  that  the  Texans  wanted  inde- 
pendence, and  Houston  diligently  encouraged  this 
view.  What  Aberdeen  did  next,  from  the  strictly 
diplomatic  point  of  view,  was  undoubtedly  a  blun- 
der, but  he  was  under  an  illusion  with  regard  to  the 
real  desire  of  the  Texans,  and  did  not  realize  how 
deeply  his  relation  to  America  had  been  changed  by 
Webster's  retirement  from  the  State  Department 
a  few  months  before.  The  new  policy  was  inti- 
mately connected  with  the  anti-slavery  agitation  in 
England.  Three  important  steps  had  been  taken 
for  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade. 

The  three  international  agreements  —  the  Quin- 
tuple Treaty,  the  Texan  Treaty,  the  Webster- 
Ashburton  Treaty  —  were  all  fresh  in  the  public 

of  his  career  his  motives  are  obscure.  But  that  period  does  not 
date  from  1843.  It  is  safest  to  take  his  actions  during  that  year 
at  their  face  value.  Especially  it  is  well  to  give  heed  to  his  own 
statements  of  his  motives.  While  not  at  all  a  great  man,  neither 
was  he  an  evil  one. 


I^ll 


i 


^i 


i! 


t     !' 


i 


ii 


I 


il 


134     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

mind  and  seemed  to  mark  an  era.  Abolitionists 
everywhere  took  heart,  thinking  their  day  was  at 
hand.  Ashbel  Smith  as  early  as  January,  1843, 
was  aware  of  the  working  of  this  powerful  force 
and,  thinking  he  perceived  a  reaction  to  it  on  the 
part  of  the  British  Ministry,  he  wrote  home: 

It  is  the  purpose  of  some  persons  in  England  to  procure 
the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas.  They  propose  to 
accomplish  this  end  by  friendly  negotiation  and  by 
the  concession  of  what  ^t-ill  be  deemed  equivalents.  I 
believe  the  equivalents  contemplated  are  a  guaran- 
tee by  Great  Britain  of  the  Independence  of  Texas  — 
discriminating  duties  in  favor  of  Texian  products  and 
perhaps  a  negotiation  of  a  loan,  or  some  means  by 
which  the  finances  of  Texas  can  be  readjusted.  .  .  . 

Rely  on  it,  as  certain,  that  in  England  it  is  intended 
to  make  an  effort,  and  that  some  things  are  already  in 
train  to  accomplish  if  possible  the  abolition  of  slavery 
in  Texas.  And  might  not  Texas  exhausted  as  just 
described,  listen  in  a  moment  of  folly  to  such  overtures 
of  the  British  Government?  .  .  . 

The  independence  of  Texas  and  the  existence  of 
slavery  in  Texas  is  a  question  of  life  or  death  to 
the  slave  holding  states  of  the  American  Union.  .  .  . 
The  establishment  of  a  free  state  on  the  territory  of  Texas 
is  a  darling  wish  of  England  for  which  scarcely  any  price 
would  be  regarded  as  to  [sic]  great.  The  bargain  once 
struck  what  remedy  remains  to  the  South.  ■ 

"  Texan  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  vol.  ii.  j  ,    1I05-II06.     The 
italics  are  iu  the  original. 


H 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  135 

Ashbel  Smith's  surmise  as  to  the  ultimutf  aims 
of  the  British  Ministry  must  hv  read  in  the  h'ght  of 
later  events.  He  was  not  mistaken  ns  to  tlie  re- 
newed activity  of  the  abolitionists.  Tnder  the 
auspices  of  the  British  and  Foreign  Anti-Slavery 
Society  a  world's  convention  of  opponents  of  slav- 
ery was  arranged  to  meet  in  London  from  June 
13th  to  June  20,  1843.  As  an  event  in  the  devel- 
opment of  abolition  this  convention  does  not  at 
present  concern  us,  but  as  a  political  event,  it  is  of 
the  first  magnitude. 

This  world's  convention  naturally  drew  to 
London  the  most  militant  American  abolitionists. 
Among  them  was  Stephen  Pearl  Andrews  from 
Galveston,  Texas.  Lundy's  dream  of  a  Texas 
filled  with  anti-slavery  colonies,  though  it  had 
never  been  realized,  had  not  been  entirely  vain. 
There  was  some  —  it  is  very  diflScult  to  say  how 
much  —  anti-slavery  sentiment  in  Texas,  and  the 
new  ferment  of  anti-slavery  enthusiasm  the  world 
over  had  its  effect  among  the  Texan  abolitionists. 
Andrews,  as  their  representative,  set  out  for  Lon- 
don. Passing  through  the  United  States  he  joined 
another  militant  abolitionist,  Lewis  Tappan,  and 
together  they  called  on  the  grim  leader  of  their 
cause,  John  Quincy  Adams.    In  his  diary  Adams 


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m     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
hM  recorded  this  visit.  The  passage  is  worth  brack- 
eting  with  the  one  already  quoted  from  Ashbel 
Smith.     The  entry  which  Adams  made  runs  thus: 

Mr.  Tappan  had  with  him  the  New  Orleans  Bee  of  the 
13th  and  16th  May,  containing  several  long  articles 
sounding  the  trumpet  of  alarm  at  the  symptoms  re- 
cently manifested  in  Texas  of  a  strong  party  with  a 
fixed  design  to  abolish  slavery.  ,  .  .     Mr.  Andrews 
.  .  .  is  now  about  to  embark  in  the  steamer  Caledonia, 
tomorrow,  for  England,  with  a  view  to  obtain  the  aid 
of  the  British  government  to  the  cause.  ...     I  bade 
him  God  speed,  and  told  him  that  I  believed  the  free- 
dom of  this  country  and  of  all  mankind  depended  upon 
the  direct,  formal,  open  and  avowed  interference  of 
Great  Britain  to  accomplish  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
Texas;  but  that  I  dis*i  U!,ted  the  sincerity  of  the  present 
British  administration  :n  5  he  anti-slavery  cause. 

The  Convention  in  London  in  the  month  of  June 
was,  of  course,  a  great  event  and  it  was  watched 
by  all  sorts  of  people,  from  all  sorts  of  points  of 
view  —  by  such  political  enemies  as  Lord  Aberdeen 
and  Lord  Brougham;  by  the  keen  and  observant 
envoy  from  Texas;  above  all,  by  a  singular  Ameri- 
can  busybody,  Duflf  Green,  whose  importance  will 
presently  appear. 

A  committee  of  the  Convention,  sometimes  re- 
ferred to  as  "the  Tappan  Committee,"  obtained 


T 

I, 


i^  il 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  137 

an  audience  with  Al  erdeen  which  proved  to  be  an 
historic  event.  Precisely  what  took  place  during 
this  interview  is  somewhat  doubtful.  The  com- 
mittee gave  one  version;  Lord  Al>erdeen,  another. 
Doubtless  it  was  an  instance  of  hot- headed  enthu- 
siasts misunderstanding  the  very  cautious  state- 
ments of  one  who  .sympathized  with  them  per- 
sonally but  had  not  at  the  moment  any  intention 
of  committing  himself  officially.  What  the  com- 
mittee believed  Aberdeen  to  have  said  gave  rise 
to  the  report,  destined  to  have  wide  influence  in 
America,  that  England  would  guarantee  the  in- 
terest of  a  Texan  loan  if  its  proceeds  should  be 
applied  to  the  purchase  and  emancipation  of  slaves. 
Aberdeen's  version  of  the  conference  —  which 
was  not  known  in  the  United  States  until  the  Com- 
mittee's version  had  become  a  fixed  tradition 
accepted  by  such  incompatibles  as  Calhoun  and 
Adams  —  was  expressed  in  reply  to  a  direct  in- 
quiry from  Smith,  in  whom  the  version  circulated 
by  the  committee  roused  alarm. 

His  Lordship  replied  in  effect  (Smith  wrotel  that  it  is 
the  well  known  policy  and  wish  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  abolish  slavery  everywhere;  that  its  abolitioa 
in  Texas  is  deemed  very  desirable  and  he  spoke  to  this 
point  at  some  length,  as  connected  with  British  policy 


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188     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

and  British  interests  and  in  reference  to  the  United 
States.  He  added,  that  there  was  no  disposition  on  the 
part  of  the  British  Government  to  interfere  improperly 
on  this  subject,  and  that  they  would  not  give  the 
Texian  government  cause  to  complain;  he  was  not  pre- 
pared to  say  whether  the  British  Government  would 
consent  hereafter  to  make  such  compensation  to  Texas 
as  would  enable  the  slaveholders  to  abolish  slavery, 
the  object  is  deemed  so  important  pf-rhaps  they  might! 
though  he  could  not  say  certainly.  ... 

Lord  Aberdeen  also  stated  that  despatches  had  been 
recently  sent  to  Mr.  Doyle,  the  British  Charge  d*  Af- 
faires at  Mexico,  instructing  him  to  renew  the  tender 
of  British  mediation  based  on  the  abolition  of  slavery 
in  Texas,  and  declaring  that  abolition  would  be  a 

great  moral  triumph  for  Mexico.     Your  Department 
wdl  not  fail  to  remark  that  this  despatch  to  Mr.  Doyle 

appears  to  introduce  a  new  and  important  condition 

into  "mediation."  .  .  . 
The  British  Government  greatly  desire  the  abolition 

of  slavery  in  Texas  as  a  part  of  their  general  policy  in 

reference  to  their  colonial  and  commercial  interests 

and  mainly  in  reference  to  its  future  inauence  on 

slavery  in  the  United  States. 

Here  we  find  Aberdeen's  new  policy.  Mexico 
was  to  be  persuaded  to  abandon  the  demand  for  a 
nominal  sovereignty  over  Texas  and  was  to  con- 
cede independence;  the  quid  pro  quo  was  to  be 
the  "moral  triumph"  of  a  Texan  assent  to  aboli- 
tion; as  Aberdeen  told  Smith,  this  programme  had 


n 


n  i 


ENGLAND  AS  PEACEMAKER  139 

alppady  been  comnmnicuted  to  Doyle  in  Mexico. 
Soon  after  this  interMfw  AlK-rdet-n  wrott-  again 
to  Doyle  reviewing  his  interview  with  the  "Tap- 
pan  Committee,"  repeating  his  desire  to  have 
Texas  "confer  entire  emancipation  on  all  persons 
within  its  territory,"  and  concluding  with  the 
statement  that  "H.  M.  Government  desires  that 
yoti  should  press  this  point  earnestly  on  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Mexican  Government."  That  Aber- 
deen should  have  supfioscd  Santa  Anna  and  his 
gangsters  suscrplible  to  ll.-  charms  of  whjit  the 
Englishman  considered  a  'moml  trnuiiph"  is 
strange  beyond  expression  Hu!  apprinntly  Al)er- 
deen  was  sincere  in  this  heliei .  And  he  siems  not  to 
have  had  the  slightest  .suspicion  how  his  course 
would  be  interpreted  by  the  succt-ssors  of  Webster 
at  Washington.  It  now  remains  to  be  seen  how 
this  conciliatory  Lord  Aberdeen,  a  .statesman  fol- 
lowing the  will-o'-the-wisp  of  his  politi<-al  illusions, 
had  digged  fen-  himself  a  great  pitfall. 


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CHAPTER  Vm 

THE   INTERNATIONAL    CRISIS  OF   1844 

In  this  period  of  American  life,  distrust  of  England 
was  broadcast.  The  dominant  men  in  politics  were 
of  the  generation  succeeding  the  Revolution,  and 
the  impression  of  their  youth  —  of  tl.e  bitter  hos- 
tility to  Great  Britain  in  1812  —  remained  with 
them  to  color  their  views  and  shape  their  conduct. 
Men  like  Calhoun  and  John  Quinc;  Adams,  who 
had  little  else  in  common  except  their  ability,  were 
at  one  in  their  reading  of  some  ulterior  motive  into 
every  British  act.  It  is  the  pathetic  fallacy  of 
the  time  that  so  few  American  patriots  could  see 
beyond  their  immediate  horizon.  Calhoun  inter- 
preted a  certain  set  of  facts  as  evidence  that  Eng- 
land desired  the  extinction  of  slavery,  and  perhaps 
even  the  dissolution  of  the  Union,  in  her  own  com- 
mercial interest,  while  Adams  reasoned  from  the 
same  set  of  facts  that  England's  "interest  is  to 
sustain  and  cherish  slavery." 

140 


7-7^#ii||>  m„„^m. 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      141 

The  statesman  who  was  now  Secretary  of  State, 
had  the  limitations  of  his  day.  Abel  P.  Upshur 
based  his  foreign  policy  on  the  belief  that  England 
was  aiming  to  abolish  "domestic  slavery  through- 
out the  continent  and  islands  of  America  in  order 
to  find  or  create  new  markets  for  the  products  of 
her  home  industry,  and  at  the  same  time  destroy 
all  competition  with  the  industry  of  her  colonies." 
In  accounting  for  Upshur's  foreign  policy  it  must  be 
remembered  also  that  his  point  of  view  was  exclu- 
sively American,  the  point  of  view  of  a  "practi- 
cal" man  with  a  clear,  though  narrow,  vision  of 
cause  and  effect,  and  of  a  slaveholder  and  a  believer 
in  slavery. 

About  the  time  that  Upshur  became  Secretary, 
Duff  Green  began  ^Titing  home  sensational  ac- 
counts of  the  relations  between  Aberdeen  and  the 
Tappan  Committee.  He  wrote  to  Calhoun,  who 
passed  his  letters  on  to  Upshur,  and  also  directly 
to  Upshur.  As  Green  was  a  politician  of  some 
prominence,  a  newsj)aper  editor,  and  a  faithful 
Democrat,  and  as  he  had  met  in  Europe  some 
distinguished  people  and  had  been  invited  by 
Delane  to  \\Tite  articles  for  The  Times  on  American 
conditions,  his  reports  on  Aberdeen  struck  his 
American  friends  with  the  force  of  oracles.     Two 


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142     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

misapprehensions  of  Aberdeen  which  Green  circu 
latedalarmed  Upshur.   Oneof  them  was  the  account 
given  out  by  the  Tappan  Committee  of  their  in- 
terview with  the  Foreign  Secretary,  according  to 
which  Aberdeen  promised  to  guarantee  an  Anglo- 
Texan  emancipation  loan.    He  expressed  his  other 
misapprehension  when  he  said  "that  the  British 
Government  deem  it  so  important  to  prevent  the 
annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States  that  they 
were  disposed  to  support  the  loan  if  it  should  be 
required  to  prevent  annexation."    Thus  Upshur 
and  Calhoun  formed  a  conception  of  Aberdeen's 
foreign  policy  which  they  never  abandoned. 

The  Anti-slavery  Convention  and  the  incident 
of  the  Tappan  Committee  were  widely  reported 
throughout  the  United  States,    .\nti-slavery  people 
were  jubilant,  slaveholders  alarmed.    The  prospect 
of  a  free  Te.xas  offering  an  asylum  to  runaway 
slaves -a  second  Canada  only  a  river's  width 
away  -  stirred  the  slaveowning  oligarchy  of  the 
South  mto  action.    Though  defeated  in  1838  and 
put  aside,  as  it  seemed,  by  the  Whig  victory  in 
the  election  of  1840,  annexation  might  now  have 
another  chance.    Tyler  had  broken  with  the  Whigs 
who  had  elected  him.    In  Upshur  he  had  put  at  the 
head  of  hi.s  cabinet  an  avowed  annexationist.    The 


.I'M^^^mmmm 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      143 

indiscretion  attributed  to  Aberdeen  was  just  what 
was  needed  to  breathe  new  life  into  the  cause.  If 
anything  more  was  required,  it  was  supplied  by  a 
conversation  between  Aberdeen  and  Brougham  in 
the  House  of  Lords,  Brougham  inquired  what  the 
Government  was  doing  in  Texas;  he  wanted  to 
know  whether  Mexico  was  being  pressed  to  recog- 
nize Texas  on  the  basis  of  emancipation;  and  he 
made  the  diplomatically  unfortunate  remark  that 
abolition,  if  it  could  be  erfectetl  in  Texas,  would 
react  against  slavery  in  the  United  States.  Aber- 
de«'n  refused  to  explain  his  course  and  insisted  that 
it  was  not  the  proper  time  for  submitting  to  Parlia- 
ment a  statement  of  his  Mexican  |X)licy,  but  he 
assured  his  noble  friend  I  hat  so  far  as  slavery  was 
concerned  his  refusal  "did  not  arise  from  indiffer- 
ence but  from  (juite  a  contrary  reason."  A  report 
of  this  conversation  printed  in  the  New  York 
Herald  on  September  20,  1843,  drew  the  conclusion 
that  England  was  aiming  at  the  destruction  of  the 
United  States. 

These  European  events,  though  Upshur  assigned 
to  them  prime  importance  in  reviving  the  annexa- 
tion issue,  were  not  the  only  matters  troubling  him 
in  the  early  autumn  of  184.'i.  Though  Texas  in 
1838,  after  Adams'  great  victory  in  Congress,  had 


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If 


144     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

withdrawn  its  request  for  annexation,  the  request 
had  been  renewed  in  1842,  and  remained  out- 
standing till  the  summer  of  1843,  when  President 
Houston  again  withdrew  it. 

What,  in  the  light  of  the  supposed  British  in- 
trigues, lay  behind  this  action?  Isaac  van  Zandt, 
the  Texan  Minister  at  Washington,  wrote  home  in 
September  that  it  had  "fired"  Upshur  with  re- 
newed zeal  for  annexation.  Van  Zandt  perhaps  did 
not  make  sufficient  allowance  for  the  perspective 
in  which  the  event  was  placed  before  Upshur's 
imagination  by  the  news  from  London  and  by  the 
talk  of  the  abolitionists. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  there  was  nothing  mysterious 
or  sinister  in  Houston's  withdrawal  of  the. request 
for  annexation.  Had  it  been  known  at  Washington 
on  the  day  it  was  ordered  —  July  6,  1843  —  its 
significance  might  have  been  perceived.  Only 
three  weeks  had  elapsed  since  Houston's  proclama- 
tion of  June  13,  1843,  ordering  a  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities under  the  Robinson  armistice.  What  could 
have  been  more  absurd  than  to  discuss  terms 
which  involved  a  possible  recognition  of  Mexican 
sovereignty  by  Texas,  while  there  remained  out- 
standing a  formal  request  for  annexation  to  the 
United  States." 


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INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      145 
But  us  the  summer  proRrt'ssed  and  the  negotia- 
tions with  Mexico  showed  no  sign  of  ooming  to 
an.N'thing.  Houston  became  nervous  and  furnished 
students  of  history  some  cause  to  quarr«*l  over  his 
motives.    There  is  something  to  h<«  said  for  simply 
accef)ting  the  record  at  its  face  value.    During  the 
previous  year  Houston  had  nt'eiveil  distinct  re- 
buffs from  the  United  States.     The  Adams  mani- 
festo threatening  civil  war  if  Texas  were  annexed 
was  but  a  few  months  old.    The  treaty  of  commerce 
and  amity  between  Texas  and  the  United  States 
had  been  rejected  by  the  American  Senate  within 
the  year.    To  be  sure,  Webster,  the  great  enemy  of 
Texas,  was  gone  from  the  State  Department,  but 
as  yet  his  retirement  had  not  produced  a  change  of 
front  toward  Texas.    On  the  other  hand,  English 
officials  had  negotiated  the  Robinson  armistice. 
For  the  first  time  since  the  war  began,  '''"xas  had 
a  real  breathing  space.     What  more  natural  than 
that  Houston  —  who  resented  the  succcssiv*'  re- 
buffs brought  about  by  Web.ster  and  Adams,  who 
was  grateful  for  the  respite  in  the  war,  and  who 
hoped  for  some  sort  of  peace  —  was  eager  at  this 
moment  to  be  unembarrassed  by  an  American 
affiliation  and  to  make  the  most  of  the  friendship 
of  England? 


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146     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

When  in  (h.-  late  autumn  Houston  hoard  from 
Van  Zandt  that  I'p,hur  \uv\  proposiHl  a  treaty  of 
annexation,  the  .sit nation  in  which  he  f«„nd  himself 
had  ohang*.!.  ll,oui?h  it  i.s  quite  possible  that  his 
i*ympathies  at  thi.  time  were  still  definit.  !y  pro- 
British,     rfousfon  told  Charles  Elliot  "that  with 
the  mdepr,..le„<r  of  7\.xas  recx>gnized  by  Mexico 
he  would  ..ever  m,    .„t  f„  any  treaty  on  this  pro-' 
jeet  of  annexation  I.,  flu-  United  States."    On  the 
ground  of  what  he  «aid  to  T'pshur  .some  critics 
have  charged  him  with  duplicity,  for  Van  Zandt 
was  to  tell  rp.shur  that  the  matter  nould  be  con- 
sulered  only  on  receipt  of  a  definite  proposal  fron, 
the  United  .States  Senate. 

The  clue  to  Houston's  tem,>orizinK  is  to  be  found 
m  certam  occurrences  in  Mexico.    Three  incidents 
that  were  hardly  noticed  at  Washington,  but  that 
loomed  large  in  Texas  occurred  in  the  latter  part  of 
1843.    One  was  no  more  .lignified  than  a  quarrel 
between  Doyle  and  the  M,.xi<an  authorities  over  a 
British  flag  exhibited  among  certain  trophies  of 
war.    Doyle's  demand  for  the  removal  of  the  flag 
and  the  scjuabbling  of  the  Mexicans  caused  a  c  ssa- 
tion  of  diplomatic  relations,  «  popular  demonstra- 
tion against  England,  and  even  threats  of  war 
To  Houston,  who  had  hoped  that  England  would 


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INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      U7 
find  a  way  to  iMrinanont  p<'un«.  this  toni|H)rury 
paralyzinK  of  hor  influt'iut'  in  Mexico  wais  diston- 
wrting.    A  srcond  di.s<|uit'tin«  liuppt'ninK  wus  thr 
pacification  of  Yucatan.    Santa  Anna  had  kvn 
seriously  embarrasse<l  throughout  the  year  by  the 
civil  war  against  his  administration  in  Yucatan, 
and  his  consent  to  the  armistice  may  have  come 
from  his  desire  to  center  his  whole  strength  upon 
Yucatan.     But  toward  the  end  of  the  year  the 
quarrel  was  made  up.    Just  when  Houston  saw  his 
great  friend,  England,  become  powerless  in  Mexico, 
he  also  saw  his  worst  enemy,  Santa  Anna,    urn  to- 
ward Texas,  his  purpose  clearly  shown  by  the  third 
alarming  circumstance.    Mexico  knew  that  volun- 
teers from  the  United  States  had  always  formed  the 
chief  recruiting  supply  of  the  Texan  army.     In 
1843  the  Mexican  (iovernment  issued  a  proclama- 
tion announcing  that  any  foreigner  who  invaded 
the  territory  of  the  republic  whether  "accompanied 
by  a  few  or  many  adventurers"  should,  if  taken 
with  arms  in  his  hands,  be  shown  no  quarter  but 
should  "be  immediately  put  to  death." 

Considering  the  Mexican  situation,  Houston 
plainly  saw  where  his  line  of  safety  lay.  So  im- 
perative was  his  need  of  an  ally  that  he  dared  not 
refuse  any  offer.    It  is  quite  likely  that  his  first 


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148  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
choice  would  have  been  an  independent  Texas, 
and  he  continued  to  assure  Elliot  that  he  still 
hoped  for  it.  Nevertheless  Houston  would  not 
commit  himself  adversely  to  the  American  pro- 
posal. He  was  maneuvering  for  position  and 
seeking  a  means  of  defense  against  the  dreaded 
Mexican  blow. 

Meanwhile  Upshur  at  Washington,   it  would 
seem,  dreaded  a  blow  from  outsi  le  as  much  as 
Houston  in  Texas.    Though  Everett  at  London,  by 
Upshur's  instructions,  had  asked  Aberdeen  what 
were  his  intentions,  and  though  Aberdeen  had 
denied  any  intention  to  intervene  in  Texas,  the 
denial  as  reported  by  Everett  served  if  anything 
to  increase  Upshur's  conviction  that  England  was 
playing  a  game  of  deception  with  the  United  States. 
"The  subject  of  domestic  slavery, "  Everett  wrote 
in  his  report  of  the  interview,  "was  never  so  much 
as  mentioned  or  alluded  to  by  the  British  Minister 
to  the  Government  of  Texas,  except  to  disclaim  in 
most  emphatic  terms  any  intention  on  the  part 
of  England  to  interfere  with  it  here.     Her  Texas 
policy  was  to  build  up  a  power  independent  of  the 
United  States  who  could  raise  cotton  enough  to 
supply  the  World ;  of  which  power  slav-v  would  be 
a  necessary  element." 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      149 

Whether  or  no  Aberdeen  was  candid  in  this 
interview  may  be  left  to  his  biographers.  To 
Upshur,  at  least,  the  whole  truth  seemed  to  lie  in 
Everett's  conclusion  that  England  desired  an  in- 
dependent Texas  as  rival  to  tht  United  States  in  the 
growing  of  cotton.  He  was  confirmed  in  his  beHef 
that  England  was  an  ogre  seeking  her  commercial 
interests  utterly  without  scruple.  To  defeat  the 
British  move  against  Texas  was,  therefore,  for  the 
United  States  a  matter  of  life  or  death.  From  this 
time  forward  the  great  majority  of  the  anti-British 
sank  all  other  considerations  before  their  over- 
powering fear  of  the  ogre  in  London.  Subsequent- 
ly Calhoun  asserted  this  fact  in  so  many  words 
and  insisted  that  it  was  not  for  sectional  but  for 
national  reasons  that  he  urged  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  At  the  time  his  enemies  did  not  believe 
him.  Certain  later  historians  have  sought  to  prove 
him  insincere  by  exposing  the  misapprehension 
on  which  his  reasoning  was  based;  but  such  a 
refutation  concerns  his  political  acumen  and  not 
his  motive.  It  becomes  increasingly  plain  that 
both  Calhoun  and  Upshur,  carried  away  by  their 
traditional  dread  of  Great  Britain,  saw  the  Texas 
question  as  a  matter  of  international  strategy. 

Believing  the  American  danger  to  be  real  and 


If  'i 


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1 


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150     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

acute,  Upshur  was  set  on  edge  by  Houston's  equivo- 
cal attitude  during  the  latter  part  of  1843.  Van 
Zandt,  also  provoked,  exceeded  his  authority  and 
negotiated  a  treaty  of  annexation.  Then,  perhaps 
alarmed  at  his  own  temerity  and  on  second  thought 
appreciating  Houston's  position  better,  he  de- 
manded a  guarantee  of  protection  by  the  United 
States  against  Mexico  in  the  course  of  negotia- 
tion, should  Texas  consent  to  negotiate.  Here  was 
the  crux  of  the  Texan  issue  narrowly  considered. 
Should  the  United  States  enter  the  war?  We  have 
seen  that  a  few  years  earlier  almost  all  Americans, 
even  friends  of  Texas  like  Preston,  were  resolute 
not  to  annex  a  war;  but  at  that  time  the  British 
ogre  had  not  been  raised  from  '*  .  dead.  Its  res- 
urrection now  transformed  the  case.  Convinced 
that  England  was  moving  upon  Texas  and  that  she 
must  be  kept  out  at  all  cost,  Upshur  prepared 
for  war  with  Mexico.  Verbal  assurance  was  given 
Van  Zandt  that  Texas  would  be  defended  against 
Mexico.  At  the  same  time  Upshur  sent  a  virtual 
ultimatum  to  Houston  in  which  he  very  nearly 
threatened  to  go  over  Houston's  head  and  ap- 
peal direct  to  the  Texan  people.  Upshur  further 
stated  that  annexation  could  now  be  carried  in  the 
United  States  Senate,  warned  Houston  against 


1.1 


'*_Li 


twl 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844  151 
trusting  the  friendship  of  England,  and  cited  the 
fable  of  the  wolf  and  the  'amb. 

It  is  highly  probable  that  Van  Zandt,  not  being 
in  sympathy  with  Houston,  had  anticippied  Up- 
shur's implied  threat  and  was  already  correspond- 
ing with  the  Department  of  State,  behind  Houston's 
back.    At  least  it  is  certain  that  a  popular  move- 
ment for  annexation  was  started  in  Texas  at  the 
close  of  1843.    From  this  Houston  held  off,  there- 
by provoking  sharp  criticism.     He  was  accused  of 
acting  too  often  behind  a  "  veil  of  secrecy."    Pres- 
ently, being  pushed  forward  by  Washington  and 
by  the  clamor  at  home,  he  laid  the  whole  situation 
before  the  Texan  Congress  and  emphasized  the 
great  danger,  should  negotiations  with  the  United 
States  fail,  that  England  and  France  might  take 
offense  at  such  disregard  of  their  good  offices  and 
leave  Texas  alone  to  face  a  vengeful  Mexico.    He 
insisted  upon  at  least  a  defensive  alliance  with  the 
United  States  before  entering  upon  negotiations. 
The  possibility  of  such  an  alliance  seemed  to  be 
established  shortly  afterwards  by  the  receipt  of 
Van  Zandt's  dispatch  reporting  the  verbal  assur- 
ance of  protection.    To  clinch  the  matter  Hous- 
ton applied  to  the  American  minister  William 
S.  Murphy,  who  stated  in  writing  to  the  Texan 


fi 


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ii. 


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152     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Government  that  "neither  Mexico  nor  any  other 
power  will  be  permitted  to  invade  Texas  on  account 
of  any  negotiation  "  with  the  Ut  ited  States.  This 
assurance  determined  Houston,  and  the  next  day 
he  sent  off  a  special  envoy  to  cooperate  with  Van 
Zandt.  On  the  day  following  he  wrote  to  his 
old  friend  Jackson  urging  him  to  use  his  influ- 
ence on  behalf  of  annexation,  saymg  that  Texas 
approached  the  United  States  "like  a  bride  adorned 
for  her  espousal"  but  intimating  that  there  were 
other  lovers  in  the  field  should  the  presumptive 
bridegroom  prove  too  coy. 

Meanwhile,  though  the  negotiations  had  been 
kept  secret,  the  Mexican  Minister  at  Washington 
scented  danger.  This  official  was  none  other  than 
that  same  Almonte  who,  years  before,  had  filled 
Lundy  with  erroneous  views  upon  Texas  and  who 
now  again  becomes  associated  with  John  Quincy 
Adams.  In  December,  1843,  Almonte  unbosomed 
himself  to  Adaras  and  was  assured  that  an  annexa- 
tion treaty  could  not  pass  the  Senate.  Not  wholly 
satisfied,  Almonte  then  interviewed  Upshur.  The 
Secretary  of  State  made  no  secret  of  his  fear  that 
England  was  striving  to  control  Texas  and  to 
injure  the  United  States.  Upshur  expressed  his 
dread  of  England  by  saying  that   "he  would 


:U 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      153 

infinitely  prefer  to  see  Texas  again  in  possession 
of  the  Me:-lcans  than  under  the  influence  of  the 
British  Government.  ..."  When  Ahnonte  sug- 
gested that  England  might  object  to  the  "sale" 
of  Texas,  even  if  Mexico  were  willing,  Upshur  re- 
plied that  in  such  an  event  the  United  States 
would  go  the  length  of  war  with  England.  Almon- 
te's last  word  was  to  the  effect  that  before  he  could 
again  communicate  with  his  Government,  Mexi- 
can armies  would  be  in  the  heart  of  Texas.  Be- 
fore anything  further  could  be  done,  Upshur  was 
killed  by  the  explosion  of  a  great  cannon  during 
an  artillery  display  on  the  warship  Princeton  on 
February  28,  1844. 

Calhoun  now  became  Secretary  of  State  and  no 
one  could  have  been  found  more  likely  to  continue 
an  anti-British  policy.  With  characteristic  bold- 
ness he  sent  for  Almonte,  informed  him  that  a 
treaty  of  annexation  was  in  preparation,  and  asked 
whether  Mexico  could  be  induced  to  consent.  Al- 
monte replied  that  annexation  meant  war  and  that 
he  would  ask  for  his  passports  the  moment  the 
treaty  was  ratified.  With  the  issue  thus  clearly 
defined,  the  diplomats  parted. 

Nothing  daunted,  Calhoun  turned  to  the  Texan 
representatives  —  for  the  special  envoy  had  now 


if 


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154     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

arrived  —  and  confiimed  the  promise  of  protection, 
"Should  the  exigency  arise  to  which  you  refer  in 
your  note  to  Mr.  Upshur,"  he  said  in  writing  to 
Van  Zandt,  "I  am  further  directed  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  say,  that,  during  the  pendency  of  the  treaty 
of  annexation,  he  would  deem  it  his  duty  to  use  all 
the  means  placed  within  his  power  by  the  constitu- 
tion to  protect  Texas  from  all  foreign  invasion." 
On  April  12,  1844,  the  Texan  .  avoy  signed  the 
treaty  of  annexation. 

In  the  six  weeks  since  Upshur's  death  the  Mexi- 
can Minister  on  his  part  had  labored  industriously. 
The  letters  which  he  sent  to  his  Government  during 
March  told  of  conferences  with  congressmen,  sena- 
tors, and  other  persons  of  importance;  he  was 
assured  that  New  England,  New  York,  and  Penn- 
sylvania would  secede  rather  than  permit  annexa- 
tion; the  abolitionists  would  all  stand  by  Mexico. 
He  therefore  concluded  that  it  was  most  impor- 
tant to  invade  Texas  without  delay.  The  one  dis- 
couraging circumstance  was  the  attitude  of  the 
British  Minister,  who  gave  no  hope  that  England 
would  try  to  prevent  annexation  by  force.  Almon- 
te was  accordingly  convinced  that  England's  great 
trade  with  the  United  States  would  prevent  war. 
Plainly  Washington  was  a  boiling  pot  when  the 


■'  ■ !      '■ 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      155 

treaty  was  signed.  It  is  highly  probable  that  the 
Administration  had  become  doubtful  of  its  strength. 
Perhaps  for  this  reason  it  delayed  ten  days  before 
sending  the  treaty  to  the  Senate;  or  perhaps  it 
sought  to  arouse  public  interest.  The  political 
strategy  of  these  ten  days  is  not  altogether  clear, 
but  the  new  Secretary  of  State  undoubtedly  cre- 
ated enemies  for  the  treaty  by  making  public  a 
significant  letter  to  Lord  Aberdeen. 

Among  Upshur's  unfinished  business  Calhoun 
had  found  a  letter  from  Pakenham,  the  British  Min- 
ister, enclosing  a  dispatch  from  Aberdeen.  Re- 
ports from  America  of  the  great  excitement  over 
his  dealings  with  the  Tappan  Committee  had  at 
last  come  to  Aberdeen's  ears,  and  he  saw  that  the 
American  excitement  must  immediately  be  quieted. 
With  that  end  in  view  he  sent  the  dispatch  now 
known  as  the  first  paper  in  the  Calhoun-Paken- 
ham  correspondence.  This  letter  was  little  more 
than  a  plain  statement  of  Aberdeen's  attitude  to- 
ward Texas,  repeating  practically  what  he  had 
said  to  Ashbel  Smith  the  previous  summer.  He 
denied  that  he  had  any  secret  design  with  regard  to 
Texas  and  frankly  admitted  his  desire  for  aboli- 
tion "throughout  the  world"  but  insisted  that 
England  would  do  nothing  "  secretly  or  underhand." 


:( 


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156     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

He  said  further  that  England's  interests  in  Texas 
were  purely  commercial  and  that  she  had  "no 
thought  or  intention  of  seeking  .o  act  direc.Iy 
or  indirectly  in  a  political  sense  on  the  United 
States  through  Texas." 

To  this  letter  Calhoun  wrote  a  long  reply,  a  copy 
of  which  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  with  the 
treaty.    There  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  his  own 
mind  it  was  an  argument  for  Americanism,  an 
appeal  to  his  countrymen  to  resent  a  foreign  inter- 
ference with  a  domestic  institution.    His  text  was 
/berdeen's  avowal  of  his  desire  to  see  slavery 
abolished  throughout  the  world.    From  this  Cal- 
houn drew  the  conclusion  .hat  England  desired  a 
world  unsafe  for  slavery;  and  from  that  it  followed 
that  she  would  enforce  her  views  on  the  United 
States  by  violence.    Would  any  American,  slave- 
holder or  other,  stand  by  and  see  his  country's 
institutions  mutilated  by  an  invadei      Such  was 
the  sentiment  Calhoun  wished  to  inspire  in  every 
American.    Unfortunately  for  his  cause,  he  did  not 
confine  himself  to  the  general  theme  but  discussed 
at  length  the  merits  of  slavery  and  compared  the 
conditions  of  negroes  in  the  South  and  in  the  North. 
The  precise  effect  of  this  letter  has  never  been  de- 
termined. Did  it  defeat  the  treaty?  Did  it  fall  flat? 


II!  • 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      l..? 

\Mio  knows!  It  aroused  u  storm  of  protest  and  the 
treaty  was  eventually  rejected  by  the  Senate,  but 
whether  these  facts  are  causally  related  is  not 
easily  told. 

The  Texan  an  lexation  treaty  was  before  the 
Senate  from  April  until  June.  During  that  time 
the  national  conventions  were  held,  that  of  the 
Whigs  on  the  1st  of  May  and  that  of  the  Demo- 
crats later  in  the  same  month.  The  Whig  platform 
did  not  mention  Texas.  Clay,  the  foregone  con- 
clusion in  the  way  of  Whig  candidate,  had  pre- 
viously issued  a  letter  defining  his  position  with 
regard  to  Texas.  In  this  document  Clay  I  eld  that 
it  was  "perfectly  idle  and  ridiculous,  if  not  dis- 
honorable, to  talk  of  resuming  our  title  to  Texas," 
insisted  that  annexation  meant  war  with  Mexico, 
opposed  the  project,  and  poohpoohed  the  idea  that 
England  was  moving  against  the  United  States 
through  Texas. 

Among  the  Democrats  the  annexation  issue  pro- 
duced 'omplicated  intrigue,  the  details  of  which 
are  not  important  here.  It  is  enough  to  say  that 
Van  Buren,  until  then  the  most  promisinj:  .andi- 
date  for  nomination,  spoiled  his  chances  by  a  letter. 
With  his  eye  on  the  political  .situation  in  the  North 
and  fearfu^  of  losing  the  anti-slavery  wing  of  his 


If 


Vf 


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I  i 


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HI 

(i 


158     TEXAS  AM)  TIIK  MEXICAN  WAR 
party,  which  wus  now  IurK<«,  \'an  Burt-n  came  out 
frankly  uKiiinst  annexation  on  the  ground  that  it 
meant  war  with  Mexico.    In  contrast  to  this  atti- 
tude. James  K.  Polk  took  up  Clay's  challenge  and 
in  unequivocal  terms  announced  himself  "in  fa- 
vor of  immediate  re-annexation  of  Texas,"  and  th«' 
Democratic  politicians,  who  saw  that  at  this  mo- 
ment they  needed  a  fighting  man.  nominated  Polk. 
As  the  Presidential  campaign  began,  the  foreign 
affairs  of  the  T^nited  States  entered  upon  a  new  and 
very  singular  chapter.    In  both  connections  Clay 
held  the  center  of  the  stage.    His  great  personality, 
so  hypnotic  in  its  effect  upon  his  associates,  was 
also  to  impress  Aberdeen  and  to  give  direction  to 
his  policy.    As  far  back  as  December,  1843,  Clay 
had  met  Elliot,  then  on  a  visit  to  New  Orleans,  and 
had  assured  him  that  he  need  not  be  alarmed  over 
rumors  of  projected  annexation,  for  no  annexa- 
tion treaty  would  pass  the  Senate.    These  assur- 
ances Elliot  sent  to  Aberdeen.     Later  on,  Paken- 
ham  told  Aberdeen  that  he  could  rely  on  "the 
whole  strength  of  Mr.  Clay's  party"  being  thrown 
against  annexation. 

The  e  seems  little  doubt  that  the  Whigs  at  this 
*imc  ^peared  to  Aberdeen  as  the  dominant  Ameri- 
can party.    How  completely  he  was  convinced  that 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      15» 

his  best  course  luy  in  close  coiW  Tution  with  them, 
is  shown  by  u  passage  in  a  subsef|uent  dispatch  to 
France  in  which  he  confessed  alarm  U'st  his  policy 
had  been  "throwing  additional  weight  into  the 
scale  of  .  .  .  Mr.  Polk  .  .  .  tti  J  proportionately 
diminishing  Mr.  Clay's  Election  to  the  Presiden- 
tial Chair."  Until  very  recently  Aberdeen's  part 
in  this  year  of  destiny,  1844.  has  been  ignored  by 
American  historians.  Even  today  his  motives  are 
uncertain  and  I  is  actions  seem  in  part  ambiguous. 
Three  illusions  m  his  mind  furnish  a  clue  to  his 
|}olicy:  first,  that  he  had  the  dominant  American 
party  on  his  side;  second,  tha'  opposition  to  an- 
nexation represented  only  the  alarm  of  slaveholders 
over  the  question  of  abolition  in  Texas;  and.  third, 
that  Texas  was  opposed  to  annexation  and  would 
regard  as  an  act  of  aggression  any  attempt  by  the 
United  States  to  achieve  it.  The  differ  t  chap- 
ters in  Aberdeen's  diplomacy  may  be  mar  1  off,  as 
first  one  and  then  another  of  his  polilical  illusions 
faded  away. 

The  most  important  .  '  •  hese  —  the  vision  of  a 
troubled  Texas,  afraid  of  both  Mexico  and  the 
United  States,  and  eager  to  be  independent  of 
both  —  was  inspired  by  a  letter  from  Elliot,  r**- 
porting  that  Houston  assured  him  his  demands  for 


hi 


\  11 
'  III 


^1     it 

ii 


ii'i 


i 


i  ■ ! 


i    , 


f^li 


! 


J'i 


ill  f 


'^ 


i     iii 


160     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

protection  by  the  United  States  were  intended  as 
an  impossible  condition  which  would  bring  annexa- 
tion to  a  standstill.    He  hoped  that  Great  Britain 
would  "find  means  of  preventing  all  further  risk  of 
complication  in  that  direction."    During  most  of 
1844  Aberdeen  was  in  two  minds  towards  the 
United  States.    On  the  one  hand,  Upshur's  anti- 
British  agitation  incensed  him.    Tyler's  message  of 
December,  1843,  contained  sneers  at  England  that 
caused  Aberdeen  to  lose  his  temper.    He  wrote 
Pakenham  "to  state  to  Mr.  Upshur  H.  M.'s  Govt, 
would  have  been  glad  if  they  could  have  discovered 
in  the  Message  greater  evidence  of  that  disinterest- 
ed policy,  the  presumed  absence  of  whiV-h  in  other 
quarters,  the  President  has  thought  necessary  to 
call  to  the  Notice  of  his  Countrymen."    Paken- 
ham wisely  disobeyed  instructions  and  did  not 
deliver  this      mmunication.    Aberdeen's  temper 
after  Calhoun's  reply  to  Pakenham  was  foreseen 
by  the  Minister  when  he  wrote  home:  "Your 
Lordship   will   perceive   with   surprise   and   dis- 
pleasure .  .  .  that  the  explanations  furnished  by 
Her  Majesty's  Government  have  been  received  in  a 
sense  quite  contrary  to  their  obvious  and  literal 
meaning."    Plenty  of  cause  here  for  temper! 
The   Oregon   negotiation  was,   however,   still 


■  1 


JAMES  K.  POtX 
la  Cb«  oaUwtioa  flf  L.  C.  Budy.  WMyagtoa. 


ii.l 


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INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      161 

outstanding,  and  Aberdeen  was  eager  to  bring  it  to  a 
happy  conclusion.  During  half  the  year  his  course 
vacillated  between  an  indulgence  of  his  temper  and 
a  consideration  of  his  best  interests.  In  his  calmer 
moments  he  could  not  forget  the  watchful  attitude 
of  British  business,  with  its  enormous  American 
trade,  and  at  such  times  he  must  have  fully  realized 
that  a  breach  with  the  United  States  would  have 
wrecked  the  ministry.  Behind  Aberdeen  stood 
Peel,  the  Prime  Minister,  an  incomparably  larger 
man  and  one  who  kept  a  far  better  balance  between 
his  impulses  and  his  actions.  On  both  of  these  men 
the  opposition  in  Parliament  served  a  warning  in 
May  when  it  demanded  what  the  Government  was 
doing  in  America,  basing  the  inquiry  on  a  sus- 
picion that  it  was  meddling  with  the  internal 
affairs  of  other  countries.  Both  Aberdeen  and  Peel 
refused  to  commit  themselves.  Shortly  before,  the 
Liverpool  Mercury  had  declared  that  a  war  with 
the  United  States,  even  if  successful,  would  so 
damage  British  trade  as  to  be  a  "calamity  of  the 
most  fatal  description." 

Against  this  complex  background  must  be  seen 
Aberdeen's  rash  move  earlier  in  the  year  when  he 
invited  France  to  join  with  him  in  a  protest  against 
the  pending  treaty.     Guizot,  always  agreeably 


^r 


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HI 

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t. 


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'/i 


162     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

disposed  towards  the  British  autliorities,  instructed 
the  French  Minister  at  Washington  to  codperate 
with  Pakenham.  Fortunately  for  Al  i^rdeen  the 
two  ministers  agreed  that  Aberdeen's  plan,  if  car- 
ried out,  would  not  phiy  into  Clay's  hands  but 
into  those  of  his  enemies,  would  stimulate  the  anti- 
British  feeling,  and  would  give  annexation  a  tr'imp 
card.    The  protest,  it  seems,  was  not  made. 

During  the  month  of  May,  when  ^he  treaty  was 
before  the  Senate  and  Clay  was  forcing  the  issue 
with  an  apparent  firmness  destined  soon  to  dis- 
appear, Aberdeen  resolved  to  get  entirely  free  of 
his  entanglement  with  the  international  abolition 
of  slavery.    This  he  did  before  the  month  was  over 
by  entering  into  new  negotiations  with  Mexico  in 
which  he  definitely  withdrew  all  his  previous  sug- 
gestions as  to  abolition  in  Texas.    Three  days  later 
he  sent  a  dispatch  to  Pakenham  informing  him  of 
this  change  of  front,  accompanied  by  a  full  state- 
ment of  the  attitude  of  the  British  Government  on 
the  subject  of  slavery  in  the  United  States.    There- 
in he  repeated  his  condemnation  of  slavery  but 
promised  to  refrain  car^  .uUy  from  any. steps  which 
could  affect  the  interest  of  the  United  States  "in 
this  particular." 
If  Aberdeen's  view  of  the  American  situation 


I 


'■  u 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      163 

had  been  correct,  if  Clay  had  dominated  it,  and  if 
the  militant  slavery  faction  had  been  his  only  seri- 
ous enemies,  Aberdeen  might  well  have  congratu- 
lated himself  on  a  shrewd  stroke.  Doubtless  he 
thought  he  had  the  situation  in  hand  when,  in  this 
new  overture  to  Mexico,  he  proposed  on  the  one 
hand  that  Mexico  should  acknowledge  Texan  in- 
dependence and  on  the  other  that  Texas  should 
pledge  herself  not  to  consent  to  annexation  by  any 
other  power,  and  that  England  and  France  should 
guarantee  the  pledge. 

A  short  but  obscure  chapter  in  Aberdeen's  di- 
plomacy thus  begins.  While  awaiting  action  by 
Mexico,  he  obtained  the  assent  of  the  amiable 
Guizot  to  his  new  plan.  Then  with  apparent 
abruptness  Aberdeen  changed  front  or  "2  more. 
On  the  18th  of  July,  before  any  reply  to  his  over- 
ture had  been  received  from  Mexico,  he  wrote  to 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Paris  that  the  scheme 
must  be  abandoned  or  at  least  indefinitely  post- 
poned. What  had  happened  between  May  and 
July?    What  illusion  had  dissolved? 

Clay's  firm  opposition  to  annexation  was  based 
on  his  belief  that  it  was  safe  policy.  The  illusion 
he  had  helped  create  in  Aberdeen  dominated  him  as 
well  in  that  month  of  May,  when  he  thought  he 


I 


f 

i: 

■  r.'ti 


Hi       '   *_ 

r.  f  "  i J 

il 


k 


.1 


It , 


ll 


S  I    . 


1^^, 


164     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

would  certainly  be  the  next  President  of  the  United 
States.    At  first  it  looked  as  if,  in  forcing  the  fight, 
he  had  split  the  Democrats.    When  the  treaty  came 
to  a  vote  it  lacked  the  necessary  two-thirds  major- 
ity.   The  seven  Democrats  who  voted  against  it 
were  taking  revenge  for  the  Van  Buren  faction  be- 
cause the  party  machine  had  not  accepted  their 
favorite.   It  was  quickly  made  plain,  however,  that 
this  was  a  case  of  the  sulks  and  not  a  settled  policy. 
Thomas  H.  Benton,  chief  supporter  of  Van  Buren, 
first  voted  against  the  treaty  and  then  came  out  in 
favor  of  annexation  through  the  action  of  Con- 
gress.   All  factions  of  the  Democratic  party  ac- 
cepted an:  exation  as  their  cardinal  doctrine.    Van 
Buren  himself  oflFered  no  opposition,  and  his  per- 
sonal following  in  New  York,  which  was  the  "piv- 
otal State,"  took  their  strategic  place  in  the  battle. 
Each  week  of  the  campaign  made  it  clearer  that 
Clay  and  Aberdeen,  with  their  illusion  that  the 
militant  slaveholders  formed  the  whole  strength  of 
the  annexation  movement,  had  made  a  fatal  blun- 
der.   The  United  States  wanted  Texas.    At  any 
rate,  so  loud  and  insistent  and  widespread  was  the 
cry  for  annexation  that  Clay,  whose  ear  was  to  the 
ground,  became  alarmed.    He  began  to  make  ad- 
missions, to  explain  away  his  position,  to  prepare 


INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS  OF  1844      165 

to  straddle  the  issue.  At  length  he  wrote  the  fa- 
mous letter  that  killed  him  politically.  The  ad- 
vocates of  annexation  had  gone  too  far  in  defiance 
of  him  to  swing  around  like  a  dog  to  a  whistle 
because  he  now  offered  to  accept  theii  terms. 
When  he  announced  that  he  v/ould  be  glad  to  see 
Texas  annexed  if  it  could  be  done  "without  dis- 
honor, without  war,  upon  the  common  consent  of 
the  Union,  upon  just  and  fair  terms,"  he  shattered 
the  anti-Texas  faction.  Whether  it  could  have 
won  if  its  leader  had  stuck  to  his  colors  is  a  subject 
of  dispute  to  this  day. 

All  these  moves  in  the  political  game  were  de- 
scribed by  Pakenham  to  Aberdeen.  Both  Paken- 
ham  and  the  French  Minister  perceived  the  turning 
of  the  tide.  A  victorious  anti-Texas  party  that 
would  welcome  or  at  least  acquiesce  in  the  Anglo- 
French  guarantee  of  Texan  independence  proved 
to  be  a  dream.  Both  ministers  warned  their  Gov- 
ernments not  to  proceed  with  the  plan.  The  de- 
termining letter  appears  to  be  the  dispatch  to 
Pakenham  dated  the  27th  of  June.  Though  at 
that  date  Clay  had  not  yet  written  the  letter  that 
destroyed  him,  Pakenham's  political  insight  read 
the  situation  correctly.  While  still  hoping  much 
from  Clay's  election,  he  made  the  remarkable 


1  n\ 


I  >•', 


V 


\ 


Irll 


IS 


Mill 

■■- 1'  ''♦ 

^.1  i 


■I 


i 


166     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
prophecy  that,  even  if  elected.  Clay  would  not 
after  all  be  able  to  stop  annexation,  but  merely  to 
secure  for  it  a  fair  consideration.    Pakenham  told 
Aberdeen  almost  in  so  many  words  that,  if  England 
and  France  should  pursue  their  plan  "without  the 
consent  and  concurrence  of  this  country  previously 
obtained,"  the  result  might  be  war.    There  had 
arisen  "a  crisis  of  the  utmost  delicacy  in  our  rela- 
tions with  this  Country."    Other  information  with 
regard  to  the  American  situation  had  also  come  to 
Aberdeen.    Side  by  side  with  the  Texas  question 
the  Oregon  question  had  grown  more  and  more 
momentous.     The  Democratic  platform  declared 
that  the  title  of  the  United  States  to  "the  whole 
of  the  territory  of  Oregon  is  clear  and  unquestion- 
able; that  no  portion  of  the  same  ought  to  be  ceded 
to  England."    The  whole  country  rang  with  the 
cry:  "Fifty-four  forty  or  fight! " 

What  was  the  British  Ministry  to  do?  The 
whole  thought  of  Aberdeen  upon  American  aflFairs 
during  June  and  July,  1844,  has  never  been  dis- 
closed. But  the  result  of  his  thinking  was  soon 
made  manifest.  There  are  those  who  believe  that 
for  a  brief  space  his  temper  overmastered  his  true  m- 
terests  and  that  he  contemplated  war.  If  that  is  so. 
it  was  indeed  a  midsummer  madness  that  quickly 


I*     I 


*    r 


INTERN ATIO.,AL  CRISIS  OF  1844      167 

passed.  In  late  July.  AlHTcleen  was  rorrospond- 
ing  with  Paris  and  decently  burying  his  ambitious 
scheme  of  the  previous  May.  He  had  decided  fi- 
nally upon  an  amicable  policy  towards  the  United 
States.  As  to  Texas,  ♦'  "  future  was  to  be  left  to 
circumstance.  Oregon  was  to  be  the  imme<liatt 
witness  to  the  desire  of  Great  Britain  to  settle  her 
American  problems  in  a  friendly  way.  Pakenham 
pressed  Calhoun,  who  was  still  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment, to  resume  negotiations.  In  August  when  the 
American  crisis  had  taken  on  another  and  very 
startling  aspect,  the.^o  two  abl  -  men.  in  a  tone 
that  was  like  a  cool  breeze  amid  the  'not  fury  of 
American  politics,  opened  the  final  chapter  in  the 
long  controversy  over  Oregon. 


,f 

i 
11 

k 

1,1 


ii 


If 


CHAPTER  IX 


^P, 


THE  DOMESTIC  CRISIS  OF  1844 

Whiuj  the  ostentatious  Polk  and  the  unsUble 
Clay  imagined  they  were  the  great  players  in  the 
presidential  game,  the  real  contest  in  1844  lay 
between  Calhoun  and  another  powerful  personal- 
ity.  Robert  Barnwell  Rhett;  and  thai  contest  was 
fought  out  in  South  Carolina.  The  fundam  .tal 
issue  between  Calhoun  and  Rhett  was  not  annexa- 
tion but  secession. 

We  have  Rhetfs  word  that  he  became  a  seces- 
sionist in  1844.  and  that  he  was  the  only  one  * 
Congress  during  that  year.  He  was  then  a  repre- 
sentative  from  South  Carolina.  A  perfectly  fear- 
less and  a  wonderfully  direct  man,  he  had  often 
before  then  threatened  to  accept  secession  as  a 
solution  of  the  sectional  conflict.  As  early  as  1838, 
in  a  counterblast  to  a  petition  against  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  he  moved  that  "the 
constitution  of  the  United  States  having  proved 

1«8 


II 


^J^-» 


i  \ 


THE  DOMESTIC  CRISIS  OP  1844       1«» 

inadequate  to  protect  the  Southern  States  in  the 
peaceable  enjoyment  of  their  rights  and  property : 
Resolved,  that  a  committee  of  two  members  from 
each  State  in  the  Union  be  appointed  to  report 
upon  the  expediency  and  practicality  of  amending 
the  constitution  or  the  best  mode  of  dissolving  the 
Union."  He  had  taken  part  in  those  great  par- 
liamentary battles  in  which  Adams  had  led  the 
assaults  upon  the  friends  of  Texas,  and  he  made 
his  irrevocable  decision  soon  after  Adams  had 
threatened  a  secession  of  Northern  States. 

About  this  time  occurred  a  schism  in  the 
Methodist  Church  which  appears  to  have  made 
a  deep  impression  on  the  Southerii  imagination. 
The  Charleston  Mercury,  the  newspaper  that  was 
Rhett's  especial  organ,  remarked  that  "the  split 
of  the  Methodist  Church  [into  the  Northern  and 
Southern  Churches]  is  of  peculiar  significance  as 
marking  an  epoch  —  the  first  dissoluti*  '  of  the 
Union."  Putting  all  these  signs  together,  Rhett 
concluded  that  the  experiment  of  anion  was  a 
failure.  He  therefore  determined  to  take  Adams 
at  his  word  and  to  anticipate  his  threatened  North- 
em  recession  by  an  attempt,  at  least,  to  lead  the 
South  into  secession.  Rhett  first  urged  the  South- 
em  members  of  Congress  to  issue  an  address  to 


m 


\  'r 


Ml 


•! 


.(  >     >,lJ 


170     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
their  constituents  advocating  a  convention  of  the 
whole  South  to  deal  with  the  Texan  question. 
When  this  failed,  he  advanced  to  the  position 
which  he  held  ever  after   and  which   put   him 
fundamentally  at  odds  with  Calhoun.     Since  the 
South  would  not  act  as  a  whole,  Rhett  urged  upon 
the  South  Carolina  delegation  that  they  send  home 
a  circular  advocating  separate  action  by  their  own 
State.     His  theory  was  that  if  South  Carolina 
seceded  the  other  Southern  States  would  be  forced 
by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  to  follow  her 
example.    If  we  may  accept  the  bitter  version  of 
this  incident  recorded  in  the  diary  ..x  Governor 
Hammond,  though  the  plan  promised  success  for  a 
while,  "at  the  eleventh  hour  Calhoun  came  m  and 
broke  it  up  chanting  praises  to  the  Union  and 
peace."    Rhett  thereupon  went  home,  leaving  be- 
hind him  the  war-cry,  "Texas,  with  or  without 
the  Union." 

Partisans  of  Rhett  in  South  Carolina  were  al- 
ready making  active  demonstrations  in  favor  of 
annexation.  They  held  meetings  and  adopted  res- 
olutions. Though  most  of  these  gatherings  were 
not  in  favor  of  disunion  before  Rhett  returned  up- 
on the  ground,  some  of  them  were.  For  instance, 
one  meet-:  .g  at  Barnwell  resolved  that  if  annexation 


f  l. 


THE  DOMESTIC  CRISIS  OF  1844       171 

failed  "a  dissolution  of  the  Union  would  be  both 
inevitable  and  highly  desirable,"  and  another 
at  Beaufort  resolved  that,  "We  will  dissolve  the 
Union  rather  than  abandon  Texas." 

Even  before  Rhett  took  command  of  his  forces  in 
person,  the  movement  for  secession  was  progress- 
ing so  rapidly  that  in  the  middle  of  June  the  Charles- 
ton Courier,  an  anti-Rhett  paper,  published  a  letter 
from  "A  Plain  Man"  advising  "Mr.  Calhoun  to 
send  a  missionary  into  the  State,  for  the  purpose 
of  attending  all  political  meetings  and  checking  the 
recklessness  and  headlong  course  of  his  political 
friends.  With  great  propriety  may  he  exclaim, 
'deliver  me  from  my  (foolish)  friends,'  etc." 

In  the  first  weeks  of  the  presidential  campaign, 
many  South  Carolinians  were  averse  to  Polk.  There 
was  much  talk  of  supporting  Tyler  for  President. 
There  was  also  much  talk  of  disunion.  To  combat 
both  these  tendencies  the  Courier  reiterated  quota- 
tions of  the  views  of  Calhoun  and  insisted  that 
he  and  his  friends  were  entirely  satisfied  with  the 
nomination  of  Polk.  The  Courier  rejoiced  "that 
the  disunion  spirit,  lately  revived  and  thus  mani- 
fest among  us,"  had  not  made  headway  outside  the 
State  and  held  it  "a  matter  of  real  gratulation  that 
Mr.  Calhoun  should  throw  the  weight  of  his  great 


i  f 

'  'hi.; 


;*; 


i^  hk 


ri^ 


I 

i: 


5.' 


I-;* 


172     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

name  against  intemperate  action  of  any  kind." 
The  Mercury  sharply  took  the  Courier  to  ta.k  for 
its  attitude,  and  the  Calhoun  organ  replied;  "We 
repeat  here  our  high  gratification  at  the  stand 
now  taken  by  Mr.  Calhoun  against  separate  State 
action,  or  separate  Southern  action,  on  matters 
of  natior.al  concernment  —  we  know  of  no  leader 
under  whom  we  would  more  willingly  enlist  than 
our  great  Southern  statesman,  should  he  indeed 
return  to  his  first  love,  recover  his  nationality  of 
feeling  and  unfurl  the  glorious  banner  of  Union 
and  Liberty." 

Thus  the  issue  was  joined.    To  Calhoun's  argu- 
ment that  nothing  ought  to  be  done  until  the  elec- 
tion should  determine  whether  Polk  or  Clay  was  to 
direct  events,  Rhett  had  his  reply.    To  his  mind  it 
was  no  longer  a  question  of  the  Presidency  but  of 
the  House  of  Representatives.    There,  more  and 
■nore  clearly,  lay  the  heart  of  the  problem,  as  the 
House  tended  to  divide  on  sectional  lines.    Before 
long  a  solid  majority  from  the  free  States  would 
control  it.    Secession  or  submission  were  the  al- 
ternatives before  the  South.    Since  a  choice  must 
be  made,  why  not  at  once  before  the  enemy  forces 
had  time  to  consolidate  fully.? 
Rhett  took  immediate  command  of  his  battle  in 


k  k 


.iLul 


THE  DOMESTIC  CRISIS  OF  1844       178 

an  address  which  he  delivered  on  the  31st  of  July 
at  Bluflfton  at  a  public  dinner  given  in  his  honor. 
The  significant  toast  was  "Disunion  the  only 
remedy";  and  another  ,oast  was  "John  C.  Cal- 
houn —  we  will  follow  him  as  long  as  he  is  true  to 
us."  The  event  of  the  day  was,  of  course,  Rhett's 
speech,  in  which  he  clearly  defined  his  position. 
He  saw  no  hope  from  the  presidential  election;  the 
Democratic  party  throughout  the  country  could 
not  be  relied  upon  to  protect  the  South;  Texas 
must  be  acquired;  the  tariff  must  be  ai^olished;  the 
one  way  to  preserve  Southern  institutions  was  to 
secede.  Rhett's  speech  was  enthusiastically  re- 
ceived, and  the  entire  assemblage  appeared  to  be 
with  him.  "The  spirit  of  Brutus,"  said  the  Mer- 
cury, "has  not  passed  away  but  will  inspire  the 
people  until  the  State  once  more  is  free." 

During  August  and  September  the  battle  raged. 
For  a  time  Rhett  seemed  to  be  carrying  everything 
before  him.  He  made  numerous  specf  lies.  He  re- 
ceived great  ovations.  It  seemed  that  the  spell 
of  Calhoun  had  been  broken.  "If  it  be  true," 
said  a  letter  which  the  Mercury  displayed  as  an 
editorial,  "that  our  old  commander  has  bid  adieu 
to  his  faithful  soldiers,  another  leader,  not  as  able, 
nor  perhaps  as  judicious  in  the  council  yet  as  brave 


i  1  ' 


i 


\  \m 


f! 


J. 


•I 

fit 


j;,: 

■  i. 

.1 

f' 

174     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

and  determined  in  the  field,  it  will  be  1.0  difl5cult 
matter  to  select." 

But  those  who  thought  that  the  old  commander 
had  lost  his  hold  had  been  premature  in  their  judg- 
ment.    While  Calhoun  remained  at  Washington 
negotiating  with  Pakenham  over  Oregon,  a  few 
letters  from  him,  the  reiteration  of  his  views  by 
his  recognized  agents,  and  the  arguments  of  the 
newspapers  that  represented  him,  gradually  re- 
stored his  spell.    It  was  a  great  victory  for  sheer 
prestige.    By  the  end  of  Auijust  the  resolutions  at 
public  dinners  were  beginning  to  regain  th<»ir  old 
tone  of  hero-worship  for  Calhoun.    Gradually  his 
argument  for  no  action  until  after  the  election 
became  the  popular  one.    Rhett's  contention  that 
Coii-ress  and  not  the  Presidency  was  the  heart 
-'  tne  matter  lost  its  allurement.    In  September 
the  Courier  declared  that  "Mr.  Calhoun  has  been 
and  is  still  the  guiding  star  for  South  Carolina." 

That  Calhoun  feared  what  might  follow  disunion 
only  less  than  he  feared  the  consequences  of  a  con- 
solidation of  the  Union,  every  biographer  has 
recognized.  But  time  has  shown  that  consolidation 
or  disruption  was  inevitable,  and  it  was  this  alter- 
native which  Rhett  saw  in  1844  and  Calhoun  failed 
to  see.   Must  Calhoun's  defenders  come  eventually 


ill 


>^».L. 


1  \^\ 


THE  DOMESTIC  CRISIS  OF  1844       175 

to  the  conclusion,  then,  that  in  1844  the  older 
statesman  was  the  inferior  strategist? 

Two  considerations  interpose  to  arrest  this  con- 
clusion. For  one  thing,  Calhoun  had  a  new  vision 
which  Rhett  had  not  —  the  vision  of  a  United 
South  acting  as  a  unit,  in  place  of  the  older  vision 
of  a  Southern  group  of  friendly  but  separate  States. 
It  was  this  vision  which  Calhoun  handed  on  to 
those  successors  of  his  who  beat  Rhett  a  second 
time  in  1851.  Another  consideration  may  have 
ruled  Calhoun's  action.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  he  was  hypnotized  by  his  belief  that  England 
would  turn  aggressor  in  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
were  it  not  for  the  opposition  of  the  United 
States.  When  he  said  that  his  Texan  poHcy  was  na- 
tional not  sectional,  he  told  the  strict  truth.  The 
best  proof  is  his  course  in  South  Carolina,  the 
truly  pivotal  State.  We  need  not  say  that  he 
had  lost  strategic  insight,  but  rather  that  he  was 
keen  enough  Lo  pierce  through  sectional  limitations. 
Assumi».g  his  view  of  British  policy,  what  could 
have  seemed  more  disastrous  in  1844  to  America 
than  a  division  of  the  Union  into  two  weakened 
republics  to  replace  a  single  powerful  one?  Twenty 
years  later,  in  a  similar  situati,  ■  '.he  third  Napo- 
leon tried  to  conquer  Mexico.    A  divided  republic 


ill 


!r|H 


li¥ 


,1 


,*i: 


176  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
in  1844  would  have  given  the  same  opportunity, 
not  to  the  conciliatory  Aberdeen,  but  to  the  aggres- 
sive and  anti-American  Palmerston.  who,  but  a 
few  months  after  Rhetfs  defeat,became  Aberdeen's 
successor.  Whether  Calhoun  was  right  or  wrong 
in  his  view  of  Aberdeen,  what  great  good  fortune 
for  America  that  he  kept  a  united  front  in  the  face 
of  Palmerston  when  such  a  prize  as  Texas  might 
have  tempted  that  grand  swashbuckler  to  follow 
his  natural  bent! 


^1 


■JLS- 


CHAPTER  X 

AN  ADVENTURE  IN  IMPERIAUSM 

The  Democratic  victory  in  November  reunited 
the  party.  Taking  the  election  of  Polk  to  be  an 
indorsement  of  the  programme  of  annexation,  the 
party  leaders  set  confidently  to  work.  What  could 
not  be  done  by  treaty,  should  be  done  now  by 
action  of  Congress.  A  few  Whigs,  equally  obedient 
to  the  popular  will,  joined  the  friends  of  Texas. 
A  joint  resolution  was  adopted  by  both  Houses 
inviting  Texas  to  become  a  State  of  the  Union  and 
was  signed  by  President  Tyler  on  March  1,  1845. 
Thereupon  Almonte  demanded  his  passports  and 
left  Washington. 

Meanwhile  Mexico  had  become,  to  use  a  modem 
term,  isolated.  We  may  date  her  isolation  from 
the  end  of  April.  Mexico  was  at  that  time  deeply 
stirred  by  a  report  that  annexation  was  impending. 
An  appeal  to  the  British  Minister  was  met  by  the 
assertion  that  "any  assistance  from  England  must 

la  177 


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178     TEXAS  AND  THF  MEXICAN  WAR 

be  a  moral  one  for  that   whatever   disposition 
may  have  at  one  time  existed  to  go  '      and  that 
line  had  now  been  withdrawn."   T        a  Aberdeen 
was  led  by  the  Texan  Government  mo  one  more 
attempt  to  intervene  in  the  interest  of  independ- 
ence, it  was  as  mediator  only  that  he  acted.    As  a 
result,  Mexico  offered  to  recognize  the  Republic  of 
Texas  if  it  would  remain  independent.    But  Texas 
was  treating  also  with  the  United  States,  with  re- 
gard to  annexation,  and  when  the  two  proposals 
-  peace  with  Mexico  and  independence  or  no 
peace  and  annexation  —  were  laid  before  a  con- 
vention that  assembled  on  July  4,  1845.  Texas 
accepted  the  invitation  of  the  United  States. 

And  now  the  center  of  the  stage  belongs  to  the 
new  President  of  the  United  States,  James  Knox 
Polk.  Undoubtedly  Polk  did  not  want  war;  but  he 
was  as  ignorant  of  the  Mexican  character  as  Adams 
or  Jackson  and  treated  the  Mexican  ultimatum  as 
of  no  consequence.  He  regarded  the  Texan  episode 
as  closed  -  as,  with  skillful  diplomacy,  perhaps  it 
might  have  been  —  and  now  maneuvered  to  bring 
forward  a  scheme  of  his  own.  His  first  aim  was  to 
restore  diplomatic  relations  with  Mexico.  During 
the  whole  of  his  first  year  of  office  he  made  tor- 
tuous and  fruitless  attempts  to  induce  the  Mexican 


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AN  ADVENTURE  IN  IMPERIALISM    179 

Government  to  eat  its  words,  assume  again  that 
there  was  peace  between  the  nations,  and  receive 
an  American  Minister.  But  in  all  these  efforts  he 
failed  to  consider  the  Mexican  point  of  view  and 
the  internal  situation  with  its  swift  and  revolu- 
tionary changes  of  control,  and  the  fact  that,  in 
addition  to  the  Government,  there  was  a  Mexican 
people  —  ignorant,  visionary,  sensitive,  and  en- 
raged against  the  United  States.  Whatever  their 
leaders  might  wish  personally  —  and  the  sensible 
ones  among  them  knew  what  war  with  the  United 
States  would  mean  —  none  of  them  dared  defy 
public  opinion  in  Mexico  and  receive  an  American 
Minister.  The  bare  rumor  of  such  a  possibility 
evoked  from  Mexican  newspapers  such  comment 
as  this: 


il 


The  vile  government  [of  Mexico]  has  been  and  is  in  cor- 
respondence with  the  usurpers.  The  Yankee  Parrot 
[William  S.  Parrott,  a  confidential  agent  of  Polk]  and 
the  American  consul  at  Mexico  are  those  who  have 
agreed  with  the  government  for  the  loss  of  Texas,  and 
this  same  Parrott  has  departed  for  the  North  to  say  to 
his  government  to  send  a  commissioner  to  make  with 
our  government  an  ignominious  treaty  on  the  basis  of 
the  surrender  of  Texas  and  we  know  not  what  other 
part  of  the  republic.  This  is  as  certain  as  the  existence 
of  God  in  Heaven. 


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180     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Behind  this  hysteria  was  an  inkling  of  the  truth. 
During  1845  Santa  Anna  was  not  the  man  of  the 
hour  in  Mexico.  His  personal  fortunes,  his  risings 
to  power  and  his  fallings  from  power,  were  as 
kaleidoscopic  as  the  revolutions  of  his  country. 
The  year  1845  fell  in  one  of  his  periods  of  eclipse, 
when  he  was  living  in  exile  in  Havana.  A  short- 
lived  government  headed  by  General  Herrera  ap- 
pears genuinely  to  have  desired  peace  at  any 
price,  and  had  intimated  to  Polk  that  a  minister 
would  be  received.  Polk  jumped  at  the  chance, 
and  in  the  autumn  commissioned  John  Slidell 
Minister  to  Mexico. 

The  written  instructions  issued  to  Slidell  both 
summed  up  a  great  deal  of  previous  diplomacy  and 
foreshadowed  a  great  deal  more.  His  avowed  pur- 
pose was  the  settlement  of  American  claims  against 
the  Mexican  Government,  involving  business  losses 
by  American  citizens  during  twenty  years,  due  in 
some  cases  to  arbitrary  acts  of  the  Mexican  au- 
thorities, in  others  to  unoflScial  violence  during  the 
countless  Mexican  revolutions.  Ten  years  before, 
Adams  had  accused  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  with 
deliberately  keeping  the  claims  unsatisfied  so  as  to 
work  up  anti-Mexican  feeling  in  the  United  States. 
In  point  of  fact,  at  that  very  time  an  arbitration 


AN  ADVENTURE  IN  IMPERIALISM    181 

was  being  nej^utiated.  It  wus  conducletl  by  two 
commisnonors  from  each  country  with  an  umpire 
named  by  the  King  of  Prussia,  The  commissioners 
agreed  upon  payments  to  Americans  amounting  to 
about  half  a  million  dollars.  The  ampire  awarded 
in  addition  about  a  million  and  a  half.  This  was 
too  much  for  the  Mexican  treasury  to  pay,  and 
the  undischarged  obligation  remained  a  convenient 
issue  which  the  United  States  had  always  ready, 
should  diplomacy  demand  a  crisis.  Polk  meant  to 
make  the  most  of  it.  lie  assumed  that  Mexico  was 
as  good  as  bankrupt,  and  his  instructions  to  Slidell 
disclosed  his  ulterior  purpose.  If  Mexico,  acknowl- 
edging Texan  independence,  would  accept  the  Rio 
Grande  as  a  boundary,  the  United  States  would 
itself  discharge  the  claims. 

But  even  this  "rectification  of  frontier"  was  not 
Polk's  dearest  aim.  While  the  wrangle  over  Texas 
was  going  on  in  1844,  this  secretive  man  pondered 
many  things  in  his  own  mind  and  apparently  came 
to  an  unsuspected  conclusion.  Turning  his  eyes 
towards  the  West,  he  saw  in  imagination  the  germ 
of  another  Texas  far  away  beyoiid  the  mountains. 
Amid  the  gigantic  spaces  and  the  illimitable  forests 
of  "  the  Calif ornias,"  here  and  there,  was  a  dwin- 
dling Mexican  settlement.     Once  New  Spain  had 


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H«  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

made  un  attempt  to  otxupy  that  enorniow  coun- 
try, but  the  inspiration  died  and  now  its  Spanish- 
Mexican  population  was  a  mere  handful.    Of  real 
government  under  Mexico,  the  vast  tract  had  none. 
Adventurers  from  the  I'nited  States  had  nuide 
their  way  into  the  storied  region,  as  earlier  into 
Texas.    They  came  in  direct  defiance  of  Mexican 
law  and  stayed  because  they  dared  to,  with  no 
rights  in  the  land.    The  Sacramento  Valley  grad- 
ually became  their  favorite  re<?ion.    A  place  called 
Sutter's  Fort  —  built  by  a  German  adventurer  who 
passed  himself  off  as  a  Frenchman  and  had  been 
naturalized  as  a  Mexican  —  was  their  wonderful 
Alsatia,  "where  all  the  wandering  English  and 
American  vagabonds  found  a  refuge  in  which  they 
could  not  be  disturbed  by  any  Mexican  authori- 
ties. '    Before  Polk  became  Prosident,  things  were 
beginning  to  stir  in  the  Sacramento  Valley.    Sir 
George  Simpson,  who  was  in  California  in  1842, 
wrote  regarding  the  polyglot  adventurer  that  if 
Sutter  had  "the  talent  and  courage  to  make  the 
most  of  his  position,  he  is  not  unlikely  to  render 
California  a  second  Texas.    Even  now  the  Ameri- 
cans only  want  a  rallying  point  for  carrying  into 
effect  their  theory  that  the  English  race  is  destined 
by  'right  divine'  to  expel  the  Spaniards  from  their 


ih 


AN  ADVENTITHE  IN  IMPERIALISM    183 

ancient  seats  —  u  theory  which  has  olready  begun 
lo  develop  itself  in  n.on*  ways  than  one." 
Not  really  a  part  of  Mexico.  th«'  California  of 
*4  has  l»een  well  described  as  a  derelict  on  the 
sea  of  international  politics,  "to  be  picked  up  by 
any  adventurer  who  <hose  to  take  it  into  the  port 
of  a  strong  and  stable  government."    More  than 
once  the  United  States  had  felt  a  pa.ssing  impulse 
to  acc|uire  California.    Jackson  and  Anthonv  But- 
ler had  that  purpose  in  the  back  of  their  heads. 
Webster  ha<l  talked  of  it  with  Lord  Ashburton  and 
had  learned  that  England  would  make  no  objec- 
tion.   Aberdeen  had  expressed  himself  in  the  same 
terms.    Nevertheless  in  1844  there  was  a  persist- 
ent rumor  in  the  United   States   that   England 
was  scheming  to  take  possession  of  California. 
Later  researches  have  proved  that  it  was  quite 
without  foundation.     But,  like  that  other  British 
rumor,  the  great  war  scare  of  1844.  it  seemed  a 
reality,  at  least  to  such  men  as  Polk.    On  these 
two  foundations  —  the  American  movement  into 
the  Sacramento  Valley  f.nd  the  rumor  of  a  Brit- 
ish design  to  appropriate  California  —  Polk's  for- 
eign policy  in  1845  was  based.    Slidell  was  to  in- 
form Mexico  that  the  United  States  could  not 
allow  the  Califomias  to  fall  into  other  hands.    For 


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1S4     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Upper  California  and  New  Mexico,  he  might  oflFer 
as  much  as  twenty-five  million  dollars. 

Into  the  shifting  scene  of  Mexican  politics 
stepped  John  Slidell,  the  king's  pawn  in  Polk's 
vision  of  peaceful  imperialism,  only  to  find  that 
Herrera's  Government  was  in  a  panic.  Rumors 
that  it  intended  to  make  terms  with  the  United 
States  were  creating  a  furor  and  a  wily  military 
politician.  General  Paredes,  was  working  in  the 
army  for  revolution.  The  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Relations  almost  tearfully  besought  Slidell  to  go  his 
way,  to  remain  hidden,  to  do  anything  but  force 
the  Government's  hand!  Recognition  of  him  as 
Minister,  at  that  minute,  was  not  to  be  dreamed  of. 
To  Slidell,  a  capable  but  obtuse  man,  who  seems  to 
have  been  utterly  blind  to  the  nature  of  the  situa- 
tion, the  terror  of  the  Government  tottering  to- 
ward its  fall  was  merely  "unparalleled  bad  faith." 

While  Slidell  was  thus  describing  Mexican  policy 
in  his  dispatches,  Paredes  raised  a  revolt,  over- 
turned the  Government  and  made  himself  Presi- 
dent. Slidell's  prompt  demand,  under  Polk's  or- 
ders, for  recognition  or  his  passports,  met  the  reply 
that  Mexico  would  make  no  roncessions.  His 
passports  were  delivered  to  him  in  March,  1846. 

The  failure  of  Slideli's  mission  placed  Polk  in  a 


AN  ADVENTURE  IN  IMPERIALISM    185 

quandary.    It  was  plain  that  the  Californias  could 
not  be  obtained  without  war.    And  he  was  afraid 
of  Congress.    Tolk  knew  that,  if  he  were  to  ask  for 
support  in  i^  defensive  .var  to  protect  Texas  from 
attack,  oi  ^'vi  n  on  llv-  doubtful  question  of  the 
Texan  boui.ili.;y,  1  •>  could  rely  on  a  safe  majority. 
The  old  Texas  of  Spanish  days  stopped  at  the 
Nueces  River.    We  have  seen  that  the  new  Texas 
boldly  claimed  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Rio 
Grande.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  a  debat- 
able land  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande 
where  neither  Texas  nor  ISIexico  was  in  control. 
But  numerous  American  leaders  were  willing  to 
adopt  the  Texan  claim  and  stand  on  the  defensive 
all  along  the  Rio  Grande.    Calhoun  took  this  posi- 
tion.   Nevertheless,  eager  friend  of  Texas  though 
he  was,  he  wanted  no  further  campaign  of  aggran- 
dizement.    When  it  was  rumored  in  Congress  that 
Polk  meditated  something  larger  and  more  sinister 
than  merely  the  holding  the  line  of  the  Rio  Grande, 
Calhoun  was  deeply  alarmed  and  had  friendly  con- 
ferences on  this  hinted  danger  with  some  of  his 
political  enemies. 

Though  Polk  had  entered  on  his  Mexican  nego- 
tiations hopeful  of  a  peaceful  solution,  he  did  not 
intend  to  be  caught  napping.    He  had  kept  a  hand 


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186     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

behind  his  back,  and  in  it  he  held  his  weapons.   For 
he  had  put  the  army  and  navy  in  position  to  strike 
if  necessary  and  had  caused  orders  to  be  issued  to 
the  Pacific  squadron,  to  the  Gulf  squadron,  and  to 
the  army  in  the  Southwest.     Preparations  were 
made  for  a  blockade  of  the  east  coast  of  Mex- 
ico.      General   Zachary  Taylor,   in  command  in 
the  Southwest,  was  instructed  early  in  the  game 
to  take  his  forces  into  Texas.    He  went  thither 
by  sea  and  in  August,  1845,  was  encamped  near 
Corpus  Christi.     There  he  remained  until  March 
of  the  following  year. 

Since  the  Mexican  Government  refused  to  re- 
ceive Slidell,  Polk  decided  to  proceed  to  extremities. 
Even  before  this  Taylor  had  been  ordered  to  the 
Rio  Grande.  It  was  known  that  the  army  had  ad- 
vanced southward  when,  on  May  9, 1846,  there  was 
held  a  Cabinet  meeting  at  which  Polk  urged  upon 
his  ministers  a  war  policy.  All  the  Cabinet  agreed 
with  him  except  George  Bancroft,  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  who  said  he  would  "feel  better  satisfied 
m  his  course  if  the  Mexican  forces  had,  or  should, 
commit  any  act  of  hostility." 

It  would  seem  that  this  appeal  to  the  Goddess  of 
Discord  was  not  in  vain.  The  evening  of  that  same 
day  came  a  dispatch  from  Taylor  announcing  a 


h    i. 


AN  ADVENTURE  IN  IMPERIALISM    187 

skirnish  with  the  Mexicans  on  the  24th  of  April, 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Rio  Grande,  in  which  several 
Americans  had  been  killed.  As  if  by  magic  Polk's 
horizon  cleared.  Fate  had  thus  suddenly  and  unex- 
pectedly filled  his  hand  with  trumps.  He  spent  Sun- 
day,the  10th  of  May,  on  his  celebrated  war  message, 
and  the  facts,  adroitly  stated  to  suit  his  plans,  were 
laid  before  Congress  the  next  day  in  these  words : 


I. 


The  strong  desire  to  establish  peace  with  Mexico  on 
liberal  and  honorable  terms,  and  the  readiness  of  this 
Government  to  regulate  and  adjust  our  boundary  and 
other  causes  of  difference  with  that  power  on  such  fair 
and  equitable  principles  as  would  lead  to  permanent 
relations  of  the  most  friendly  nature,  induced  me  in 
September  last  to  seek  the  reopening  of  diplomatic 
relations  between  the  two  countries.  .  .  .  An  envoy 
of  the  United  States  repaired  to  Mexico  with  full 
powe  adjust  every  existing  difference.  .  .  .     The 

Mexii  vernment  not  only  refused  to  receive  him 

or  liste  .  to  his  propositions,  but  after  a  long  contin- 
ued series  of  menaces  have  at  last  invaded  our  terri- 
tory and  shed  the  blood  of  our  fellow-citizens  on  our 
own  soil.  .  .  . 

The  movements  of  the  troops  [of  the  United  States] 
to  the  Del  Norte  (Rio  Grande]  was  made  by  the  com- 
manding general  under  positive  instructions  to  abstain 
from  al!  ^^ressive  acts  towards  Mexico  .  .  .  unless 
she  should  declare  war  or  commit  acts  of  hostility 
indicative  of  a  state  of  war.  .  .  . 


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188     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

The  Mexican  forces  at  Matamoras  assumed  a  bel- 
ligerent att.tude.  and  on  the  l^th  of  April  General 
Ampudia.  then  m  command,  notified  General  Taylor 
to  break  up  h.s  camp  within  twenty-four  hours  and  to 
retire  to  the  Nueces  River.  and  in  the  event  of  his  fail- 
ure to  comply  with  these  demands  announced  that 
arms,  and  arms  alone,  must  decide  the  question     But 
no  open  act  of  hostility  was  committed  until  the  24th 
of  April     On  that  day  General  Arista,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded to  the  command  of  the  Mexican  forces,  com- 
munu^ated  to  General   Taylor  that   "he  considered 
hostilities  commenced  and  should  prosecute  them  " 
A  party  of  dragoons  of  6.'*  men  and  officers  were  on  the 
same  day  dispatched  from  the  American  camp  up  the 
Rio  del  Norte,  on  its  left  bank,  to  ascertain  whether 
the  Mexican  troops  had  crossed  or  v  ere  preparing  to 
cross  the  river,  "became  engaged  with  a  large  body 
of   hese  troops  and  after  a  short  affair,  in  which  some 
sixteen  were  killed  and  wounded,  appear  to  have  been 
surrounded  and  compelled  to  surrender  " 

As  war  exists,  and,  notwithstanding  all' our  efforts 
to  avoid  It,  exists  by  the  act  of  Mexico  herself,  we  are 
called  upon  by  every  consideration  of  duty  and  patriot- 
ism to  vmdicate  with  decision  the  honor,  the  rights 

and  the  interests  of  our  country i  invoke  the 

prompt  action  of  Congress  to  recognize  the  existence 
of  war.  and  to  place  at  the  disposition  of  the  Executive 
the  means  of  prosecuting  the  war  with  vigor,  and  thus 
hastening  the  restoration  of  peace. 

This  message  proved  to  be  a  bombshell  which 
blew  the  oppos'-'ion  to  bits.    The  President  was 


AN  ADVENTURE  IN  IMPERIALISM    180 

authorized  to  raise  an  army  of  fifty  thousand  men. 
Ten  million  dollars  were  placed  at  his  disposal. 
The  war  fever  which  started  in  Congress  swept  the 
country.  Volunteers  flocked  to  the  recruiting 
stations  and  with  reckless  expedition  v,'°re  hurried 
to  the  front.  The  Gulf  squadron  immediately 
blockaded  the  Mexican  coast. 

Chance  had  put  still  another  card  into  Polk's 
hand.  Early  in  the  year  an  agent  of  the  exiled 
Santa  Anna,  Colonel  Atocha,  had  appeared  at 
Washington,  seeking  an  interview  with  Polk.  His 
aim  was  to  teach  Polk  how  to  manage  Mexico. 
What  was  needed  was  the  high  hand.  The  leaders 
were  willing  enough  to  do  all  that  the  United 
States  desired  but  dared  not  appear  to  be  yielding. 
This  interview  had  occurred  during  the  last  stag* 
of  Slidell's  attempt  to  impose  himself  as  American 
Minister  to  Mexico.  Let  SHdell  retire  to  Vera 
Cruz,  said  Atocha,  go  aboard  an  American  ship  of 
war,  and  from  its  deck  issue  an  ultimatum.  But 
even  thus  the  situation  could  not  be  saved  properly 
unless  that  true  friend  of  the  United  States,  the 
noble  Santa  Anna,  should  be  restored  to  power. 

Polk  listened  with  intense  interest.  At  the  mo- 
ment he  declined  to  commit  himself.  But  Atocha 
had  made  an  impression,  f  '•  shortly  afterward  Polk 


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190     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
suggested  to  the  Cabinet  just  such  a  performance 
by  Slidell,  warship  and  all,  as  the  wily  Atocha  had 
described.    But  the  Cabinet  did  not  approve,  and 
Polk  decided  to  bide  his  time. 

Now  that  fate  had  put  the  game  in  his  hand,  the 
President,  who  was  not  in  the  least  degree  blood- 
thirsty, returned  to  his  old  love,  and  dreamed  of 
gaining  his  end  peacefully  after  all.  A  great  show 
of  force  and  cooperation  with  a  bought  President 
at  Mexico  City  —  what  might  not  the  two  accom- 
plish with  the  minimum  loss  of  blood !  On  the  day 
on  which  war  was  declared  the  following  "private 
and  confidential"  order  was  sent  to  Commodore 
Conner  of  the  Gulf  squadron:  "Commodore:  if 
Santa  Anna  endeavors  to  enter  the  Mexican  ports, 
you  will  allow  him  to  pass  freely." 

But  such  arrangements  were  not  enough.  To 
hasten  the  peaceful  solution,  Polk  entered  into  di- 
rect negotiation  with  the  rascally  Mexican  exile 
at  Havana.  Commander  A.  S.  Mackenzie,  a  neph- 
ew of  Slidell,  who  was  sent  to  Cuba,  discussed 
with  Santa  Anna  his  hypocritical  programme  of 
"reforms"  and  received  from  him  a  written  state- 
ment of  what  he  proposed  to  do.  In  this  paper 
Santa  Anna  declared  that  "he  would  not  hesitate 
to  make  concessions  rather  than   see  Mexico" 


h> 


li 


AN  ADVENTURE  IN  IMPERIALISM    191 

ruined  by  its  present  rulers,  and  that  "  if  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  shall  promote  his 
patriotic  desires,  he  offers  to  respond  with  such  a 
peace  as  has  been  described."  In  this  paper  Santa 
Anna  advised  that  Taj'lor  invade  Mexico  as  far  as 
San  Luis  Potosi,  "which  movement  will  compel 
Mexicans  of  all  parties  to  recall "  Santa  Anna.  He 
stipulated  that  "the  greatest  secrecy  be  observed 
concerning  these  comnmnicalions,"  and  he  also 
gave  advice  about  attacking  Vera  Cruz  and  the 
conduct  of  the  blockade. 

No  European  pretender  —  Stuart,  Bourbon,  or 
any  other  —  ever  offered  to  sell  out  his  country 
with  a  more  barefaced  cynicism.  No  unscrupu- 
lous foreign  government  ever  fell  into  a  pretender's 
trap  more  easily.  Subsequently,  as  might  have 
been  expected,  Santa  Anna  denied  ever  having  had 
this  interview  or  made  these  statements.  But  his- 
torians have  shown  thus  far  no  inclination  to  accept 
his  word  rather  than  Mackenzie's.  Santa  Anna's 
character  stands  in  the  way  of  any  such  vindi- 
cation. Furthermore,  the  preliminary  mission  of 
Atocha  fits  too  closely  into  the  circumstantial 
evidence.  Polk  himself  had  no  doubt  of  the  accu- 
racy of  Mackenzie's  report;  the  orders  by  which 
a  chink  in  the  blockade  was  kept  open  for  Santa 


IVL' 


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I't 


i^'  i^ 


192     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Anna's  benefit  continued  in  force,  and  in  the  mid- 
dle of  August  Santa  Anna  slipped  through  the 
chink.  Between  ihe  Hnes  of  Commodore  Cr  mcr's 
report,  the  incident  becomes  positively  comic. 
Santa  Anna  was  aboard  a  British  ship,  the  Arab, 
and  Conner's  silences,  if  they  mean  anything, 
allow  us  a  glimpse  of  officers  of  the  British  and 
American  navies  winking  at  each  other  with  their 
tongues  in  their  cheeks  as  the  Arab  gets  through 
the  blockade  and  out  again  and  the  Enghshmen 
certify  to  Conner  that  the  ship  carried  no  freight. 
By  just  what  sort  of  "gentlemen's  agreement" 
they  manipulated  this  farce  Conner  does  not  say. 
Thus  Santa  Anna  came  home  to  Mexico! 


hi 


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CHAPTER  XI 

•*      IK  HERO  OF  BUENA   VIST  A " 

The  man  who  was  the  striking  arm  of  the  United 
States  Government  during  1846  was  a  first-rate 
soldier,  though  not  much  of  a  general.  He  was 
sixty-two  years  old  and  had  behind  him  forty  years 
of  hard  service,  chiefly  against  the  Indians.  In 
origin  a  farmer,  he  remained  to  the  end  the  rug- 
ged countryman.  He  despised  form,  held  insig- 
nia in  contempt,  and  loved  his  shirt  sleeves.  "Old 
Rough  and  Ready "  was  the  army's  nickname  for 
Zachary  Taylor. 

The  forces  which  Taylor  commanded  in  the 
Mexican  War  at  first  consisted  of  a  portion  of  the 
regular  army,  rapidly  augmented  by  volunteers. 
The  war  fever  d.ow  men  to  the  colors  from  all  parts 
of  the  country.  One  of  the  distinguishing  features 
of  this  war  was  the  hard  fighting  endured  with 
honor  by  American  volunteers  in  their  initial  en- 
gagements.   To  be  sure,  these  were  very  different 


13 


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194     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

from  the  scientific  rnovcnicnt.s  of  the  present  day. 
Taylor's  battles,  especially,  depended  little  upon 
strategy  but  for  that  very  reason  they  tested  all 
the  more  the  mettle  of  the  American  temperament 
—  its  boldness,  its  em'rgy,  its  primness.  Tay- 
lor's victories  wert  particularly  the  victories  of  the 
average  American  soldier. 

The  petty  skirmish  which  enabled  Polk  to  save 
his  policy  occurred  while  Taylor  was  entrenching 
himself  near  the  Rio  Grande  and  was  btulding  what 
is  now  known  as  Fort  Brown  opposite  Matanioras. 
His  base  of  supplies  was  on  the  coast  at  Point  Isa- 
bel. The  importance  of  the  American  vohmteers 
in  this  war  was  foreshadowed  by  Taylor's  im- 
mediate appeal  to  the  Governors  of  Texas  and 
Louisiana  to  send  him  with  all  possible  speed  five 
thousand  men. 

The  Mexicans,  whose  base  was  at  Matamoras, 
planned  to  surround  Taylor,  cut  his  connections 
with  Point  Isabel,  and  force  his  surrender.  To 
frustrate  this  and  to  obtain  fresh  supplies  Taylor 
marched  back  to  Point  Isabel  on  ^lay  1,  1846, 
leaving  a  garrison  under  Major  Brown  at  the  fort. 
The  relative  movements  of  the  two  armies  do  not 
reflect  credit  on  their  intelligence  systems.  While 
Taylor  was  marching  east,   he  passed,   without 


II 


I'f 


"THE  HERO  OF  BL'ENA  VISTA"       195 

knowing  it.  the  inuin  body  of  tlu-  Mi-xican  army, 
which  had  crossed  the  river  between  Fort  Hrown 
and  Poinl  Isabel.  The  Mexican  (leiieral,  Arista, 
liearing  of  his  movements,  turnetl  west  for  an  at- 
tack on  the  fort,  whose  present  name  commemo- 
rates [the  death  of  Major  Brown  in  the  pillant 
repulse  of  the  Mexicans. 

On  the  7th  of  May,  with  two  hundred  wagons 
and  over  two  thousand  men,  Taylor,  like  the  noble 
Duke  of  York  in  the  familiar  rhyme,  prepared  to 
march  back  again.  But  Arista  got  wind  of  his  in- 
tention and  prepared  for  a  battle  at  a  place  called 
Palo  Alto.  There  Taylor  encountered  him  on  the 
8th  of  May.  The  little  battle  which  followed, 
though  it  has  been  made  a  great  action  by  fervid 
describers,  ended  with  the  fall  of  night  and  left 
neither  side  victorious.  But  after  sharp  experi- 
ence of  the  Americans  at  short  range,  the  Mexi- 
cans, though  technically  undefeated,  thought  they 
had  had  enough  of  it,  and  at  dawn  began  an  or- 
derly retreat.  The  American  soldier  rather  than 
his  general,  morale  rather  than  strategy,  had  tri- 
umphed. By  ten  o'clock  on  the  9th  of  May  the 
Mexicans  had  withdrawn  to  a  new  position  five 
miles  nearer  the  river  and  were  in  camp  along 
a  ravine  not  far  from  the  Resaca  de  la  Palma. 


f! 


ii 


^i    /. 


IM  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Taylor  followed  deliberately,  and  not  until  late 
afternoon  was  fightinK  re-sumed.  This  time  tht- 
Americans  really  won  the  battle.  Arista,  who  did 
not  expect  an  attack  that  day.  had  made  no  prepa- 
rations. As  the  sun  began  to  sink,  he  was  in  his 
tent  writing.  His  men,  greatly  depressed  by  their 
experience  at  Palo  Alto,  were  cooking  their  sup- 
pers. The  horses  were  unsaddled.  Into  this  dis- 
mal but  unsuspecting  army  there  dropped  the 
sudden  fire  of  the  advancing  American  infantry. 
Jollowv'd  by  sharp  fighting  sustained  by  the  Mexi- 
can outposts  and  then  a  staggering  cavalry  charge 
led  by  Captain  May  of  the  American  regulars. 
A  panic,  a  stampede  —  and  the  Mexicans  had 
abandoned  the  field.  Arista  retreated  into  Mexi- 
co, since,  with  his  demoralized  army,  he  found  it 
impossible  to  hold  Matamoras,  and  Taylor  took 
possession  of  the  place. 

While  Taylor  was  feeling  his  way  southward 
through  eastern  Mexico,  two  raids  farther  west 
revealed  the  fact  that  all  northwestern  Mexico  was 
without  troops  for  its  defense.  From  Fort  Leaven- 
worth, early  in  tht-  summer,  Colonel  Stephen  W. 
Kearny  led  forth  an  expedition  that  would  have 
been  one  of  the  follies  of  history  had  it  not  been 
inspired  by  accurate  knowledge  of  Mexico  and  the 


"THE  IIKRO  OF  BUENA  ViSTA"       197 

Mexicans.  Aiming  at  nothing  less  thun  the  con- 
quest of  New  Mexico  and  with  no  base  of  supplies 
behind  him,  Kearny  took  barely  .sufficient  food  to 
carry  him  to  Santii  Fe.  His  faith  in  his  own  judg- 
ment was  justified  by  the  surrender  of  Santa  Fe 
the  moment  he  apptNired  before  it.  Having  pro- 
claimed all  New  Mexico  a  part  of  the  United  States, 
I'earny  turned  westward  across  the  horizon  of  the 
present  narrative  and  rode  blithely  into  the  little 
side  war  then  raging  in  California. '  In  the  autumn 
and  early  winter  General  Wool,  starting  from 
San  Antonio,  marched  three  hundred  miles  to  the 
Mexican  town  of  Parras,  whence  he  made  a  wide 
sweep  eastward  and  eventually  joined  Taylor's 
army  without  encountering  serious  opposition  at 
any  point. 

Now  to  return  to  the  main  army.  For  nearly 
four  months  Taylor  was  making  ready  for  a  fur- 
ther advance  into  Mexico.  Though  his  enemies 
did  not  molest  him,  he  had  great  difficulties. 
In  everything  but  fighting  the  American  army 
was  inefficient.  Sickness,  inadequate  transport, 
and  congestion  at  every  possible  point  made  a 
dreary  record  for  the  summer  of  1846.    Meanwhile 

•See  The  Forty-Ninert,  by  Stewart  Edward  White  (in  Th» 
Chronicle*  of  America). 


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198     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

volunteers  poured  into  Taylor's  camp  faster  than 
he  could  provide  for  them.  Too  often  the  new- 
comer went  directly  to  the  hospital  —  or  what 
passed  muster  for  a  hospital.  "The  mortality  in 
our  camp,"  wrote  an  eye-witness,  "was  appalling. 
The  dead  march  was  ever  wailing  in  our  ears  and 
even  at  this  distant  period,  I  can  scarcely  look  back 
to  our  stay  there  without  a  shudder.  .  .  .  Large 
hospital  tents  were  constantly  full  —  the  dead  be- 
ing removed  at  sunrise  and  sunset  but  to  make 
room  for  the  dying.  The  groans  and  lamentations 
of  the  poor  suflFerers  during  those  sickly  sultry 
nights  were  heart-rending." 

Taylor  had  fixed  on  the  city  of  Monterey  as  his 
next  objective.  Early  in  September,  with  about 
six  thousand  effective  troops,  he  was  on  the  march. 
On  the  nineteenth,  he  approached  the  city  and 
went  into  camp  about  three  miles  to  the  northeast. 
Monterey  lay  on  a  plain,  open  on  the  north  but 
inclosed  by  mountains  on  the  other  three  sides. 
The  enemy  had  made  the  most  of  these  natural 
defenses  and  were  present  in  force.  Taylor  divided 
his  army  into  two  sections  —  one  under  his  im- 
mediate command  and  the  other  under  General 
WiUiam  J.  Worth,  who  was  ordered  to  make  a  de- 
tour around  the  north  side  of  the  city  and  to  attack 


"THE  HERO  OF  BUENA  VISTA"       199 

from  the  west,  cutting  the  road  from  Monterey 
to  Saltillo.  These  two  commanders  attacked  the 
town  from  opposite  sides  and  each  fought  his  own 
battle  with  but  Httle  knowledge  of  the  movements 
of  the  other.  The  conduct  of  the  men  was  above 
praise.  1  xnger  seemed  a  meaningless  word  to 
them.  Death  they  had  forgotten.  During  the 
21st,  22d,  and  23d  of  September  the  Americans 
fought  their  way  into  the  city,  from  both  sides,  in 
the  most  gallant  fashion,  foot  by  foot.  On  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-fourth  General  Ampudia, 
with  his  surviving  troops  cooped  up  in  the  center 
of  the  town,  asked  for  terms.  Taylor  did  not  in- 
sist on  an  unconditional  surrender  but  accepted  an 
agreement  to  evacuate  with  a  temporary  cessation 
of  hostilities.  Thus  Ampudia  withdrew,  leaving 
the  Americans  in  possession  of  Monterey. 

The  sheer  hard  fighting  at  Monterey  and  the 
capture  of  the  city  naturally  impressed  the  Ameri- 
can people,  and  they  accepted  the  commanding 
general  as  a  conquering  hero.  The  Administra- 
tion, however,  saw  the  situation  in  other  colors. 
"In  agreeing  to  this  armistice,"  Polk  wrote  in  his 
diary,  "General  Taylor  violated  his  express  orders 
and  I  regret  that  I  cannot  approve  of  his  course. 
He  had  the  enemy  in  his  power  and  should  have 


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200     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

taken  them  prisoners.  ...  It  will  only  enable  the 
Mexican  army  to  reorganize  and  recruit  so  as  to 
make  another  stand."  Polk's  irritation  and  anx- 
iety were  due  in  part  to  the  turn  that  had  been 
given  to  affairs  by  the  course  of  Santa  Anna.  That 
slippery  intriguer  had  done  what  might  have  been 
expected  of  him  —  had  broken  all  his  promises  to 
Polk,  had  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  military 
party  in  Mexico,  and  was  now  making  ready  for 
what  looked  like  determined  war.  Polk  realized 
what  a  vain  folly  had  been  his  game  with  Santa 
Anna.  He  saw,  too,  that  more  troops  must  be  sent 
to  Mexico.  There  must  bt  ore  hard  fighting. 
Would  Congress  stand  by  h"  How  exasperat- 
ing at  such  a  moment  to  her  t  ^t  Taylor  for  the 
second  time  had  failed  to  striii..  ^  body  blow. 

Thenceforth,  the  Administration  had  no  good 
word  for  Taylor.  It  must  be  admitted  that  Tay- 
lor's dispatches  during  the  remainder  of  the  year 
contained  nothing  to  commend  him.  They  were 
often  querulous,  sometimes  ill-tempered,  always 
weighted  with  advice  about  the  further  conduct  of 
the  war.  These  plans  were  often  patently  unwise 
and  revealed  Taylor's  poor  understanding  of  strat- 
egy. He  was  a  splendid  fighter  —  just  the  man  to 
take  a  city  by  storm  —  but  an  inferior  general. 


\  .    ' 


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CUUcry  of  Art.  Waahington. 


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"THE  HERO  OF  BUENA  VISTA"       201 


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Polk  had  now  lost  faith  in  Taylor.  Gradually, 
under  other  advice,  the  President  developed  a  new 
plan  of  campaign.  In  November  it  was  decided  to 
invade  Mexico  from  the  sea.  Vera  Cruz  was  to  be 
taken  as  the  base  of  operations.  The  command  of 
this  ambitious  expedition  was  entrusted  to  General 
Winfield  Scott.  Late  in  the  month,  dispatches 
were  sent  to  Taylor  informing  him  of  the  plan,  in 
which  he  was  to  play  the  inferior  r6le  of  maintain- 
ing a  threatening  attitude  on  the  northern  flank  of 
Mexico.  The  real  business  was  now  the  Vera  Cruz 
expedition.  Taylor  was,  therefore,  to  send  every 
man  he  could  spare  to  the  coast,  whence  they  would 
be  forwarded  to  Scott. 

During  this  period  of  uncertainty  at  Washing- 
ton, Taylor  had  pursued  a  course  which  Polk  inter- 
preted as  paying  "  no  regard  to  the  views  of  the 
Government."  While  not  exactly  disobeying  the 
War  Department,  Taylor  had  treated  its  advice  as 
of  little  consequence.  He  had  pushed  forward  his 
advance  guard  to  the  Mexican  town  of  Saltillo  and 
was  holding  what  Washington  considered  an  ex- 
posed position  in  defiance  of  the  wishes  of  the 
War  Department.  There  were  now  under  Tay- 
lor's command  several  distinct  units  which  he  had 
placed  at  widely  distant  points  on  a  line  nearly 


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202     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

five  hundred  miles  long  running  from  the  sea  at 
Tampico  through  Monterey  and  Saltillo  far  into 
the  interior  of  Mexico.  "General  Taylor  by  dis- 
persing his  forces  into  small  bodies,"  wrote  Polk  in 
his  diary,  "  has  acted  directly  agau.st  the  views  of 
the  Government  and  contrary  to  his  own  views  as 
communicated  to  the  Government  that  he  could 
not  advance  beyond  Monteiey  with  safety." 

During  December  Taylor  himself  became  con- 
vinced that  he  had  not  disposed  his  forces  well. 
He  was  busily  rearranging  his  disposition,  when, 
after  singular  delays,  he  received  in  January,  1847, 
imperative  orders  subordinating  him  to  Scott. 
Taylor  thereupon  sent  a  bitter  dispatch  to  Scott 
saying  he  could  not  "misunderstand  the  object 
of  the  arrangement"  showing  that  he  had  "lost 
the  confidence  of  the  Government"  —  which  was 
quite  true. 

Though  Taylor  obeyed  the  unconditional  part 
of  his  new  instructions,  he  continued  to  disregard 
advice.  Scott  urged  him  to  fall  back  from  Saltillo 
and  to  concentrate  at  Monterey.  It  is  possible 
that  Taylor,  bitterly  mortified  by  the  action  of 
the  Government,  was  rendered  stubborn  by  this 
advice.  At  any  rate,  he  took  the  opposite  course. 
Drawing  together  what  he  could  of  the  troops  left 


"THE  HERO  OF  BUENA  VISTA"  80S 
to  him,  he  passed  beyond  Saltillo  and  went  as  far 
as  a  place  called  Agua  Nueva,  where  he  maintained 
his  headquarters  from  the  5th  to  the  21st  of  Feb- 
ruary. The  force  under  his  immediate  command 
was  smaller  than  when  he  began  the  march  to 
Montr rey.  It  consisted  of  little  over  forty-seven 
hundred  men,  some  of  whom  were  quite  raw. 

While  Taylor  was  thus  exposing  himself  to  the 
danger  of  an  attack  by  a  rapid  concentration  of  the 
enemy,  Santa  Anna  was  leading  northward  by  way 
of  San  Luis  Potosf  a  force  which  outnumbered 
Taylor's  three  to  one.  On  the  20th  of  February, 
Taylor  heard  that  Santa  Anna  had  passed  San 
Luis  Potosf  and  was  moving  straight  toward  him, 
while  two  thousand  cavalry  under  General  Mifion 
were  circling  through  the  mountains  to  the  east  of 
Saltillo,  which  was  still  his  main  depot  of  supplies. 
On  the  following  day,  Taylor's  scouts  sighted 
Mifion  to  the  eastward,  while  to  the  south  they 
made  out  the  advance  of  Santa  Anna.  As  Agua 
Nueva  was  no  place  for  a  defensive  battle,  Taylor 
was  at  last  compelled  to  take  the  advice  he  had 
hitherto  scorned  and  retire  to  safer  ground. 

From  Agua  Nueva  a  highroad  ran  north  eighteen 
miles  to  Saltillo  through  a  broad  pass  in  the  moun- 
tains.   The  character  of  this  pass  determined  the 


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204     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

course  of  the  battle  which  forms  the  conclud- 
ing incident  in  Taylor's  military  career.  Taylor 
marched  back  twelve  miles  to  the  hacienda  of 
Buena  Vista  near  the  northern  end  of  the  pass.  He 
was  unable  to  remove  all  the  supplies  collected  at 
Agua  Nueva  but  carried  off  a  portion  in  wagon 
trains  at  "furious  speed"  and  ordered  the  rear 
guard  to  destroy  the  remainder.  At  daybreak  on 
the  22d  of  February,  the  whole  American  army  was 
gathered  about  Buena  Vista. 

Looking  back  over  the  course  of  his  retreat,  the 
course  which  Santa  Anna  might  be  expected  to 
follow,  Taylor  pondered  certain  features  of  its  to- 
pography but  failed  entirely  to  allow  for  certain 
others.  He  disposed  his  forces  in  an  unfortunate 
way.  The  scene  before  him,  as  he  saw  it,  had  three 
main  characteristics.  First,  the  average  level  of  the 
pass  was  a  flat  though  deeply  crevassed  plain,  lying 
north  and  south  and  bounded  c  either  hand  by 
mountains  of  considerable  heig'  The  space  be- 
tween the  mountains  varied  in  ividth  from  a  mile 
and  a  half  to  five  miles.  In  the  second  place,  the 
crevasses  worn  in  this  plain  by  watercourses  were 
not  only  deep  but  were  also  of  a  peculiar  formation, 
the  most  important  one,  as  Taylor  thought,  having 
its  bottom  sixty  to  seventy  feet  below  the  average 


»i 


•THE  HERO  OF  BUENA  VISTA"       «05 

level  of  the  plain.  The  earthen  cliffs  that  fonned 
the  walls  of  these  crevasses  were  as  a  rule  very 
nearly  perpendicular.  The  geological  explanation 
is  that  frost,  with  its  corroding  and  crumbling 
effects  on  earthen  banks,  is  in  that  region  almost 
unknown.  The  mountain  torrents  cut  their  way 
through  the  plains  as  neatly  as  if  the  cutting  had 
been  done  by  a  gardener's  spade,  and  their  banks 
remain  perpendicular,  like  the  banks  of  a  well-kept 
ditch.  For  an  advancing  force  of  infantry  to  de- 
scend one  side  of  these  crevasses  and  ascend  the 
other  without  the  aid  of  scaling-ladders  would  be 
extremely  difficult,  especially  along  the  deep  parts 
of  the  crevasses.  For  cavalry  or  artillery,  it  would 
in  many  places  be  impossible. 

The  third  thing  which  Taylor  perceived  correctly 
was  the  relation  of  the  highroad  from  Agua  Nueva 
to  this  system  of  crevasses  and  their  watercourses. 
There  was  a  main  stream  through  the  pass  and  a 
number  of  tributaries.  The  main  stream  followed 
closely  the  western  ridge,  running  along  its  foot 
and  leaving  almost  the  whole  of  the  plain  of  the 
pass  between  it  and  the  eastern  ridge.  Through 
the  crevasse  or  miniature  canyon  of  this  main 
stream  the  road  came  northward  toward  Taylor's 
eye,  in  a  narrow  passage  between  the  water  and 


(1  > 


:.! 


V 


t 

■1 


j'l 


■v'l 


^ 


mm 


If  t 


-'I 


I  . 


■» 


Hi     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
th.«  perpendicular  earthen  cliffs.    To  a  man  stand- 
'ng  in  the  road  by  the  stream  side,  tlic  tops  of  the 
earthen  cliffs  which  formed  the  banks  of  the  cre- 
"  li.    ditch  appeared  to  be  more  than  forty  feet 
'i'O'.t  his  head,  level  with  the  plain  of  the  pass,  and 
•  'V   lo'^ng  over  his  left  shoulder,  lu  could  see  a 
lu'i^c  .Instance  through  lateral  crevasses  of  appar- 
rnt'^  .<|Uft|  .iepH,  reaching  off  toward  the  eastern 
I    Mint  J.. M  -       ^uier  miniature  canyons  whose  floors 
iviintJ  i  ...   of  the  main  canyon  through  which  ran 
the  St  and  the  highway.    Such  were  the  three 

eharacterisncs  of  the  scene  which  Taylor  grasped. 
But  there  was  still  a  fourth,  more  viUl  than  the 
others,  which  he  failed  to  grasp. 

The  field  of  battle,  as  Taylor  conceived  it,  was 
to  be  a  new  Thermopylae.    Owing  to  lateral  cre- 
vasses, which  appeared  to  the  American  general  to 
be  impassable,  Santa  Anna  with  his  cavalry  and 
his  artillery  would  have  no  choice  but  to  advance 
along  the  highroad,  through  the  sunken  corridor. 
Thus  the  coming  fight  would  involve  a  grim  de- 
fense of  a  narrow  passage  —  as  at  Thermopylae, 
with  its  narrow  passage  between  mountain  and  sea 
—  and  Santa  Anna  might  come  to  his  destruction 
between  the  river  and  the  cliff  and  be  welcome. 
There,  as  Taylor  saw  it,  was  the  key  to  the  coming 


|t      '  ; ' 


"THE  HERO  OF  BUENA  VISTA"       807 

battle  and  then'  lit'  posted  the  urtiUery  upon  which 
he  chiefly  reUed  —  eight  guns  under  Captain  Wash- 
ington. The  bulk  of  the  American  army  wa.s  drawn 
up  on  the  left  of  Washington  and  in  his  rear.  The 
troops  to  the  left  were  mainly  on  the  plain,  high 
above  Washington's  head,  along  the  brink  of  a 
crevasse.  In  their  rear  were  two  light  batteries 
commanded  by  Captain  William  T.  Shermun  and 
Captain  IJraxton  Bragg.  Neither  to  the  right  nor 
to  the  left  did  the  American  line  .  t<  nd  the  whole 
way  to  the  mountains  that  formed  the  parallel 
walls  of  the  pass,  thougli  far  to  the  left  near  the 
base  of  the  mountains  was  an  outpost  of  cavalry 
and  four  companies  of  foot. 

Let  us  now  reverse  the  point  of  view  and  look 
upon  the  scene  with  the  eyes  of  Santa  Anna  as  he 
came  up  through  the  pass  from  the  south.  Though 
not  a  great  general,  Santa  Anna  was  no  fool.  To 
march  on  along  the  sunken  roiid  to  a  Homeric 
slaughter  in  front  of  Washington's  guns,  as  Taylor 
was  inviting  him  to  do.  was  quite  too  obviousK  a 
case  of  the  spider  and  the  fly.  Santa  Anna  and  his 
oflBcers  also  observed  the  topography  of  the  pass 
and  promptly  seized  upon  the  fourth  characteristic, 
which  Taylor  had  overlooked.  Trie  lateral  cre- 
vasses, far  back  at  the  heads  of  their  watercourses. 


;-! 


i'i 

! 

i 


n 


u 


si 


N 


Mdd 


il 


208     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

became  shallow.     Along  the  foot  of  the  eastern 
mountains,  before  the  water,  in  its  rush  toward  the 
main  stream,  had  cut  deep  into  the  plain,  there  was 
a  strip  of  land  where  the  crevasses  were  not  suffi- 
ciently deep  to  impede  the  movements  of  troops. 
There  and  not  at  the  Thermopylae  of  the  highroad, 
lay  the  real  key  to  the  situation.    The  topography 
of  the  land  made  it  necessary  for  any  one  attempt- 
ing to  hold  this  pass  against  attack  to  fight  simul- 
taneously two  battles  —  one  down  in  the  corridor 
of  the  stream  to  hold  control  of  the  road,  and 
another  at  some  distance  to  the  east  to  hold  the 
open  country  at  the  heads  of  the  lateral  crevasses. 
Between  the  two  positions   lay  the  impassable 
region  of  the  deep  crevasses  with  their  nearly 
perpendicular  walls. 

The  battle  of  Buena  Vista  consisted  of  four 
stages.  The  first  comprised  the  American  prep- 
arations; the  second,  the  first  Mexican  attack 
which  promptly  revealed  the  faultiness  of  Taylor's 
plan;  the  third,  Taylor's  rearrangement  of  his 
forces.  These  three  stages  occurred  on  the  22d  of 
February.  The  fourth,  the  knock-down  fight 
under  conditions  Taylor  had  not  foreseen,  occurred 
the  next  day. 
The  second  stage  of  the  battle  consisted  of  a 


i".   !  ■   ' 


/ 
•  i 

*   ■ 


t, 


▼iag  after '%d«guerreot.vp^i|iM  at  the  time  of  the 
Jiexiean  War.    In  the  Print  DeparUi^  «i  the  New  York  l»iiUic 

1-  /  /  •     A* 


^'-«i\5 


M 


•A':^ 


I'il 


'■ 


*      I 


ll 


■!.(i 


'■■    ■  »     MI    Wit   ■   -  ,    ..     .1   I      , 


II    '(II  •  ;,.,;    ,(| 


■'''•"""I  IK//,;,. 


<i( 


f 


!'!| 


I 


I  ... 


'•I 


( 


4  , 


'I 


I-  ^;i' 


ft  llR^  li 


;;.:iw 


"THE  HERO  OF  BUENA  VISTA"  209 
quiet  movement  of  the  Mexican  troops  by  means 
of  the  shallow  ends  of  the  lateral  crevasses  on 
to  the  lower  slopes  of  the  eastern  mountains  and 
toward  the  open  country.  The  Mexicans  meant 
to  turn  the  American  position  from  the  east,  and, 
while  the  Americans  guarding  the  road  were  held 
in  their  Thermopylae  by  a  frontal  attack,  to  envelop 
the  entire  army  caught  in  its  own  net. 

The  instant  the  Americans  perceived  this  pur- 
pose the  third  stage  of  the  battle  began.    Taylor 
had  been  involved  in  his  own  imperfect  strategy. 
His  efforts  to  rectify  his  mistake  late  in  the  day  de- 
manded radical  changes  in  the  arrangement  of  the 
American  troops.    It  was  obvious  now  that  the 
main  battle  would  be  the  eastern  one  and  would 
be  fought  at  the  heads  of  the  crevasses.    Taylor 
accordingly  withdrew  three  of  Washington's  guns 
from  the  road,  hurried  them  up  to  the  plain,  and 
sent  them  eastward  to  the  region  where  the  advanc- 
ing Mexicans,  now  established  on  the  mountains, 
threatened  to  accomplish  their  flanking  design.  To 
support  the  guns  he  sent  other  reenforcements  in 
the  same  direction.    At  the  same  time,  as  if  fear- 
ful that  he  had  been  caught  napping  at  each  end 
of  his  line,  Taylor  ordered  part  of  Bragg's  artillery 
with  a  supporting  force  to  cross  the  stream  and 

14 


i; 


^1 


ri 


!l 


^1 


4 


11 


210     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

take  position  in  the  other  gap  he  had  left  open  at 
the  far  edge  of  the  strip  of  fields  along  the  foot  of 
the  ridge  on  the  west. 

These  movements  and  counter-movements,  in- 
volving some  desultory  firing  at  long  range  with 
little  serious  result,  filled  the  22d  of  February.  At 
nightfall  Taylor  had  rearranged  his  army  and  had 
partially  closed  the  gap  between  the  heads  of  the 
crevasses  and  the  eastern  mountains.  But  this 
crucial  ground  was  not  really  in  his  possession. 
The  Mexicans  were  on  the  slopes  of  the  moun- 
tains still  farther  to  the  east  in  an  admirable  posi- 
tion to  carry  out  their  plan  of  turning  the  flank  of 
the  Americans. 

During  the  night  the  American  commander  went 
back  to  Saltillo  to  make  sure  that  all  was  well  at 
his  base.  He  was  not  on  the  field  when  the  real 
battle  began  at  dawn  on  the  23d  of  February.  On 
that  day  the  two  actions  which  nature  had  fore- 
ordained took  place.  The  one  on  the  road  was  not 
seriously  pressed  by  the  Mexicans.  Knowing  the 
American  position  to  be  impregnable,  they  con- 
tented themselves  with  enough  of  a  demonstration 
to  keep  the  defenders  at  their  posts.  The  real 
battle  was  an  ebb  and  flow  —  backwards  by  the 
Americans  from  the  heads  of  the  crevasses  to  the 


t-" 


"THE  HERO  OP  BUENA  VISTA"       211 

hacienda  and  forward  again  to  their  original  posi- 
tion.   This  eastward  battle  was  opened  by  skir- 
mishing on  the  mountains,  followed  by  a  great  rush 
of  Mexicans  along  the  lower  slopes  and  through 
the  open  strip  at  their  feet.    The  most  exposed 
American  troops  at  that  moment  were  the  gun- 
ners of  the  three  cannon  sent  thither  the  night  be- 
fore and  some  Indiana  volunteers  supporting  them. 
In  a  furious  combat  these  checked  the  Mexicans 
for  a  few  moments  but  were  soon  driven  back 
with  the  loss  of  one  of  the  guns.    Every  man  and 
horse  belonging  to  it  had  been  killed  or  disabled. 
As  these  exposed  Americans  fell  back  while  the 
bulk  of  the  Mexican  army  continued  its  circling 
movement  along  the  base  of  the  mountains,  there 
could  no  longer  be  any  doubt  where  the  battle  .was 
going  to  be  lost  or  won.     The  thin  American  line 
which  the  night  before  had  been  thrown  so  hastily 
across  from  the  crevasse  heads  to  the  mountains, 
as  an  obstacle  to  the  Mexican  advance,  must  be 
saved  at  all  cost.    Sherman  accordingly  pushed  all 
his  guns  forward.    Bragg  and  his  Kentucky  vol- 
unteers, who  had  been  sent  across  to  the  western 
mountain  slopes  at  nightfall,  were  now  hastily 
recalled  and  hurried  off  to  the  extreme  east. 
But  before  the  reinforcements  could  make  their 


i 


i 


'I 


I!' 


1 


iil 

m 


IP ' 


J     i 
i 


i! '  ij); 

i 


«12     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

presence  felt,  the  mischief  had  been  done.  The 
Mexicans  had  burst  through  the  American  line. 
The  American  skirmishers  on  the  extreme  east  were 
cut  off  from  the  main  army.  looking  back,  they 
saw  the  struggling  American  line  swinging  like  a 
gate  on  a  pivot  where,  at  the  right  hand,  it  touched 
the  deep  section  of  a  crevasse,  swinging  back,  back, 
from  its  original  position  at  right  angles  to  the 
mountains  until  the  gate  was  open  and  the  way 
was  free  for  the  Mexicans.  To  reach  their  com- 
rades the  skirmishers  had  to  run  for  it,  making  a 
wide  detour,  getting  ahead  of  the  advancing  Mex- 
icans, and  then  racing  right  across  their  path. 
Their  escape  was  made  possible  only  by  the  brief, 
desperate  interruption  of  the  Mexican  advance 
when  Bragg  and  Sherman  got  into  action. 

The  whole  eastward  battle  by  this  time  had  the 
look  of  an  American  defeat.  The  Mexicans,  pour- 
ing now  along  the  base  of  the  mountains  through 
the  wide  open  gateway  around  the  heads  of  the 
crevasses,  appeared  to  have  the  success  of  their 
encircling  movement  within  easy  reach.  On  the 
left,  the  backward  swinging  American  line  was  ap- 
proaching the  hat'.enda.  The  loss  of  the  Americans 
in  killed  and  wounded  had  been  heavy.  Their 
formations  were  more  or  less  disorgau     d.   Indeed, 


"THE  HERO  OF  BUENA  VISTA"       213 

some  Americans  were  running,  and  these  ".strag- 
glers," racing  past  the  hacienda,  did  not  pause 
until  they  reached  Saltillo,  where  they  reported 
the  destruction  of  the  American  army. 

It  was  in  this  desperate  moment  when  the  battle 
appeared  to  be  lost  that  Taylor  returned  to  the 
field  after  his  night  at  the  base  of  supplies.  The 
grim  old  Indian  fighter  found  now  just  the  situa- 
tion in  which  he  appeared  at  his  best.  Arriving  at 
the  hacienda,  he  saw  the  vicinity  occupied  by  sol- 
diers slowly  retreating  in  confusion.  But  close  at 
hand  fortunately  was  the  regiment  of  Mississippi 
Rifles  commanded  by  Jefferson  Davis.  With  these 
and  with  the  reserves  which  had  hitherto  supported 
Washington's  battle  but  which  were  now  brought 
up  to  save  the  other  engagement,  the  Mexican  ad- 
vance was  checked.  A  quick  reorganization  of  the 
confused  troops  surrounding  the  hacienda  and  a 
swift  counterstroke  converted  the  check  into  a 
retirement.    The  Mexicans  drew  back. 

While  the  Mexicans  paused,  Taylor  completed 
the  reorganization  of  the  eastward  battle  and  pre- 
pared for  an  heroic  attempt  to  regain  his  position 
—  to  turn  his  line  back  on  its  pivot  at  the  deep 
crevasse,  to  swing  the  gate  shut  against  the  enemy. 
This  was  the  time  for  a  supreme  stroke  on  the  part 


;i 


'W 


ii 


1  i  il 


«U     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

of  the  Mexicans:  but  they  missed  their  chance. 
Hovering  along  the  base  of  the  mountains,  they 
foolishly  satisfied  themselves  with  cavalry  charges. 
One  detachment  of  cavalry  swept  right  through 
the  hacienda,  reached  the  stream,  crossed  it,  rode 
completely  around  the  American  army,  and  then 
made  its  way  along  the  western  mountains  to  a 
juncture  with  the  Mexicans  before  Washington. 

Another  downpour  of  Mexican  horsemen  created 
the  military  reputation  of  Jefferson  Davis.  Across 
their  path  was  drawn  Davis'  command  and  the 
third  Indiana  regiment.  Coming  down  on  the 
gallop,  the  Mexicans  did  not  like  the  look  of  that 
line  of  silent  Americans  motionless  in  the  open. 
The  Mexican  leaders  shorter, ed  rein  and  rode  warily. 
Then  they  halted.  At  that  moment  the  word  of 
command  ran  along  the  American  line.  There  was 
the  spitting  crackle  of  the  deadly  American  fire. 
Mexican  saddles  were  emptied.  Horses  plunged 
and  ran  masterless.  The  surviving  Mexicans  jerked 
their  horses  round  and  rode  hard  for  the  mountains. 

Now,  too  late,  Santa  Anna  threw  all  his  reserves 
into  the  eastward  battle  which  became  a  furious 
fight  in  the  contracted  area  between  the  crevasse 
heads  and  the  mountains.  The  superior  mettle  of 
the  Americans  determined  the  outcome.    Though 


it 


it 


'THE  I.ERO  OF  BUENA  VISTA' 


215 


the  Mcxicuii!4  hati  rumbers  on  their  side,  thry  were 
slowly  and  steadily  pushed  hack.  By  nightfall 
they  had  been  driven  around  the  heads  of  the  cre- 
vasses and  off  the  lower  slopes  of  the  mountains. 
The  return  movement  of  the  Americans,  still  piv- 
oted at  the  right  hand  on  the  flanking  crevasse, 
had  succeeded.  The  gate  had  been  swung  back 
and  was  now  shut  against  the  Mexicans.  As  dark- 
ness fell,  the  two  armies  stood  practically  where 
they  had  stood  the  night  before.  The  net  result  of 
the  twenty-four  hours  since  the  battle  began  was 
apparently  nothing  at  all  —  except  for  the  miseries 
of  the  wounded  and  the  tragic  peace  of  the  den<l. 
If  the  Mexicans,  with  their  great  advantage  in 
numbers,  should  prove  equal  to  the  occasion,  what 
were  Taylor's  chances  for  the  morrow.^  But  the 
Mexicans  had  no  stomach  for  more  fighting.  By 
this  time  their  morale  was  exhausted.  In  the  night 
under  a  pale  moon  Santa  Anna  with  all  his  army 
stole  oflP  on  a  forced  march  back  to  San  Luis 
Potosi.  When  morning  dawned,  the  Americans 
were  without  adversaries.  Taylor  instantly  sent  off 
dispatches  proclaiming  a  splendid  victory.  The 
American  public  went  wild  and  in  due  time  gave  the 
commander  his  reward  by  making  him  President  of 
the  United  States. 


i 


^i  • 


vi 


m 


Mi^Ji^^Mi 


gmmim 


P»;:| 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  STROKE  FROM   THE  EAST 


I  (- 


1    ' 


!-  H 


General  Winheld  Scott,  whom  Polk  had  re- 
luctantly placed  in  command  of  his  invading  army 
—  for  Polk  was  a  strict  party  man  of  the  old  sort 
and  Scott  was  a  Whig  —  was  a  brilliant,  elderly 
dandy.  He  loved  fine  uniforms.  Afoot,  his  fig- 
ure was  criticized  as  being  short  in  the  leg;  but 
this  defect  enhanced  his  appearance  mounted,  es- 
pecially when  he  rode  a  big  horse  and  "towered," 
as  the  comment  was,  resplendent.  He  had  the 
dandy's  traditional  courage.  As  a  young  man  in 
the  war  of  1812  he  had  made  a  name  for  himself  as 
a  gallant  soldier.  At  sixty  he  was  an  accomplished 
student  of  the  art  of  war,  and  was  well  versed  in  the 
theories  accepted  by  his  time.  He  knew  something 
of  European  travel.  There  was  a  dash  of  the 
writer  in  him.  His  intellect,  though  deliberate, 
was  powerful.    He  had  a  shrewd  eye  for  men. 

To  sum  up  the  characteristics  that  made  for  his 

ti« 


=  r/»V 


THE  STROKE  PROM  THE  EAST       «17 

advantage,  he  was  talented,  cultivated,  impressive, 
debonair. 

Unfortunately  there  was  another  side  to  Scott. 
Hi'  was  vain,  and  a  love  of  flattery  was  one  of  his 
dangers.  There  were  circunistanrt^s  in  which  his 
temper  could  not  be  reliinj  upon.  The  incipient 
vsTiter,  caged  so  to  speak  in  the  soldier,  sometimes 
broke  free,  rash  and  undis<ipline<l,  with  results  that 
in  one  case  at  least  w<*re  appalling  —  as  will  be 
seen  in  the  nmrveliuiis  letter  that  must  be  quoted 
toward  the  end  of  this  compter.  Altogether,  good 
qualities  and  bad,  WinfjeiH  ^cott  Inspired  one  of  his 
ablest  critics  to  compare  hi'n  with  Tieneral  Webb  in 
Thackeray's  Henry  Esmond.  The  comparison  is 
a  happy  one.  George  Lockharl  Rives  penetrates 
Scott's  character  when  he  says,  "those  lines  which 
pleased  Webb  so  highly  might  well  have  been 
written  of  Scott: 

"Before  the  front  the  general  sternly  rides 
With  .such  an  air  as  Mars  to  battle  strides; 
Propitious  heaven  must  sure  a  hero  save. 
Like  Paris  handsome  and  like  Hector  brave." 


The  brilliant  qualities  of  Scott  were  in  evidence 
during  the  early  part  of  his  invasion.  From  his 
rendezvous  at  Lobos  Island,  off  the  Mexican  coast 


^^^^^ 


iM 


218     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

to  Ihe  south  of  Tampico,  he  sailed  with  a  great  fleet 
of  transports  to  Vera  Cruz.  One  of  the  thrilling 
moments  for  the  American  army  was  that  in  which 
Scott's  landing  parties  entered  their  boats,  a  few 
miles  south  of  Vera  Cruz,  facing  an  open  beach 
backed  by  a  line  of  sand  hills  behind  which  for 
all  they  knew  might  be  the  whole  Mexican  army.' 
Amid  loud  cheers  from  the  ships,  over  a  glistening 
sea.  the  boats  raced  for  the  beach.  The  first  boat 
to  touch  carried  the  commanding  oflScer,  General 
Worth  —  fighting  Worth  of  Monterey  —  who  was 
the  first  man  ashore.  Leaping  overboard  in  shal- 
low water,  forming  instantly  in  a  battle  line,  the 
Americans  charged  the  sandhills,  topped  them,  and 
faced  —  an  empty  landscape.  An  anticlimax,  to 
be  sure,  but  with  no  element  of  the  unheroic. 

Scott  promptly  invested  Vera  Cruz.  After  four 
days'  bombardment,  during  which  the  city  was 
ruined  while  the  American  loss  was  trifling.  Vera 
Cruz  surrendered.  No  Mexican  forces  had  ap- 
proached to  relieve  the  city;  there  was  no  evidence 
that  any  notable  army  threatened  him;  and  yet  at 
hand  on  the  coast  was  an  enemy  that  Scott  right- 
ly feared.    This  was  yellow  fever.     His  next  aim, 

•  A  party  of  Mexican  cavalry  liaii  been  driven  from  the  beach 
by  cannon  fire. 


i  I 


THE  STROKE  FROM  THE  EAST       SIO 

therefore,  was  to  clear  Vera  Cruz  and  get  up  in- 
to the  mountains  before  the  fever  appeared  on 
the  coast,  and  in  this  he  succeeded  and  so  saved 
his  army. 

The  American  invaders  set  out  for  "the  City," 
the  capital  of  Mexico,  following  much  the  line 
which  Cortes  had  taken  three  hundred  years  be- 
fore. A  charming  record  of  this  great  march  has 
been  preserved  in  the  letters  of  a  young  artillery 
captain  to  his  wife.  Robert  Anderson,  afterward 
Major  Anderson  of  Fort  Sumter  fame,  looked  upon 
the  road  through  Mexico  with  the  eye  of  the  imag- 
ination. Witness  his  suggested  contrast  of  past 
and  present,  in  connection  with  what  was  known 
as  the  National  Bridge  whence  he  "went  to  visit 
an  old  fortification  intended  to  command  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  bridge.  The  fort  is  an  old  one  on  a 
high  hill,  the  side  pretty  well  defended  by  mus- 
quetry  fires.  This  place  we  learned  had  been  fur- 
nished with  eight  pieces  of  artillery  which  were 
withdrawn  the  day  before.  .  .  .  The  scenery  at 
the  bridge  is  beautiful.  .  .  .  The  bridge  is  like 
all  of  the  Spanish  works  of  art  constructed  during 
their  stay  in  this  country,  well  executed  and  on  a 
magnificant  scale." 

Even  the  bravest  of  the  Americans,  in  whom  fear 


\\ 


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I      ! 


I     1 


^ 


MO     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

had  no  place,  might  wHl  congratulate  themselves 
as  they  wound  op  and  up  into  rugged  and  still  more 
rugged  mountain,  where  impregnable  positions 
were  without  defeaciers,  that  they  faced  the  present 
of  Santa  Anna  and  not  the  past  of  Cortes. 

Meanwhile  what  was  Santa  Anna  about?    This 
enigmatic  man  has  received  no  serious  considera- 
ti<m  from  American  historians.    The  tradition  has 
been  that  he  does  not  deserve  any,  amd  he  is  pic- 
tured as  a  common  fraud,  alternately  boasting  and 
runnmg  away.     His  own  defense  is  baaed  on  the 
cowardice  of  his  armies,  which,  he  insists,  com- 
pelled him  often  to  flee  or  be  taken,  and  he  chose 
not  to  y>i  taken.    Nevertheless,  no  matter  who  was 
responsible  for  the  Mexican  panic  after  that  drawn 
battle  of  Buena  Vista,  Santa  Anna  had  rallied  a 
considerable  force  at  San  Luis  Rjtosi.     Military 
problems  and  a  crisis  in  Mexican  politics  had  de- 
layed his  subsequent  movemeMs  and  for  these 
reasons  Scott  had  mat  been  molested  at  Vera  Cruz. 
But  now  Santa  Ansa  had  organized  another  army, 
had  weathered  h»  political  crisis,  and  was  about  to 
challenge  Scott's  advance. 

Against  the  advice  of  his  chief  en|rineer,  Santa 
Anna  fortified  the  pass  of  Cerro  Gorde  on  the  main 
road  to  Puebla.    The  choice  of  ground  was  unwise 


THE  STROKE  FROM  THE  EAST       221 

for  several  reasons,  especially,  as  the  event  proved, 
because  in  case  of  disaster  it  would  be  impossible 
to  retreat,  so  narrow  was  the  only  exit  backward 
from  the  Mexican  position.  The  Mexican  leader 
nevertheless  placed  his  army  in  a  segment  of  high 
broken  country,  the  hollow  of  an  arc  of  mountains 
whose  chord  was  a  line  of  precipices  six  hundred 
feet  deep  forming  the  canyon  of  a  river.  Between 
the  precipices  and  the  mountains  Scott  was  ad- 
vancing along  a  zigzag  road.  The  right  wing  of 
the  Mexican  line  rested  on  the  precipices,  whence 
it  stretched  diagonally  across  the  segment  to  the 
mountains  in  such  a  way  that  most  of  the  Mexicans 
had  the  precipices  at  their  backs.  Santa  Anna  did 
not  consider  it  worth  while  to  occupy  the  lower 
slopes  of  the  mountains  so  as  to  make  impossible 
any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Americans  to  turn 
his  left  wing,  because  he  thought  not  even  a  rabbit 
could  get  over  such  difficult  ground. 

Among  the  Americans,  however,  a  young  en- 
gineer disagreed  with  Santa  Anna.  The  opinion 
of  Captain  Robert  E.  Lee,  that  the  Americans 
could  make  their  way  along  the  mountain  slopes 
and  turn  the  Mexican  left,  was  accepted  by  Scott, 
who  gave  orders  for  the  hazardous  undertaking. 
The  plan  involved  two  attacks:  at  a  set  time  the 


H 


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it 


.4         I 


222     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Americans  were  to  assail  the  front  of  the  Mexicans, 
while  at  the  same  time  the  flanking  column  was  to 
attack  from  the  rear. 

The  all  but  insuperable  diflSculty  of  this  flanking 
movement  along  the  mountain  slope  made  a  deep 
impression  upon  another  young  American  oflBcer, 
Lieutenant  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  who  subsequently  de- 
scribed this  march  "over  chasms  where  the  walls 
were  so  steep  men  could  barely  climb  them.  Ani- 
mals could  not.  .  .  .  The  engineers,  who  had 
directed  the  opening,  led  the  way  and  the  troops 
followed.  Artillery  was  let  down  the  steep  sides  by 
hand,  the  men  engaged  attaching  a  strong  rope  to 
the  rear  axle  and  letting  the  guns  down,  a  piece  at 
a  time,  while  men  at  the  ropes  kept  their  ground 
at  the  top,  paying  out  gradually,  while  a  few  at 
the  front  directed  the  course  of  the  piece.  In  like 
manner  the  guns  were  drawn  by  hand  up  the 
opposite  slopes." 

A  day  and  a  night  were  necessary  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  this  operation.  A  Mexican  detach- 
ment which  discovered  the  Americans  was  put  to 
flight,  and  an  outlying  Mexican  fortification  was 
taken  by  storm.  Early  the  next  morning,  Sun- 
day, the  18th  of  April,  the  separate  parts  of  Scott's 
army  began  their  attacks  according  to  schedule. 


THE  STROKE  FROM  THE  EAST   ««8 

The  flanking  column  hurled  itself  on  the  left  wing 
of  the  Mexicans,  crushed  it,  and  sent  the  survivors 
whirling  through  the  narrow  exit  along  the  preci- 
pices which  was  their  one  escape.  Having  pene- 
trated the  Mexican  line  to  the  brink  of  the  preci- 
pices, the  American  flanking  column  now  held  the 
bulk  of  their  enemies  in  a  trap.  Meanwhile  the 
Mexicans  of  the  center  and  the  right  had  also  been 
attacked  by  Scott's  other  columns  so  that  now  in 
front  and  on  each  side  of  them  were  the  American 
bayonets  and  at  their  back  was  the  line  of  preci- 
pices. Their  comrades  of  the  left  wing  had  already 
saved  themselves  by  running,  and  these  men,  thus 
trapped,  threw  down  their  arms.  Santa  Anna, 
however,  was  not  with  them.  The  flight  of  his  left 
wing  had  carried  him  along  with  it,  and  he  was  now 
riding  hard  for  safety.  Scott  had  nothing  further 
to  do  with  him  for  several  months.  The  only  ef- 
fective Mexican  force  between  the  American  army 
and  Mexico  City  was  thus  destroyed,  and  its  ar- 
tillery, ammunition,  and  supplies  were  all  in  the 
hands  of  the  conqueror. 

The  Americans  now  pushed  on  to  Jalapa  —  "the 
beautiful  and  celebrated  city  of  Jalapa.''  Anderson 
calls  it.  The  next  evening,  he  writes,  his  command 
encamped  "near  a  large  cotton  factory;  the  night 


m 


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2«4     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

was  intensely  cold,  ice  formed  in  our  basins."  Two 
days  afterward,  writing  from  the  historic  Castle  of 
Perote,  he  describes  the  march  from  the  camp  near 
the  cotton  factory. 

Off  again,  the  next  morning  early,  road  ascending  and 
rough;  about  eleven  we  came  to  a  village  at  the  en- 
trance to  a  pass  which  they  had  commenced  fortifying, 
but  seized  by  the  panic  spread  by  the  runaways  from 
the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo,  they  had  abandoned  it, 
leaving  seven  or  eight  pieces  of  cannon  on  the  ground. 
This  would  have  been  an  ugly  pass,  as  it  is  in  the  midst 
of  the  lava  of  an  old  volcano,  exceedingly  rough  and 
sharp;  its  rough  jagged  points  would  have  impeded  the 
advance  of  our  troops  and  kept  us  under  their  fire. 

Passing  over  this  volcanic  road,  wr  soon  found  our- 
selves in  the  region  of  the  pine.  Th<>  .scenery  was  ex- 
ceedingly grand  and  picturesque.  Encamped  that 
night  at  Las  Vegas,  water  excellent,  night  cold.  The 
next  day  we  entered  this  celebrated  work  early  in  the 
day,  the  troops  having  hastily  abandoned  it  the  pre- 
ceding day.    We  are  now  in  the  region  of  the  cedar. 


Scott's  immediate  objective  was  Puebla,  where  he 
intended  drawing  a  long  breath  before  proceeding 
to  the  extremity.  Anderson  gives  interesting  de- 
tails of  the  march.    On  the  7th  of  May,  he  writes: 


A  command  of  two  companies  of  infantry  and  one  of 
dragoons  was  sent  forward  this  morning  on  the  Puebla 


MHIi 


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THE  STROKE  FROM  THE  EAST   tW 


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road,  some  fifteen  miles,  to  bring  an  Alcade,  or  some  of 
his  subjects,  to  task  for  preventing  the  inhabitants 
around  the  town  from  bringing  provisions  to  the  troops 
here.  .  .  .  Our  paying  the  Mexicans  liberally  for 
what  they  bring  will  induce  them  to  come,  our  punish* 
ing  those  who  prevent  them  will  show  them  that  .  .  . 
our  strength  .  .  .  will  be  exerted  when  necessity  de« 
mands  it.  .  .  .  The  market  people  are  becoming 
much  more  reasonable  in  their  prices;  we  now  buy  a 
dozen  eggs  for  eighteen  and  three  quarters  cents,  occa- 
sionally five  cents  for  a  pie;  onions,  sixteen  for  six  and 
one  quarter  cents,  and  bananas,  seven  for  six  and  one 
quarter  cents.  Chickens  half  grown,  eighteen  and 
three  quarters  cents  each.  These  prices  will  do  very 
well.  The  fresh  meats  we  get  are  generall"  hog  and 
sheep  —  the  hogs  always  skinned  —  most  funny  look- 
ing things  they  are  with  their  jackets  off.  In  this  re- 
gion we  scarcely  ever  see  a  cow. 

When  we  remember  what  havoc  invading  armies 
have  made  in  our  own  time,  we  find  Anderson's  in- 
timate account  of  the  tranquillity  of  Puebia  under 
the  American  rule  refreshing. 

Scott  held  Pi'ebla  about  three  months,  from  the 
middle  of  May  until  near  the  middle  of  August. 
During  this  period  the  less  fortunate  side  of  his 
character  became  manifest.  He  was  deeply  wor- 
ried over  problems  of  supply  and  allowed  them 
to  get  on  his  nerves.  One-year  volunteers  whose 
t(  rms  of  enlistment  were  about  to  expire  had  to 

IS 


MldtOCOPY   RESOIUTION   TEST   CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


^      /APPLIED    IIVHGE      Ir 


1653  East   Main   Street 

Roctiesler.   New   York        14609       USA 

(716)   482  -  0300  -  Phone 

(716)   288-  5989  -Fox 


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226     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

be  released  and  sent  back  to  the  coast.  The  War 
Department  was  slow  in  replacing  these  men  ^  not, 
apparently,  through  the  fault  of  any  one  in  particu- 
lar but  merely  through  the  general  unprepared- 
ness  that  has  always  characterized  the  entry  of  the 
United  States  into  a  war.  These  delays  and  dis- 
appointments upset  Scott's  temper.  He  wrote 
savagely  to  the  War  Department  accusing  it  of  a 
plot  to  "destroy"  him  by  withholding  reinforce- 
ments. It  was  during  this  period  of  tense  strain 
that  a  certain  Nicholas  P.  Trist  made  his  appear- 
ance at  Puebla.  And  thereby  hangs  a  tale  —  a  tale 
that  takes  us  back  to  Washington. 

Months  before,  while  Scott  was  assembling  his 
forces  for  the  invasion,  who  should  reappear  at 
Washington  but  Colonel  Atocha.  He  had  the  same 
old  story  to  tell.  Santa  Anna  in  his  heart  longed 
for  peace,  peace  at  the  American  price  —  but  un- 
der present  conditions  he  dared  not  propose  it  to 
the  Mexican  people.  Stale  as  the  bait  was,  Polk 
rose  to  it  a  second  time.  He  discussed  with  his 
Cabinet  the  question  of  sending  a  plenipotentiary 
to  the  front  armed  with  extraordinary  powers  both 
diplomatic  and  military. 

Polk  and  his  Cabinet,  one  of  the  least  distin- 
guished in  the  annals  of  Ameri        politics,  now 


il 


THE  STROKE  FROM  THE  EAST       227 

embarked  on  a  surprising  course  of  mistaken 
diplomacy.  First  they  tried  some  backstairs  nego- 
tiations in  which  they  used  Atocha  —  that  shady 
diplomat,  once  the  personal  representative  of  the 
leader  of  the  nation  with  which  they  were  at  war ! 
—  as  the  go-between.  Atocha  made  his  way  to 
Mexico  City,  where  he  gave  out  that  the  United 
States  Government  demanded  the  cession  of  all 
Mexico  north  of  a  line  drawn  due  west  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  along  the  twenty-sixth 
parallel,  in  return  for  fifteen  million  dollars.  In 
March  the  envoy  was  back  at  Washington  with 
the  refusal  of  the  Mexican  Government  to  fon- 
sider  such  terms,  and  the  note  from  Mexico  was 
bitter,  not  to  say  insolent. 

Meanwhile  rumors  had  got  abroad  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  in  favor  of  immense  conquests  in  Mex- 
ico. Calhoun  took  alarm.  From  the  first  he  had 
opposed  a  war  of  conquest.  To  safeguard  Texas 
and  secure  a  strategical  frontier  —  that  was  all  he 
would  approve.  Distrusting  the  President,  he  in- 
troduced resolutions  in  the  Senate,  in  1847,  con- 
demning the  idea  of  extensive  Mexican  conquests. 
Nearly  a  year  before,  when  Polk  seems  to  have 
favored  the  line  through  the  mouth  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  Calhoun  had  come  out  in  support  of  a  line 


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!-.:^ 


228     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

following  the  Rio  Grande  from  its  mouth  to  £1 
Paso  del  Norte  and  thence  due  west  to  the  sea. 

Polk,  always  solicitous  lest  a  defection  among  his 
Democratic  followers  in  Congress  should  leave  him 
helpless,  decided  to  limit  his  demands  to  a  cession 
which  should  be  bounded  as  Calhoun  indicated: 
Mexico  should  cede  the  eas  t  bank  of  the  Rio  Grand's, 
New  Mexico,  Upper  California,  and  also  Lower 
California.  To  bring  this  about,  a  plenipotentiary 
was  to  go  to  the  front,  with  power  not  only  to  treat 
for  peace  but,  if  necessary,  to  order  the  command- 
ing general  to  cease  hostilities.  For  this  extraordi- 
nary mission  Polk  selected  no  high  oflScial  but  a 
mere  clerk  in  the  State  Department.  Nicholas  P. 
Trist  was  a  capable  clerk  to  be  sure,  and  a  good 
Democrat,  related  by  marriage  to  Jefferson,  but 
in  the  world's  eye  he  was  nobody.  Could  anything 
but  a  total  lack  of  imagination  explain  the  dis- 
patch of  such  an  envoy  empowered  to  manipulate 
a  sensitive  and  harassed  general,  proud  of  a  great 
achievement? 

Trist  proceeded  to  Vera  Cruz  and  sent  a  letter  to 
Scott  announcing  his  approach  and  the  nature  of 
his  mission.  Scott  received  this  letter  at  Jalapa 
and  wrote  an  irritated,  unbecoming  reply.  .le 

Scott  was  still  there,  Trist  overtook  the  army  but 


li    > 


» 


ti; 


THE  STROKE  FROM  THE  EAST       S29 

did  not  present  himself  to  the  commanding  gener- 
al, and  for  several  days  the  envoy  and  the  gen- 
eral remained  in  the  same  town  wlhout  meet- 
ing. Then  Scott  left  for  Puebla.  Two  letters  from 
Trist,  who  lingered  at  Jalapa,  called  forth  that  let- 
ter from  Scott  which  ranks  high  among  historical 
indiscretions: 

My  first  impulse  was  to  return  the  farrago  of  insolence, 
conceit,  and  arrogance  to  the  author;  but,  on  reflection, 
I  have  determined  to  preserve  the  letters  as  a  choice 
specimen  of  diplomatic  literature  and  manners.  The 
jacobin  convention  of  France  never  sent  to  one  of  its 
armies  in  the  field  a  more  amiable  and  accomplished 
instrument.  If  you  were  but  armed  with  an  ambula- 
tory guillotine  you  would  be  the  personification  of 
Danton,  Marat,  and  St.  Just  all  in  one. 

You  tell  me  that  you  are  authorized  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  of  peace  with  the  enemy,  a  declaration  which, 
as  it  rests  upon  your  own  word,  I  might  well  question; 
and  you  add  that  it  was  not  intended  at  Washington 
that  I  should  have  anything  to  do  with  the  negotiation. 
This  I  can  well  believe,  and  certainly  have  cause  to  be 
thankful  to  the  President  for  not  degrading  me  by 
placing  me  in  any  joint  commission  with  you. 

In  the  middle  of  May,  Trist  reached  Puebla. 
Until  almost  the  end  of  June  he  and  Scott  were  not 
on  speaking  terms.  During  this  time  a  ridiculous 
three-cornered  discussion  between  Scott,  Trist, 


M 


^m. 


830     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

and  the  Administration  formed  an  episode  which 
Americans  today  would  like  to  forget.  From  it  no 
one  issued  with  credit.  Scott's  resentment  went  so 
far  that  he  wrote  to  Washington  asking  to  be  re- 
Ueved.  The  President,  unable  to  see  that  his  own 
wooden-headedness  was  the  cause  of  the  trouble, 
berated  Scott  in  his  diary  and  longed  for  some  one 
he  dared  put  in  his  place. 

This  disgraceful  situation  changed  color  sud- 
denly, like  a  stage  transformation  scene,  just  as 
June  closed.  For  some  reason  not  yet  known  Scott 
and  Trist  faced  about  and  became  friends.  Pres- 
ently Trist  was  writing  to  Washington  that  his 
first  impression  of  Scott  was  all  wrong  and  that  the 
General's  "conduct  has  been  characterized  by  the 
purest  public  spirit,  and  a  fidelity  and  devotion  that 
could  not  be  surpassed  to  the  views  of  the  Gov- 
ernment." Scott  for  his  part  wrote  of  the  happy 
change  in  his  relations  with  Trist,  whom  he  now 
considered  "able, discreet, courteous, and  amiable." 
Both  asked  to  have  their  previous  letters  removed 
from  the  archives.  Was  ever  diplomacy  in  such 
fashion  made  a  laughing  stock? 

An  incident  of  the  reconciliation,  and  possibly 
one  of  its  causes,  was  a  visit  to  Puebla  of  an  at- 
tach6  of  the  British  legation.   Trist,  v»hile  he  and 


THE  STROKE  FROM  THE  EAST       «31 

Scott  were  at  outs,  had  applied  to  the  British 
Minir*er  to  put  him  into  communication  with  the 
Mexican  authorities.  Adroit  management  by  the 
Englishman  of  this  diflScult  situation,  together  with 
the  opportune  reconciliation  of  the  American  chiefs, 
made  possible  a  real,  though  underhand,  negotia- 
tion with  Santa  Anna.  Open  negotiations  would 
begin  if  Scott  and  Trist  would  promise  Santa  An- 
na a  million  dollars,  in  perfect  secrecy,  to  be  paid 
when  the  treaty  should  be  ratified,  and  if  they 
would  provide  him  at  once  with  ten  thousand 
dollars,  all  for  the  purpose  of  quelling  opposi- 
tion. Scott  and  Trist  fell  into  the  trap.  The  ten 
thousand  dollars  were  sent  forward.  But  the  open 
negotiations  promised  were  not  begun.  Santa 
Anna  resorted  to  his  old  subterfuge,  which  some- 
how seems  always  to  have  deceived  the  Americans. 
A  more  imperative  display  of  force  must  be  made. 
Scott  must  threaten  the  capital  more  obviously. 
When  the  Americans  were  at  the  gates,  Santa  Anna 
would  at  last  be  in  a  position  to  defy  his  domestic 
enemies  and  to  meet  the  American  demands. 

Just  how  far  Scott  was  taken  in  has  never  ^een 
determined.  His  subsequent  course  of  action  is 
often  bewildering,  and  no  theory  satisfactorily 
explains  all  of  it.    Did  he  believe  that  he  had 


g 


'  4 


H  H 

ilii  4 

'11 

i '  \  ■' 

238     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

fought  his  last  battle  and  that  Santa  Anna  was 
virtually  his  accomplice,  or  did  he  see  through  the 
wily  Mexican?  Did  Scott  think  another  blow  was 
necessary  and  that  then  Santa  Anna  would  keep 
his  word  and  peace  on  good  terms  would  follow? 
Or  did  the  various  possibilities  leave  him  so  in 
doubt  that  he  began  his  advance  without  any 
definite  forecast  of  the  future? 

The  one  absolutely  certain  tli':'g  is  that  on  Au- 
gust 7,  1847,  the  American  army,  consisting  now 
of  10,738  men  in  splendid  condition,  abandoned 
its  connection  with  the  coast  and  marched  out  of 
Puebla  on  its  way  to  the  City  of  Mexico. 


:1^ 


n 


'  t  \  ^  1 


sv'as 
the 
ivas 
eep 

)W? 

)  in 
any 

lOW 

ned 
tof 


CHAPTER  XIII 


THE  PIVOTAL  ACTION 


Between  Puebla  and  the  City  of  Mexico  towers  a 
wall  of  mountains  capped  with  perpetual  ice.  To- 
ward this  gigantic  fortification  the  Americans  ad- 
vanced, prepared  at  every  step  for  battle.  From 
height  to  height  they  rose,  wondering  whether  they 
would  have  to  fight  again  as  they  had  done  at 
Cerro  Gordo.  But  they  encountered  no  resistance 
and  on  the  10th  of  August  the  advance  guard 
reached  the  pass  for  which  they  had  aimed,  10,500 
feet  above  sea-level,  with  the  colossal  ice-peak, 
Iztaccihuatl,  on  their  left  hand.  Anderson,  de- 
scribing the  arrival  of  his  command  at  the  pass, 
writes: 


At  ten  o'clock  precisely,  .  .  .  my  eyes  caught  the  first 
view  of  the  valley  of  Mexico.  There  it  lay,  as  seen 
through  the  narrow  opening  made  by  the  road,  in  the 
overhanging  trees;  a  quiet  landscape  having  in  the 
foreground  a  sheet  of  waters;  the  portion  of  the  valley 


:1 


i 


i!^ 


1'' 


i 


V"l' 


'i    :.,   iji 


834     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

viiible  blending  itself  imperceptibly  in  distant  moun- 
tains, which  could  scarcely  be  distinguished,  the  day 
being  at  that  moment  cloudy,  witit  •  gentle  mist  trom 
the  mountains  which  rested  on  their  sides. 

Every  turn  of  the  road  now  opened  to  us  a  new  or 
more  extensive  view  .  .  .  every  variety  of  green  that 
could  be  formed  by  the  varied  light  and  shade  of  pass- 
ing clouds  .  .  ,  mountains  here,  nearly  in  the  fore- 
ground, there,  in  the  distance,  and  beyond  limiting 
the  view;  and  lake,  in  this  part  almost  undistinguish- 
able  from  the  grass  and  slime,  which  nearly  covered  it, 
to  the  clear  water,  in  which  the  shadows  of  the  passing 
clouds  were  visible;  the  picture  studded  with  haciendas, 
some  traced  out  by  their  huge  mud  walls  enclosing 
immense  courtyards,  like  fortifications,  villages  with 
churches,  etc.,  presented  views  which  were  charming 
to  those  who  hoped  that  there  lay  the  City,  from  which 
they  must  return  to  their  beioved  homes. 

To  the  military  mind  the  most  important  geo- 
graphical feature  before  the  invaders  was  Lake 
Texcoco,  which  lay  immediately  east  of  the  City  of 
Mexico  —  that  is,  between  it  and  '^e  American 
army.  South  of  this  lake  lay  two  others,  Xochi- 
miloo  and  Chalco,  the  latter  extending  farther  to 
the  east.  The  highroad  from  Puebla  to  the  City  of 
Mexico,  after  rounding  the  northeastern  comer  of 
Lake  Chalco,  traversed  a  long  and  narrow  isthmus 
between  the  lakes,  and  so  at  last  reached  open 
ground  in  front  of  the  ancient  city.    It  was  upon 


!f!i'    I 


THE  PIVOTAL  ACTION  «S5 

this  isthmus,  behind  foruiiduble  fortifications  on  a 
rocky  hill  known  us  the  Peflon  Viejo,  that  the  army 
of  Santa  Anna  lay  in  wait.  To  guard  against  n 
flanking  movement  by  the  Americans,  who  might 
conceivably  riake  a  wide  detour  round  Texcoco, 
another  army  was  in  position  northeast  of  the  lake. 
Did  the  failure  to  hold  the  mountain  passes  mean 
that  Santa  Anna  was  really  playing  into  Scott's 
hand?  Whatever  Santa  Anna's  secret  purpose  at 
that  time,  Scott  had  no  delusions  about  his  imme- 
diate intention.  Santa  Anna  would  make  a  genu- 
ine resistance  under  the  eye  of  the  capital.  Grim 
battle  crowned  by  a  crushing  victor/  seemed  to 
Scott  the  imperative  necessity.  On  the  east  shore 
of  Lake  Chaico  Scott  paused  to  think.  To  attack 
along  the  isthmus  would  be  Thermopylae  over 
again;  he  therefore  promptly  dismissed  the  idea. 
The  flanking  movement  round  Texcoco  did  not 
commend  itself  to  him.  Was  there  any  third  plan? 
To  the  Mexican  mind  there  apparently  was  not. 
Sa  .  Anna  had  not  even  now  learned  the  lesson  of 
Cerro  Gordo.  The  strip  of  broken  country  south  oi 
Lake  Chaico,  where  its  waters  approach'' J  the  feet 
of  the  mountains,  seemed  to  him  closed  by  nature. 
To  the  men  who  bad  dragged  their  cannon  by  hand 
through  the  chasms  at  Cerro  Gordo  it  did  not  seem 


I 


^  .! 


'if 


; 


ill 


H 


•| 


I" 


i.  •- 


'  ^ 


'  I- 


1   I 


h        ' 


t86     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

impassable.  Scott,  who  had  been  considering  this 
plan  all  along,  determined  to  attempt  >t. 

Now  began  the  strategic  move  that  was  the 
turning-point  of  the  war.  Scott  sent  a  column 
against  the  Pefion  to  serve  as  a  blind,  while  he 
swung  the  bulk  of  his  army  round  through  the 
difficult  country  south  of  the  lake.  The  movement, 
in  comparison  with  that  at  Cerro  Gordo,  proved 
only  moderately  difficult.  On  the  18th  of  August 
Scott  estab'ished  his  headquarters  at  the  village  of 
San  Agustfn  de  las  Cuevas,  west  of  Lake  Chalco, 
on  the  highroad  between  the  City  and  Acapulco. 

Scott  had  won  his  first  move;  but  had  he  actu- 
ally bettered  his  position?  Santa  Anna,  perceiv- 
ing what  his  opponent  was  about,  had  withdrawn 
from  the  isthmus,  and  had  also  established  himself 
on  the  Acapulco  road.  Three  miles  north  of  San 
Agustin  the  great  hacienda  of  San  Antonio  had 
been  fortified  by  the  Mexicans.  Two  miles  farther 
to  the  north  the  road  was  again  blocked  by  the  ex- 
tensive fortifications  of  Churubusco.  And  what  of 
the  road  itself?  Was  it,  like  the  isthmus  road,  a 
Thermopylfie?  Scott's  engineers  reported  it  was 
uiw-h  the  same  thing.  On  the  east  were  Lake 
Aochimilco  and  its  marshes;  on  the  west,  an  ancient 
lava  field,  the  Pedregal,  fissured  into  a  labyrinth  of 


I 


THE  PIVOTAL  ACTION  «S7 

chaams  worse  thun  the  mo'intains  at  Cerro  Gordo. 
If  Scott  could  not  somehow  continue  his  turnbg 
movement,  his  first  success  ir.  strategy  would  be  of 
little  value. 

Four  miles  to  the  west  )f  the  Acapulco  road, 
beyond  the  Pedregal,  there  was  another  road,  con- 
necting the  capital  with  the  village  of  San  Angel 
and  continuing  .southward  through  a  narrow  valley 
past  the  farm  of  Padierna  to  Contreras.  Could 
this  be  reached  by  skirting  the  southern  edge  of  the 
Pedregal?  Encouraged  by  the  belief  of  his  en- 
gineers that  it  could,  Scott  decided  on  a  second 
turning  movement  towarf!  the  wcst.  Leaving 
General  Worth  to  threaten  San  Antonio,  Scott 
himself  started  a  column  along  the  skirts  of  the 
Pedregal.  It  was  hard  work,  and  the  men  had  to 
march  light,  opening  a  road  as  they  went.  But 
again  th.;  Americans  pro  red  equal  tr  'he  task  and 
forced  their  way  part  the  Pedregal  »  il  they  ap- 
peared before  the  village  of  Padiuma  on  the  San 
Angel  road. ' 

Meanwhile  Santa  V  na,  though  with  less  con- 
fidence than  in  the  earlier  stage  of  the  game,  sought 

'  Through  a  confuiion  of  names  by  the  Americans,  the  fighfin;? 
on  the  San  Angel  road  was  known  at  that  time  as  the  b.:ttle  of 
Contreras. 


!< 


■;| 


/F^ 


1-  ?| 


1  .  ! 


288     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

to  prepare  against  a  further  move  of  the  Americans 
toward  the  west.  The  army  that  had  guarded  the 
north  end  of  Lake  Texcoco,  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral Valencia,  was  brought  around  to  the  west  of 
the  lake  and  was  sent  forward  to  hold  the  San  An- 
gel road.  Valencia,  advancing  as  far  as  Padiema, 
guessed  what  Scott  was  about  and  decided  to  for- 
tify the  west  side  of  the  valley  in  which  Padiema 
lies.  On  the  18th  of  August  Scott's  advance  guard 
encountered  his  outposts.  After  a  brief  skirmish 
the  Americans  withdrew.  Santa  Anna,  fearing  that 
the  Americans  might  get  between  him  and  Valen- 
cia, ordered  the  Mexican  general  to  fall  back  along 
the  San  Angel  road  in  order  to  be  in  closer  touch 
with  the  forces  at  Churubusco.  But  Valencia,  who 
was  his  political  rival  and  was  eager  to  make  a 
reputation,  refused  to  obey. 

At  P.  -iema,  in  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  of 
August,  Valencia  was  attacked.  The  Americans, 
however,  did  not  press  the  attack  but  contented 
themselves  with  long-range  firing.  Realizing  that 
Valencia's  position  was  too  strong  to  be  taken  in 
front,  the  Americans  had  decided  upon  another  au- 
dacious turning  movement.  After  an  engineering 
reconnaissance,  an  infantry  column  under  Gen- 
eral Riley  was  sent  out  to  do  just  what  Santa 


m 


ma^mt 


THE  PIVOTAL  ACTION  239 

Anna  had  feared  —  to  get  between  him  and  Valen- 
cia and  come  down  on  Padierna  from  the  rear. 
Now  the  Americans  did  their  best  marching,  "  most 
difficult  and  tedious,  passing  over  volcanic  rocks 
and  across  large  fissures  barely  narrow  enough  to 
permit  the  men  to  get  over  them  by  leaping." 
Their  path  was  through  the  heart  of  the  Pedregal. 
Another  brigade,  commanded  by  General  Cad- 
walader,  followed,  and  then  another,  commanded 
by  General  P.  F.  Smith,  who  took  command  of 
the  whole  expedition.  By  nightfall  these  forces 
were  in  part  on  the  San  Angel  road  some  distance 
north  of  Padierna  and  in  part  beyond  it  at  the  vil- 
lage of  San  Ger6nimo.  Just  as  night  fell  they  were 
menaced  by  a  large  force  of  Mexicans  advancing 
down  the  San  Angel  road  from  the  north. 

Such  was  the  hazardous  situation  of  the  armies 
along  the  San  Angel  road  in  the  late  afternoon,  as 
Scott  observed  it  from  a  high  hill  opposite  Padierna. 
The  swift  approach  of  night  induced  both  sides 
to  stand  where  they  were  and  wait  for  morning. 
Scott  laid  a  new  plan  for  the  next  day.  He  realized 
that  to  some  extent  —  he  did  not  as  yet  know  how 
far  —  Santa  Anna  had  again  paralleled  his  western 
movement.  This  accounted  for  the  unexpected 
advance  of  the  Mexicans  southward  along  the  San 


I! 


f '  1 


III! 


f'-i 


•M 


!   ^1 


1  •  P 


I     i 


240  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
Angel  road.  To  deal  with  this  new  turn  of  event 
a  double  battle  would  have  to  be  fought  next  day  - 
with  Valencia  at  Padierna  and  with  the  newcomeri 
at  San  Geronimo.  Reinforcements  were  therefore 
ordered  to  San  Geronimo  over  the  difficult  patl 
through  the  Pedregal. 

That  night  a  tempest  swept  the  Pedregal  anc 
the  San  Angel  road.  Again  a  difference  of  mo- 
rale was  revealed  in  the  opposing  armies.  The 
Americans  at  San  Geronimo,  though  without 
cover,  stood  their  ground  in  the  midst  of  the 
storm.  The  Mexicans  who  had  menaced  them 
at  nightfall  drew  back  to  find  shelter  in  the  vil- 
lages toward  the  north.  While  the  storm  raged 
Captain  Robert  E.  Lee  performed  what  Scott  de- 
scribed as  "the  greatest  feat  of  moral  and  physi- 
cal courage  performed  by  any  individual,  to  my 
knowledge,  pending  the  campaign."  Through  the 
dark  and  the  driving  rain  he  contrived  to  make 
his  way  back  from  San  Ger6nimo,  across  the  fis- 
sures of  the  Pedregal,  to  headquarters,  where  he 
reported  that  the  officers  at  San  Geronimo  advised 
a  sudden  concentration  on  the  position  of  Valen- 
cia immediately  before  daybreak.  Scott  approved 
the  plan,  and  Lee  returned  through  the  night  to 
San  Ger6nimo. 


^^ 


VIElf    OF    (HAPlLTli^SC 
AFTER    THE  BA 

Lithograph  by  N.  Cilri 
from  the  Casa  del  Mat«. 
of  Congress,  Washington 


K».'^ 


t     ;    '^M; 

11 

^ 

i 

Hr^l 


I 


f! 


h     i!" 


v\  n 


r 


■,;m     -    'A  \i\U..\\'\  \'     \       AAWIA    AWV    'A W  \  I 

/•ij/iili.l  -.ill  1..  i,i'.:nlii;(|'in  tiiiiM  ".rJt  nl      .r.lc.I/'  '-ili  ii*!!')-*.!!  iii.-.i't 

Ofi^jllKUfi/'    >-  ITJIII.    '    to 


J 


iiMitoiita* 


m  w 


L  .^ 


n      i 


Li 

■.1  ':■ 
I 

•1 

i 

tt    i              --V 

J\*t\ 

'     .    i      ' 

s. 

\     ' 

1 

;■■ 

if:!' 


THE  PIVOTAL  ACTION  Ml 

The  Mexicans  at  Padierna  seem  to  have  vacil- 
lated between  exultation  and  hysterics.     Valencia 
wrote  boastful  dispatches  dated  at  "the  trium- 
phal camp  of  Padierna";  he  promoted  officers;  he 
also  raved  against  Santa  Anna  whom  he  chaiged 
with  abandoning  him  to  the  Americans.     Mean- 
while Smith  prepared  to  move  along  the  moun- 
tains at  Valencia's  back  and  take  his  position  in 
the  rear.     It  was  three  in  the  morning  of  Friday, 
the  20th  of  August,  when  the  Americans  —  who 
had  had  no  tents  during  the  tempest  and  but  lit- 
tle food  —  started  from  San  Geronimo.     At  six 
o'clock,  they  burst  upon  Valencia's  camp.    Just 
seventeen  minutes  were  sufficient  for  the  business. 
Valencia  fled.    His  men  fled.   A  torrent  of  panic- 
stricken  Mexicans  poured  down  into  the  San  An- 
gel road  and  along  it  pell-mell  towaru  the  north, 
pursued  by  the  Americans.     The  fugitives  met 
that  other  Mexican  army  which  had  weakly  re- 
treated to  find  shelter  from  the  tempest  while  the 
Americans  had  endured  their  hardships  and  had 
gone  forward  to  victory.    This  second  array,  which 
was  really  the  main  army  commanded  by  San* 
Anna  himself,  wa  s  appalled  by  the  rout  of  Valencif   . 
army  and,  catching  the  spirit  of  retreat,  rapidly  fell 
back  toward  the  north. 


i6 


.  i 


I*  i 
t 


^1  M 


II 


mVl\ 


b:!i 


Li  t  f 


1^ 


242     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

The  force  under  Worth  that  was  watching  San 
Antonio  had  also  found  its  opportunity.  While 
Scott  pressed  the  pursuit  along  the  San  Angel  road 
he  notified  Worth  that  he  would  soon  be  able  to 
swing  round  on  San  Antonio  from  behind,  and  that 
Worth  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  sound  of  such  an 
attack  was  to  move  against  San  Antonio  from  the 
front.  Worth  exceeded  his  instructions  and  pushed 
his  command  forward  earlier  than  Scott  had  in- 
tended. In  the  forenoon  of  the  20th  of  August  the 
two  sections  of  the  American  army  were  thus  mov- 
ing northward  on  parallel  lines  still  separated  by 
the  wilderness  of  the  Pedregal  —  Scott  along  the 
San  Angel  road,  Worth  along  the  Acapuico  road. 

On  both  roads  the  Mexicans  were  retiring.  Be- 
fore Scott  they  were  in  full  retreat.  Before  Worth 
they  began  to  withdraw  as  soon  as  they  heard  of 
the  disaster  on  the  other  road,  which  had  now  made 
San  Antonio  an  untenable  position.  Pressing  after 
them,  Worth  converted  their  retirement  into  a 
rout,  followed  them  through  San  Antonio,  and 
continued  along  the  Acapuico  road  until  he  faced 
the  strong  defenses  of  Churubusco. 

About  the  same  time  Scott,  driving  the  Mexicans 
before  him  in  like  manner,  had  reached  Ihe  village 
of  Coyoacan,  southwest  of  Churubusco,  where  three 


THE  PIVOTAL  ACTION  US 

roads  opened  before  him  —  one  southeast  to  San 
Antonio,  one  northeast  to  Churubusco,  one  north- 
west to  the  city.    It  was  from  Coyoacan  that  Scott 
had  intended  to  swing  round  and  take  San  Antonio 
from  behind,  advancing  by  the  first  of  the  three 
roads.    From  the  steeple  of  the  village  church.  San 
Antonio  could  be  seen  as  well  as  that  portion  of  the 
Acapulco  road  between  San  Antonio  and  Churu- 
busco.    An  oflScer  sent  into  the  belfry  reported  that 
the  Mexicans  were  retreating  from  San  Antonio 
upon  Churubusco.    Scott's  plan  of  action  was  no 
longer  of  use.     Should  he  now  advance  by  the 
northeast  road  and  join  Worth  at  Churubusco  or 
advance  by  the  northwest  road,  leaving  Worth  to 
his  own  devices,  and  either  turn  Churubusco  from 
the  west  or  continue  straight  on  to  the  city  gates? 
The  decision  he  reached  has  been  hotly  discussed 
both  by  participants  in  the  event  that  followed  and 
by  later  students.    Perhaps  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the 
bulk  of  opinion  views  Scott's  next  movement  as  a 
hasty  blunder  and  holds  that  the  success  which 
closed  this  famous  day  was  due  not  to  generalship 
but  to  sheer  hard  fighting. ' 


-:        i 


I.I 


•  The  opposite  view  is  sicillfully  defended  by  the  latest  specialist 
m  this  field.  Justin  H.  Smith,  who  holds  that  Scott  took  the  only 
course  open  to  him.     See  The  War  mth  Mexiao.  vol.  a,  p.  112. 


^\lfr^ 


k  \ 

i 

t 

r 

* 

i^ 


It      I'     «!         .     ' 


•  t 

•  f 


«44     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Scott  resolved  to  attack  Churubusco  and  thiu 
unite  with  Worth  and  get  complete  control  of  the 
Acapulco  roiid.  It  h  not  denied  by  his  friends  that 
he  was  ill-informed  as  to  the  defenses  of  Churu- 
busco, that  he  did  not  fully  comprehend  what  he 
was  undertaking.  His  detractors  insist  that  he 
should  have  turned  this  position  as  already  he  had 
turned  the  isthmus  and  San  Antonio;  that  it  ought 
to  have  been  regarded  as  too  strong  for  a  direct 
attack;  that  only  the  personal  superiority  of  the 
American  soldier  to  the  Mexican  soldier  retrieved 
Scott's  mistake  and  saved  him  from  a  repulse. 

The  Mexican  position,  roughly  speaking,  was 
like  a  fan  opening  from  a  bridge-head  where  the 
Acapulco  road  crossed  the  Churubusco  River. 
The  bridge-head  itself  was  strongly  fortified.  South 
of  the  river,  like  the  ribs  of  the  fan,  heavy  masses 
of  building  had  been  incorporated  in  the  defenses, 
Conspicuous  among  these  was  the  old  convent  ol 
San  Mateo,  which  Mr.  Rives  describes  as: 


a  venerable  building  dating  from  the  year  1678,  whicl 
still  remains  one  of  the  most  interesting  and  attractive 
objects  in  the  immediate  neighboi  iiood  of  the  City  ol 
Mexico.  The  little  convent  church,  now  rarely  used 
is  of  solid  and  somber  Spanish  masonry,  but  is  finished 
on  its  western  front  with  blue  tiles,  or  azulejos,  whicl 


THE  nVOTAL  ACTION  94d 

add  a  delightful  touch  to  the  quaintneu  and  incom- 
parable charm  of  the  group  of  buildings.  On  the  Houth 
side  of  the  church  is  u  >H>uutiful  patio  with  a  gallery  on 
the  second  story,  and  orun^e  trees  blossoming  in  the 
midst  of  it  add  beauty  and  perfume  to  the  secluded 
spot.  The  convent  is  surrounded  with  large  gardens 
which  must  once  havt  en  cultivated  by  »he  Francis, 
can  brothers,  and  about  which  stood,  and  still  stands,  a 
strong  masonry  wall  some  twelve  feet  in  height,  the 
whole  constituting  a  very  formidable  place  of  defense. 

In  addition  to  the  defensive  advantage  whicli  this 
masonry  offered,  there  were  the  Mexican  entrench- 
ments. Both  these  and  the  convent  lay  south  of 
the  river,  a  small  stream  flowing  due  east.  North 
of  t!ie  river  large  masses  of  Mexican  infantry  were 
posted. 

In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  the  Americans 
carried  on  simultaneously,  but  without  much  co- 
operation, three  different  attacks  on  this  strong 
position.  Worth,  advancing  from  San  Antonio, 
entered  the  village  of  Churubusco  from  the  south- 
east, aiming  straight  at  the  bridge-head.  General 
Twiggs  advanced  from  Cayoacan  on  the  southwest 
to  the  storming  of  the  convent.  A  third  column, 
under  the  command  of  General  Franklin  Pierce, 
—  presently  to  be  replaced  by  General  Shields  — 
was  sent  across  the  river,  some  distance  to  the 


s 


IP' 


t46     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

west,  with  orders  to  march  round  behind  Churu- 
busco,  seize  the  Acapult^o  roud  north  of  the  bridge, 
and  attack  the  Mexicans  from  the  rear.  Scott's 
headquarters  remained  at  Cayoac4n.  from  whose 
belfry  Churubusoo  was  in  plain  view. 

The  fighting  which  now  took  place  proved  to  be 
the  sternest  which  the  Americans  had  yet  encoun- 
tered. Hitherto  they  hud  been  opposed  chiefly 
by  Indian  conscripts  with  little  interest  in  the 
war.  Now  a  large  number  of  their  opponents 
were  Spanish  Mexicans,  who  were  reinforced  by  a 
considerable  number  of  deserters  from  the  Ameri- 
can army  —  impetuous  Irishmen  who  had  been 
won  over  by  secret  agents  of  the  Aiexican  Govern- 
ment and  were  now  known  as  the  "  Companions  of 
St.  Patrick."  These  men,  likely  to  fight  desper- 
ately because  they  knew  that  capture  probably 
meant  death,  were  placed  in  the  key  position  at 
the  bridge-head. 

For  some  time  the  struggle  was  merely  a  furious 
fight;  each  of  the  three  columns  conducted  its  own 
battle,  and  each  attacked  from  a  different  point  of 
the  compass.  It  was  at  their  extreme  left,  after  an 
American  column  had  crossed  the  river  that  the 
Mexicans  first  gave  way.  Thereupon  Worth  flung  all 
his  strength  upon  the  bridge-head  and  finally  carried 


i 


ui 


"i 


THE  PIVOTAL  ACTION  «47 

it  with  the  bayonet.  The  MexicanH  made  their 
hist  .sittnd  in  the  convent.  When  they  no  longer 
hud  hope,  a  white  flag  from  the  church  tower 
brought  the  engagement  to  a  v\osv.  Churubusco 
had  fallen. 

What  forc«*s  wer-  engaged  on  the  Mexican  side 
in  these  tlay.-*  of  tlnMr  g-eat  defeat  is  not  definitely 
known.  The  number  was  probably  about  twenty 
thousand,  though  not  more  than  nine  or  ten  thou- 
sand were  in  action  at  Churubusco.  The  Mexican 
losses  are  also  largely  conjectun*.  Nearly  three 
thousand  men  were  taken  prisoner.  Among  these 
were  a  number  of  the  American  deserters,  who  re- 
ceived, after  trial  by  court  martial,  the  last  severi- 
ties of  military  law.  As  to  the  American  forces, 
out  of  about  eight  thousanc!  actually  engaged  the 
total  loss,  during  the  two  days  of  fighting  (the  19th 
and  20th  of  August),  was  about  a  thousand  men. 

Taken  altogether,  these  brilliant  actions  —  often 
spoken  of  as  two,  and  even  three,  separ  cC  battles, ' 
though  really  one  expanding  design  to  drive  the 
Mexicans  from  Churubusco  —  shattered  the  outer 
defenses  of  the  City  of  Mexico  and  placed  a  trium- 
phant American  army  at  its  very  gates. 

«  Named  Coatrcrnfi,  San  Antonio,  Churubusco. 


^m 


n 


lA    .  tf 


CILVPTER  XIV 


THE  CONQUERED   PEACE 


) '  1 


:-;|i 


The  last  gunshot  at  Churubusco  should  have  ended 
the  Mexican  War.  Yet  it  did  not.  There  were 
still,  though  probably  without  justification,  three 
hard  fought  engagements.  One  of  these  was  not 
only  unnecessary  but  was  also  the  blndiest  event 
of  the  war  —  the  slaughter  of  the  Molino  del  Rey. 
Scott's  course  of  action  in  this  last  chapter  of  the 
war  is  not  explained  by  his  own  statements,  es- 
pecially the  senseless  armistice  wliich  he  now  con- 
cluded with  Santa  Anna.  The  theory  of  Scott's 
enemies  is  that  he  was  playing  politics  with  his  eye 
on  the  presidency  and  that,  in  his  eagerness  to  gain 
popularity  by  making  peace,  he  was  trapped  by 
Santa  Anna.  According  to  a  more  generous  the- 
ory Scott  was  still  Santa  Anna's  dupe  and  realh' 
thought  that  the  Mexican  was  eager  for  the  enu 
and  that  Churubusco  had  given  him  the  excuse  he 
was  seeking.     If  so,  we  can  understand  Scott's 

248 


THE  CONQUERED  PEACE  249 

prompt  acceptance  of  Santa  Anna's  application 
for  an  armistice  —  decided  upon,  apparently,  be- 
fore the  cannon  smoke  was  well  off  the  roof-tops 
of  Churubusco. 

Now  followed  two  weeks  of  inaction  for  the 
Americans  while  Santa  Anna,  under  cover  of  nego- 
tiations, stealthily  reconstructed  his  defenses  and 
reorganized  his  army.  After  that,  Santa  Anna 
dropped  the  mask,  and  Scott,  having  now  to  endure 
being  placed  before  the  world's  eye  as  Santa  Anna's 
dupe,  resumed  the  offensive. ' 

The  renewed  operations  of  the  Americans  began 
with  the  horrible  attack  on  the  Molino  del  Rey,  a 
group  of  massive  stone  buildings  at  the  foot  of  the 
storied  hill  of  Chapultepec.  Scott,  who  had  heard 
that  this  place  was  used  as  a  cannon  foundry,  now 
ordered  its  destruction.  After  an  assault  which 
was  so  stubbornly  resisted  as  to  cause  a  grim  mor- 
tality among  the  Americans,  the  mill  was  taken. 
No  cannon  foundry  was  discovered.  Scott,  per- 
haps because  of  chagrin  at  seeing  how  plainly  San- 
ta Anna  was  his  master  in  diplomacy,  had  again 
blundered.    After  this  costly  battle  the  Americans 

'  Mr.  Justin  H.  Smith,  in  the  second  volume  of  The  War  with 
Mexico,  holds  a  brief  for  Scutt  as  diplomat  no  less  than  as  general. 
Scott's  case  will  never  be  more  subtly  argued.  But  one  may  ap- 
plaud the  skill  uf  an  advocate  without  accepting  his  conclusions. 


'    1,1'    ' 


k\. 


I        F' 


ri 


r     '! 


;.  II 


I  ^ 


}t':. 


250     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

marched  back  to  their  camp.  The  action  had 
been  perfectly  fruitless  and  had  greatly  we.  kened 
Scott's  force. 

His  next  move  was  the  storming  of  Chapultepec. 
Here  is  an  incident  in  the  war  which  will  live  for- 
ever in  the  American  imagination,  for  never  have 
Americans,  not  even  at  Chateau-Thierry,  given  a 
better  account  of  themselves  in  the  deadly  work 
of  the  bayonet.  The  steep  hill  of  Chapultepec, 
crowned  by  an  old  palace  of  the  Mexican  viceroys, 
had  Lien  well  fortified.  Against  the  advice  of  his 
best  engineers,  Scott  decided  that  its  garrison  must 
be  dislodged.  Again  there  was  furious  1  .d-to- 
hand  fighting.  The  terraces  of  Chapultepec  lit- 
erally ran  with  blood.  During  the  storming  the 
American  oflScers  for  a  while  lost  control  of  their 
men,  and  no  quarter  was  given.  This  was  in  re- 
venge for  a  base  incident  in  the  previous  battle, 
when,  in  an  interval  during  which  the  Americans 
had  fallen  back  under  heavy  fire  from  the  walls 
of  the  Molino  del  Rey,  the  Mexicans  had  sallied 
forth  and  murdered  the  prostrate  wounded.  It 
was  this  bit  of  savagery  that  was  repaid  with 
interest. 

Though  at  a  frightful  cost,  Scott  had  now  shat- 
tered the  second  line  of  defense  before  Mexico 


/I 


J'jLllia  Hlf  M    LtTH     N  V 


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I»  »-    s 


f  I  .  . 

tt  -  *    I  f 


b'  f 


l:  -i 


THE  CONQUERED  PEACE  «5l 

City.  Without  a  pause  in  his  hammerlike  blows, 
he  crashed  on  into  the  city  itself.  On  September 
13, 1847,  two  American  columns  drove  through  its 
gates.  Santa  Anna  with  what  he  could  rally  of  its 
garrison  escaped  into  the  suburbs  and  fixed  his 
headquarters  at  Guadalupe  Hidalgo.  Early  in  the 
morning  of  the  fourteenth  the  Americans  were  in 
possession  of  the  capital  of  Mexico. 

The  loss  of  the  city  was  a  heavy  blow,  but  Santa 
Anna  was  not  yet  ready  to  abandon  the  game. 
With  the  remnant  of  his  troops  he  was  planning  to 
overwhelm  the  American  garrison  at  Puebla  and  so 
cut  off  Scott  from  his  base  of  supplies,  when  he  was 
forced  to  resign  the  presidency.' 

The  office  devolved  upon  the  presiding  justice  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  Manuel  de  la  Pefla  y  Pefia, 
the  same  man  who  as  Foreign  Secretary  had  in- 
vited an  ambassador  from  the  United  States  and 
then  had  not  dared  receive  him.  At  Queretaro, 
Pefla  y  Pefia  succeeded  in  establishing  a  provisional 
government  that  was  recognized  both  at  home  and 
abroad.  He  was  still  a  moderate  in  politics,  steeled 
to  accept  the  accomplished  fact,  eager  for  peace. 

"  Shortly  afterward  Santa  Anna  once  more  sought  safety  in  ex- 
ile. As  he  had  entered  Mexico  by  American  connivance,  he  aban- 
doned it,  appropriately  enough,  under  an  American  safe-conduct. 


«5«     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

Behind  him  among  ih?  moderates  was  such  com- 
mon sense  as  Me:  'y^  possessed.  Opposed  to  him 
were  various  factions,  all  fantastic,  ranging  from 
monarchists  to  extreme  repu*-''  .s,  novae  bent 
upon  dragging  out  the  war  an  endless  gue- 

rilla conflict  which  the  United  Stai.es  might  at  last 
abandon,  some  equally  opposed  to  peace  because 
they  believed  that  only  through  annexation  to  the 
United  States  could  republicanism  become  secure 
in  Mexico.  Now  for  the  last  time  that  stubborn 
ghost  of  a  British  intervention  was  raised  and  laid. 
An  inquiry  from  Mexico  whether  England  would 
guarantee  peace  between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  followed  by  England's  positive  refusal  to 
intervene,  left  the  new  Government  alone  with  its 
difficulty.  Pefia  y  Pefla  had  hoped  to  work  at  his 
problem  with  characteristic  Mexican  deliberation. 
But  shortly  after  Trist  began  negotiations,  a  dis- 
patch arrived  from  Washington  depriving  him  of 
authority  and  ordering  him  home  —  apparently 
because  Polk  thought  he  was  becoming  merciful 
toward  the  enemy.  Pefia  y  Pefia  was  terrified. 
What  might  this  portend.'  Was  anything  behind  it 
except  dissatisfaction  with  an  agent  who  paid  little 
attention  to  instructions.''  Trist  made  crafty  use  of 
the  dispatch,  pressing  Pefia  y  Pefia  to  arm  him  with 


3 1 


THE  CONQUERED  PEACE  83S 

a  signed  treaty  which  he  might  take  home  with  him 
in  defiance  of  the  President.  He  had  the  audacity 
to  write  to  Washington,  in  substance,  that  he  was 
the  best  judge  of  what  ought  to  be  done  and  would 
continue  negotiations. 

In  spite  of  the  impending  crisis,  Mexican  di- 
plomacy kept  its  usual  intolerably  slow  course. 
There  was  desperate  effort  to  mitigate  Trist's  three 
main  demands:  that  the  Rio  Grande  be  accepted  as 
the  boundary  of  Mexi'-o,  that  New  Mexico  and 
Upper  California  be  ceded  to  the  United  States, 
and  that  the  compensation  therefor  be  only  fifteen 
millions  instead  of  the  thirty  millions  which  Mexico 
demanded.  Trist  made  some  concession  by  agree- 
ing to  assume  the  American  claims  that  were  the 
alleged  cause  of  the  war.  On  the  whole,  the  Mexi- 
cans had  reason  to  be  glad  they  were  dealing  with 
Trist  and  not  with  his  master  at  Washington. 
When  Polk  set  out  to  "conquer  a  peace,"  he  meant 
to  have  both  Californias,  Upper  and  Lower.  Had 
he  not  feared  opposition  in  Congress,  he  might  have 
demanded  still  more. 

In  spite  of  Trist's  generosity,  which  left  the  Mexi- 
cans a  considerable  part  of  their  original  domain, 
they  continued  the  vain  attempt  to  bargain.  At 
last  Trist  and  Scott,  now  on  the  best  of  terms. 


W4     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
played  their  final  trump.    Trist  named  the  day 
on  which  he  would  break  off  negotiations.    Scott, 
through  the  British  Charg6  d'Affaires,  let  it  be 
known  to  Pcfia  y  PeAa  that  he  was  preparing  to 
march  on  Quer^taro.    The  British  diplomat  gave 
the  Mexicans  a  broad  hint  that  both  Americans 
meant  business  and  that  the  only  way  to  stop  them 
was  to  sign  a  satisfactory  treaty.    Pefla  y  Pefla 
yielded.     In  the  evening  of  the  day  Trist  had 
named,  a  courier  from  Quer^taro,  riding  posthaste, 
brought  to  the  Mexican  commissioners  at  the  capi- 
tal instructions  to  sign  the  treaty  in  a  form  satis- 
factory to  Trist.    It  was  agreed,  perhaps  as  a  con- 
cession to  Mexican  pride,  that  the  signing  should 
not  take  place  in  the  city.   At  Guadalupe  Hidalgo, 
some  twenty-four  hours  after  the  courier  arrived, 
the  commissioners  of  the  two  countries  signed  on 
February  2,  1848,  the  document  v/hich  dismem- 
bered Mexico  and  added  an  empire  to  the  United 
States.    Except  for  that  small  portion  of  Arizona, 
purchased  through  James  Gadsden  six  years  after- 
ward, the  treaty  established  the  southern  boundary 
of  the  United  States  as  it  is  today. 


/  '  i 


It  is  recorded  of  that  French  minister  who  ceded 
New  France  to  Great  Britain  that  he  later  claimed 


^U 


THE  CONQUERED  PEACE  i55 

that  he  had  foreseen  how  it  would  disrupt  that 
Emr'ire,  breaking  one  strong  power  into  two  weak 
ones.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  addition  of  New 
France  to  the  British  Empire  may  have  been  fate's 
device  for  precipitating  the  American  Revolution. 
If  so,  the  addition  to  t.  j  Union  of  the  enormous 
area  ceded  by  Mexico  forms  a  parallel,  leading 
as  it  did  to  the  series  of  crises  which  ended  in  the 
Civil  War. 

Over  the  whole  matter  of  the  Mexican  cession 
lies  the  sinister  shadow  of  party  politics.  It  in> 
vaded  the  army,  producing  bitter  quarrels  between 
Scott  and  his  generals.  Indeed,  it  is  hard  to  prove 
that  he  was  not  trying  to  make  political  capital  out 
of  the  Mexican  War  and  to  prevent  others  from 
doing  so.  In  spite  of  much  talk  about  public  duty, 
the  same  may  be  said  of  Polk.  If  he  was  not  in 
oeadly  fear  of  Scott  as  a  pos.sible  Whig  candidate 
for  President,  at  least  he  was  verj'  zealous  in  punish- 
ing his  errors.  Using  the  quarrels  in  the  army  as  a 
pretext,  Polk  removed  Scott  from  command.  The 
victor  of  Contrcras  was  not  permitted  to  lead  his 
army  home.  In  the  Roman  sense,  he  was  refused 
a  triumph.  Instead,  he  was  summoned  before  a 
military  court  of  inquiry  on  the  conduct  of  the  war 
—  a  court  which  accomplished  nothing  beyond 


i!  f  i: 


■•I 


W6     TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

spoiling  the  dramatic  effect  of  the  career  of  the 
leading  general. 

The  early  months  of  1848  were  filled  with  anx- 
ious debate  upon  the  effect  that  peace  would  have 
on  the  country.  Slavery  questions,  the  Wilmot 
Proviso,  were  on  every  tongue.  Generally,  it  was 
assumed  that  a  great  cession  would  be  required  of 
Mexico  and  that  the  only  question  now  was  how 
it  should  be  divided  between  North  and  South. 
Against  this  assumption  stood  Daniel  Webster, 
insisting  that  the  United  States  should  take  no  new 
territory  but  Texas  —  that  only  so  could  we  escape 
a  terrible  division  on  the  subject  of  slavery. 

No  scruples  of  this  sort  troubled  the  President. 
Though  the  treaty  was  less  grasping  than  his  desire, 
he  determined  to  make  the  best  of  it.  On  the  day 
that  he  decided  to  send  the  treaty  to  the  Senate,  by 
a  sirange  coincidence,  John  Quincy  Adams  was 
struck  with  paralysis  at  his  place  in  the  House  — 
February  21,  1848.  The  adjournment  of  both 
Houses  that  day  and  the  next  caused  a  delay,  but 
on  the  twenty-third  the  treaty  was  communicated 
to  the  Senate.  Webster  strove  in  vain  to  defeat  it. 
On  the  10th  of  March  it  was  ratified  by  38  votes 
against  14.  The  opposing  votes  were  evenly  di- 
vided between  Whigs  and  Democrats.    Only  four 


THE  CONQIIERED  PEACE  «37 

of  them  came  from  New  England  and  the  Middle 
States;  the  rest  were  srattiTed  over  the  West  and 
South.  The  majority  '?0  Democrat.s  and  It  Whigs, 
represented  every  section  of  the  Union.  When  it 
came  to  the  pinch,  the  lure  of  empire  broke  all 
party  and  sectional  lines.  The  moment  the  acqui- 
sition was  complete,  however,  all  these  lines  were 
again  restored  and  the  quarr'^l  over  the  spoil  of 
Mexico  soon  solidified  each  of  the  two  sections  ond 
rendered  them  bitterly  self-conscious.  It  virtually 
reorganized  the  Union  on  the  principle  of  duality 
by  creating  between  the  parties  an  unstable  ecpiili- 
brium.  Thus  was  the  stage  set  for  a  great  and 
terrible  civil  war. 


IT 


i 


fl-; 


In 

i 

i 

1    1       - 

■'■■u 


I    • 


r  .1 

.1 


BIBLiOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


Tnt,'  «. '    no  .satijt'actory,  independent  narrative  of  the 
Texas  episode.    Of  modern  books,  the  Texas  (Ameri- 
can Commonwealths,  1903)  of  the  late  Professor  G.  P. 
Garrison  is  excellent,  but  in  some  respects  obsolete. 
The  chief  living  authority.  Professor  E.  C.  Barker,  un- 
fortunately has  not  written  the  book  which  he  ought 
to  write.     Very  valuable  essays  by  Professor  Barker 
are:  Stephen  F.  Austin  and  the  Independence  of  Texas, 
The  Texan  Declaration  of  Causes  for  Taking  up  Arms 
Against  Mexico,  and  Land  Speculation  as  a  Cause  of 
the  Texas  Revolution,  all  in  the  Quarterly  of  the  Texas 
State  Historical  Association;  The  Finances  of  the  Tex- 
as Revolution  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly;  Presi- 
dent Jackson  and  the  Texas  Revolution  in  the  American 
Historical  Review.    An  illuminating  essay  is  Causes 
and  Origin  of  the  Decree  of  April  6,  1830,  by  Alleine 
Howren,  Southwestern  Historical  Quarlerly,  vol.  xvi, 
pp.  378-422  (April,  1913).    Valuable  monographs  by 
Miss  E.  Z.  Rather  are  Recognition  of  the  Republic  of 
Texas  by  the  United  States  and  De  Witt's  Colony,  both 
published  by  the  University  of  Texas.     Many  con- 
temporaneous accounts  such  as  the  Reminiscences  of 
Henry  Smith  will  be  found  in  the  Quarterly  of  the  Tex- 
as State  Historical  Association,  now  the  Southwestern 
Historical  Quarterly. 

250 


1'l 


260 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


:  i 

h  i    -! 


\V    Si 


hi      I 


Among  recent  volumes  that  bear  upon  Texas,  the 
most  valuable  to  the  general  reader  is,  on  the  whole, 
George  Lockhart  Rives,  The  United  States  and  Mexico, 
1821-m8  {i  vols.,  1913).  Its  Texan  chapters  form  a 
good  outline  of  the  entire  episode.  Justin  H.  Smith, 
The  Annexation  of  Texas  (1911),  though  important, 
bears  too  heavily  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  British  con- 
spiracy. More  objective  is  Ephraim  D.  Adams,  Brit- 
ish Interests  and  Activities  in  Texas  (1910).  The  in- 
valuable Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  Republic  of 
Texas  has  been  published  in  three  volumes  as  An- 
nual Reports  of  the  American  Historical  Association, 
(1907-08). 

Of  the  great  actors  of  the  drama  adequate  lives  are 
still  to  be  written.  This  is  true  even  of  the  greatest, 
Calhoun,  though  his  latest  biography  by  W.  M.  Meigs, 
The  Life  of  John  Caldwell  Calhmn,  2  vols.  (1917),  is  a 
most  important  accumulation  of  fact.  J.  S.  Bassett, 
The  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  2  vols.  (1911),  has  sup- 
planted the  earlier  treatises  but  is  by  no  means  defini- 
tive. Of  Rhett  there  is  no  biography.  Carl  Schurz, 
Henry  Clay  (American  Statesmen,  2  vols.,  1887),  and 
H.  C.  Lodge,  Daniel  Webster  (American  Statesmen, 
1883),  are  fairly  good  and  very  readable.  The  Diary, 
4  vols.  (1910),  of  President  Polk  is  an  invaluable  docu- 
ment, as  of  course  is  the  more  famous  Memoirs  of  John 
Quincy  Adams.  Of  Austin  there  is  great  need  of  a 
good  biography.  The  same  may  be  said  of  Houston, 
who  is  clumsily  treated  by  A.  M.  Williams,  Sam  Hous- 
ton (1893),  and  delightfully,  but  briefly  and  perhaps 
too  ardently,  by  Sarah  Barnwell  Elliott  in  her  Sam 
Houston  (1900). 

The  Mexican  War  is  carefully  treated  in  J.  B. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


261 


McMaster,  Iliatory  of  the  People  of  the  United  Stuten, 
vol.  VII  (1910);  in  the  second  volume  of  Rives,  The 
United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-^8,  2  vols.  (1913). 
For  the  general  reader  these  supersede  the  older  narra- 
tives. Both  the  student  and  the  general  reader  will 
take  keen  interest  in  Justin  H.  Smith,  The  War  with 
Mexico,  2  vols.  (1920).  Aiming  to  rid  the  story  of  the 
partisan  interpretation  fastened  upon  it  by  the  Whig 
school  of  American  historians,  Mr.  Smith  is  as  artful 
in  his  silences  as  he  is  effective  in  his  utterances.  In- 
corporated in  the  graphic  narrative  and  its  voluminous 
notes  are  two  special  pleas  —  for  Polk  in  the  precipi- 
tation of  the  war,  and  for  Scott  in  its  conduct.  As  to 
military  events,  since  Mr.  Smith  has  had  access  prob- 
ably to  all  existing  documents  of  importance,  many  of 
which  have  never  before  been  used  by  historians,  his 
version  may  be  considered  authoritative.  This  work 
contains  an  extremely  full  bibliography.  Several  dia- 
ries and  memoirs  of  great  interest  are  still  in  manu- 
script. However,  Grant's  Personal  Memoirs,  2  vols. 
(1885),  have  long  been  in  print,  as  have  Sherman's 
Memoirs,  2  vols.  (1875),  while  recently  there  has  been 
{  o  the  public  The  Life  and  Letters  of  George  B. 

A  I  vols.  (1913).     A  group  of  letters  from  Tay- 

lor iiave  been  printed  under  the  title.  Letters  from  the 
Battle-fields  of  the  Mexican  War  (1908).  Very  delight- 
ful are  the  letters  of  Robert  Anderson  published  as 
An  Artillery  Officer  in  the  Mexican  War  (1911). 


■  a  ■ 

Bl'! 


INDEX 


Aberdeen,  Earl  of,  succeeds 
Palmerston  as  British 
Foreign  Secretary,  123;  ne- 
gotiates Quintuple  Treaty, 
123-24;  and  attempts  at 
conciliation  between  Texas 
and  Mexico.  127-29,  131- 
133,  138;  and  Oregon  ques- 
tion, 132,  160-01;  estimate 
of,  132-33  (note);  and  "Tap- 
pan  Committee"  of  Anti- 
Slavery  Convention,  136- 
139,  141.  142,  155;  and 
Brougham,  143;  denies  in- 
tention of  intervention  in 
Texas,  148,  149;  dispatch 
in  Calhoun-Pakenham  cor- 
respondence, 155-56;  and 
Whig  party.  158-59;  illu- 
sions furnish  clue  to  policy, 
159-6U,  164;  invites  Franc*; 
to  join  protest  against  an- 
nexation treaty,  161-62;  and 
abolition.  162;  diplomacy 
regarding  annexation  of 
Texas,  162-63;  and  Paken- 
ham.  165,  166;  decides  on 
amicable  policy  toward 
United  States,  166-67;  on 
acquisition  of  California,  183 

Abolition,  Adams  and,  94-d5, 
103,  104,  116-17;  crisis  iii 
anti-slavery  agitation,  103- 
104;  and  Texas,  104-05;  Ad- 
dress to  the  People  of  the  Free 
Sto(e«.  1 17-18;«e«  a/«o  Slavery 


Abr'itionists,     convention     in 

London  (1843),  135-39 
Acapulco  road.  Worth  on  the, 

242 
Adams,  J.  Q.,  as  a  diplomat, 
19,  22;  Poinsett's  letter  lo. 
21;  offers  to  buy  Texan 
coupiry,  22;  submits  Poin- 
selt's  treaties  to  Senate,  28; 
defeated  by  Jackson,  28; 
charges  against  Administra- 
tion, 91,  180;  and  abolition, 
94-95,  103,  104,  116-17; 
"Texas  Speech,"  108-09; 
and  Jones's  expedition,  116- 
117;  Andrews  and  Tappan 
visit,  135-36;  opinion  of 
British  motives,  140;  mani- 
festo, 145;  Almonte  and, 
152;  struck  with  paralysis 
(1848),  256 

Agua  Nueva,  Tayior  at.  203 

Alaman,  Lucas,  Mexican  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Relations, 
32;  Iniciatha,  31,  S3 

A'amo,  Cos  surrenders  at  the, 
67;  Travis's  force  at  the, 
70;  massacre,  72-74;  "  Ke- 
member  the  Alamo,"  86 

Almonte,  Colonel,  and  Lundy. 
104;  views  taken  by  Adams, 
105;  Mexican  Minister  at 
Washington.  152-53,  154; 
demands  passports,  177 

Ampudia,  General  Pedro,  at 
Monterey,  199 

An^huac,  port  for  free  impor- 
tation   of    necessities,    38; 


U 


I 


ij 


263 


264 


INDEX 


1  -1 


'.     if 


IN 


An&huar — Continued 

Bradburn  at,  38-40;  Piedras 
sent  to,  41;  Tenorio  as  cus- 
toms official  at,  57 

Auderson,  Robert,  record  of 
march  to  City  of  Mexico, 
219;  description  of  Jalapa, 
223;  quoted,  224-25,  23334 

Andrews,  vS.  P.,  135 

Arab  (British  ship),  Santa 
Anna  aboard,  192 

Arbitration  between  United 
States  and  Mexico,  180-81 

Archer,  B.  T.,  commissioner  to 
United  States  from  Texas, 
65 

Arista,  General  Manuel,  and 
battle  of  Palo  Alto,  195 

Army,  American,  inefficiency, 
197—98 

"Aroostook  War, "123 

Ashburton,  Alexander  Baring, 
Lord,  183;  special  minister 
to  United  States,  124-25; 
Clay  interviews,  125 

Atocha,  Colonel,  agent  of 
Santa  Anna.  189-90,  191, 
226-27 

Austin,  Moses,  3-4 

Austin,  S.  F.,  son  of  Moses, 
66;  founder  of  Anglo-Ameri- 
can Texas.  4-8,  11-12;  and 
Mexico.  12-13,  16,  60;  Gov- 
ernor calls  for  help  from,  15; 
and  Terdn,  25-26;  and  Mexi- 
can anti-slavery  decree,  30; 
argues  Texas  cause  in  United 
States,  35-38;  and  Mejia, 
43-44;  goes  to  Mexico  City, 
50-51;  imprisonment,  61- 
52,  53,  60;  writes  concilia- 
tory letters  from  prison.  64; 
return  to  Texas,  60;  made 
chairman  of  Committee  of 
Safety,  61 ;  defeated  for  presi- 
dency of  provisional  govern- 
ment, 65;  commissioner  to 
United  States.  65;  retires 
from  command  of  army,  66; 


joins  party  of  indeperdeoce, 
76 

B 

Bancroft,  George.  Secretary  of 

Navy.  186 
Baring.    Alexander,    tee    Ash- 
burton 
Barker,    E.    C,    Stephen    F. 

Austin  and  the  Independence 

of    Texas,    quoted,    51-52; 

cited,  70  (note) 
Barnwell  (S.  C),  meeting  at. 

170-71 
Bastrop.  Baron  de,  friend  of 

Austin.  4 
Beaufort  (S.  C),  meeting  at. 

171 
Benton.  T.  H.,  and  annexation 

of  Texas,  164 
B4xar  (San  Antonio),  highway 

to,    34;    Austin    writes    to 

authorities  of,  51-52;  Texan 

army  meets  Cos  at,  62,  65, 

66-67;  see  also  San  Antonio 
Bocenegra,  Mexican  Minister 

of   Foreign  Relations,   126, 

127 
Bowie,   Colonel  J.   W..  leads 

Texans,  45;   death   at    the 

Alamo.  73 
Bradburn,   J.    D.,   commands 

Mexicans  at  An&huac.  38- 

40;  escapes,  44-45 
Bragg,    Captain    Braxton,    at 

Buena  Vista,  207,  209,  211. 

212 
Brazoria,  riot  at,  39;  Austin's 

address  at,  60 
Briscoe,    Mr.,    practical    joke 

upon  Tenorio,  57 
Brougham,    Lord,    and    Anti- 
Slavery     Convention,     136; 

and  Aberdeen,  143 
Brown,  Fort,  194 
Brown,  Major,  commander  at 

Fort  Brown.  194;  death,  195 
Buena     Vista,    character    of 


f 


INDEX 


265 


i 


Buena  Vista — Continued 
place.    «04-07;     battle     of, 
li08  el  aeq. 

Bullock,  Colonel  J.  W.,  45 

Burnet.  David,  President  of 
provisional  government  of 
Texas,  76,  07 

Bitstiimnnte,  Anastasio,  Santa 
Anna  starts  revolution 
ncfainst,  40,  41 

ButliT,  Anthony,  and  Jackson, 
46-27;  as  Minister  to 
Mexico,  iS,  «9;  discusses 
American  purchase  of  Texas, 
48-49;  works  for  cession  of 
Texas  to  l.'nited  States, 
.54-53;  land  speculation,  55- 
56;  and  California,  183 


Cadwalader,  General  George, 

Calhoun,  J.  C  137;  on  an- 
nexation of  Texas,  90-91. 
149;  presents  resolution, 
107-08;  opinion  of  British 
attitude,  140,  149,  175-76; 
Secretary  of  State,  153;  and 
Pakenham,  155.  174;  and 
Rhett,  168, 171;  on  disunion. 
171-72,  174-75;  toast  to, 
173;  attitude  on  war  in 
Texas,  185,  227 

California,  and  international 
politics.  183-84;  war  in,  197 

Castflficda,  Francisco,  at  Gon- 
zales. ()2 

Catholics,  colonists  of  Texas 
required  to  be,  9,  10,  35 

Cerro  Gordo,  Santa  Anna 
fortifies,  220;  action  at, 
221-23 

Chalco,  Lake,  location,  234; 
Scott  near,  235,  236 

Chapultepec,  attack  at  foot  of. 
249;  storming  of,  250 

Charleston  Courier,  anti-Rhett 
paper.  171,  172,  174 


Charleston  Mercury,  Rhctt's 
organ,  169.  172,  173 

Churubusco,  Mexican  forti- 
Gcations  at,  236;  Mexicans 
at,  238;  Worth  at,  242;  Scott 
joins  Worth.  '.213-44;  battle 
of.  244-47 

Cincinnati,  subscription  for 
artillery  for  Texas,  73 

City  of  Mexico,  see  Mexico 
City 

Civil  War,  Mexican  cessions 
as  a  cause  of,  255 

Clay,  Henry,  Secretary  of 
State,  18-19;  as  a  diplomat, 
19;  relations  with  Poinsett. 
20.  22;  report  by  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations,  92; 
interviews  Ashburton,  125; 
position  on  annexation  issue 
(1844),  157,  158,  163-64; 
letter  causing  political  death, 
165 

Coahuila,  political  conflict  in, 
53-55;  state  reforms,  54-55; 
land  policy,  55-56 

"Companions  of  St.  Patrick," 
246 

Congress,  United  States,  Sen- 
ate authorizes  ratification  of 
Mexican  treaties,  28;  atti- 
tude toward  war,  90;  Jack- 
son shifts  responsibility  for 
Texas  upon,  99-100;  politi- 
cal composition,  102;  House 
suppresses  right  of  petition 
on  slavery,  103-04;  issue  of 
annexation  of  Texas,  10607 
Conner,  Commodore,  ordered 
to  allow  Santa  Anna  to  enter 
Mexico,  190 
Consultation,  meeting  (1835), 
63-65;  draws  up  Declaration 
of  causes  for  taking  up  arms 
against  Mexico,  64 
Contreras,  battle  of,  237  (note), 

247  (note) 
Corpus    Christi,    Taylor    en- 
camps near,  186 


i 


w 


«06 


INDEX 


Coi,  Martin  Perfecto  de.  gen- 
eral of  Santa  Anna,  AS-d4, 
A7;  aiTests  Viesca,  58;  incurs 
wrath  of  Texans.  A9,  01;  at 
war  with  Texas,  04;  besicKed 
at  B^xar,  66;  surrender!* 
(183A).  67:  returns  to  Texas 
(18S6),  82,  85 
CoyoacAn,  Scott  reaches.  Hi 
Crockett,  David,  73-74 

D 

Davis,    Jefferson,    commands 

Mississippi  Rifles,  813,  S14 
Democratic  party,  victory,  177 
Dickinson,  Mrs.,  at  the  Alamo, 

74 
Doyle,  Percy,  British  Charg* 

d'Affaires   in    Mexico,    138, 

139.  146 

E 

Edwards,  Haydeu,  empresario, 
5, 1 1 ;  contrasted  with  Austin, 
12;  early  history,  13;  opin- 
ion of  land  ownership,  14;  re- 
volt against  Mexico,  14-16; 
and  Republic  of  Fredonia, 
15 

Elliot,  Captain  Charles,  Brit- 
iiih  Minister  in  Texas,  130, 
131,  146,  158.  159 

Etnpresarios,  1  et  »eq. 

England,  as  peacemaker.  120 
ct  seq.;  international  crisis 
of  1844,  140  et  seq.;  and 
California,  183 

Everett,  Edward.  American 
Minister  at  London.  124, 
148,  149 


Fannin,  J.  W.,  leads  expedition 
against  Matamoras,  69.  70; 
given   orders    by    Houston, 


72,  76;  delays  and  lurrender, 
79-80 

Finance,  financial  aid  for  Texas 
in  United  States,  75.  76; 
Jackson's  financial  battle,  04 

Florida,  acquisition  of,  1; 
results  of  immigratio'^  to,  19 

France,  spoliation  clai  is,  92- 
93;  intervention  proposed 
between  Texas  and  Mexico, 
127-28;  invited  by  Aber- 
deen to  protest  annexation 
treaty,  161-62 

Fredonia,  Republic  of,  15; 
sympathy  in  United  States, 
18 

"Fredonian  War,"  14-16.  17. 
18 

Freedom  of  speech.  126-27 


Gadsden  Purchase.  254 

Gaines.  General  E.  P..  with 
United  States  troops  in 
Texas  (1836).  88-89.  90 

Galveston  Bay  and  Texas 
Land  Company  of  New 
York.  56 

Goliad.  Fannin  at,  70,  71,  76 

Gonzales,  battle  of.  01-62,  87; 
attitude  toward  Mexico  at, 
63 

Grant,  Dr.  James,  with  expedi- 
tion against  Matamoras,  68- 
70;  killed.  72;  faction  loses 
ground.  75 

Grant.  U.  S..  description  of 
march  at  Cerro  Gordo.  222 

Green,  Duff,  at  Anti-Slavery 
Convention  in  London,  136; 
letters  to  Calhoun,  141 

Greenwood,  Miles,  casts 
cannon,  75 

Guadalupe- Hidalgo,  Treaty  of, 
87,  254;  Santa  Anna's  head- 
quarters at,  251 

Guerrero,  Vicente.  President 
of  Mexico,  recall  of  Poinsett. 


ir   .' 


INDEX 


267 


(tuerrero,  Vinrente — Contiriuirl 
iH;  plBD  for  "sBvinR  of 
Texas,"  iO 

Giiizot,  French  Minister,  rv- 
funes  to  intervpnc  hplwet-u 
Texas  and  Mexiro.  128;  ami 
annexatiuD  of  Texas,  IBl-Oi 

II 

Hammonfl,  J.  H.,  Governor  of 

So')»h  Curolina,  17(J 
Harr        Mrs.    Dilne.    Rrmini.f- 

ce-       .  quoted,  7rt-7!> 
H.irf       iu',  Santa  Anna  movos 

lij.      ,,KI 

TIaMinn,  Snnla  Anna  in  p\i!f 
at.  IHO 

Herrera,  (Jenoral,  liradM  short- 
lived Mexican  government, 
180,  181 

Houston,  Sam.  11-12;  <>n 
United  States  appropriation 
of  Texas,  48;  commands 
army  in  Texas,  63,  68;  atti- 
tude toward  Johnson's  ex- 
pedition, 09,  70;  commander- 
in-chief,  72;  at  the  Alamo, 
72;  and  ,Iack:-on,  76,  90-97; 
at  Gonzales,  76,  78;  as  a 
soldier,  77;  leaves  Gonzales, 
79,  80;  Santa  Anna  against, 
81-84;  Battle  of  San  Jacinto, 
84-80;  intercedes  for  Santa 
Anna,  97;  President  of  Re- 
public of  Texas,  98,  113,  lu- 
lls; elected  second  time 
(1841),  l'i2-23;  action  on 
Sa!  til  Anna's  peace  terms, 
130  Jl; and  Texan  independ- 
ence, l.}{,  14S,  159-60: 
question  of  annexation,  144, 
146,  151;  uritish  friendship. 
145,  147,  150-51;  need  of 
ally  aijainst  Mexico,  147- 
148 

Hunt,  Memucan,  Texan  Minis- 
ter to  United  States,  102 


I 


Imperial  rol.ini*ation  Law  of 

182,J  (Mexican),  6-7 
Indinn'i,     F.d.vards's     alliance 

with  Clierokees,  15;  danger 

from    raids,    38;    report    of 

rising,     90;     population     in 

Texas.  00 
Irving,   Washingl.<n,  letter  to 

Van  Uuren,  93-01 
Itiirbide.  (ieneral  Agustin  de, 

become:*    Emperor    Agustin 

1,6-7 


Jackson,  Andrew,  and  Butler, 
26-27,  28,  29.  53;  accepts 
Mexican  treaties,  32;  fore- 
tells battle  of  San  Jacinto. 
77;  on  expansion,  88;  atli- 
tuile  toward  Texan  revohi- 
tion,  88,  89;  and  French 
spoliation  claims,  92-93;  and 
\an  Buren,  94,  95;  sends 
Morfit  to  Texas.  95;  Houston 
begs  aid  from,  97,  152;  deal- 
ings with  .Santa  .Anna,  98, 
99;  shifts  responsibility  for 
Texas  upon  Congress,  99- 
100,  101;  Adams's  accusa- 
tion of,  180;  and  California, 
1S3 

Jalapa,  Americans  at,  22.3,  228, 
229 

Johnson,  F.  \\'.,  Texan  adven- 
turer, 68,  69,  70.  72 

Jones,  ("oraraodore  T.  A.  ('.,  at 
Monterey,  110,  117.129 

K 

Kearny,  Colonel  S.  W.,  leads 
expedition  to  New  Mexico, 
190-97 

King,  W.  R.,  Senator  from  Ala- 
bama, on  Vermont  resolu- 
tions, 107 


r 


i 


n 


268 


INDEX 


rl 


Lafitte,  Jean,  pirate.  9 

Lamar,  M.  B,,  second  Presi- 
dent of  Texas,  111-lti 

Land,  American  idea  of  rights 
to,  99-96,  37;  contention 
over,  53-48 

Lara.  B.  G.  de,  Mexican 
refuRee,  t 

Lee,  Captain  R.  E.,  at  Cerro 
Gordo.  ««1;  at  San  Ger- 
6nimo.  240 

Lobos  Island.  Scott  *t,  217 

Long,  James,  sets  up  "Re- 
public of  Texas."  «-9 

Lovejoy,  Elijah,  murdered,  104 

Lundy,  Benjamin,  180,  1.'52; 
abolitionist,  104;  The  Origin 
and  True  Cause  of  the  Texan 
I  naurrection,  104-04;  The 
War  in  Texae.  104 

M 

McDuffie,  George,  Governor 
of  South  Carolina,  on  ad- 
mission of  Texas,  104 

Mackenzie,  A.  S.,  and  Santa 
Anna.  190 

Masons,  branches  become 
bases  of  political  parties. 
21 

MaUmoras,  TerAn  at,  33,  34; 
Mejia  occupies,  43;  Son 
Antonio  soldiers  set  out  for. 
68;  Fannin's  expedition 
against,  69;  Mexican  base 
at.  194;  Taylor  takes,  196 

May.  Captain,  leads  cavalry 
charge.  196 

Mejia.  Colonel  J.  A.,  occupies 
Matamoras.  43;  and  Austin. 
43-44;  Texans  join,  4.5 

Mexican  War,  bibliography, 
260-61 

Mexico,  changes  in  govern- 
ment. 6;  Imperial  Coloniza- 


tion Law  of  I8t9.  6-7; 
colonisation  law  (1H24-24). 
8:  Minister  withdraws  from 
Washington.  00;  sends  sol- 
diers to  Texas.  34;  Texan 
indictment  of,  04;  isolation. 
177-78 

Mexico  Cit^,  suspicion  of 
American  intentions  at.  48; 
march  of  Americans  to.  210; 
mountain  fortifications.  233; 
Americans  enter,  831 

Mier.  Texan  forces  attack,  114; 
prisoners  m;  ssacrcd,  129 

Mier  y  Teran,  Manuel  de. 
Mexican  boundory  com- 
missioner, 23;  description  of 
Texas,  84-23;  official  reports 
on  Texos,  80-30;  and  anti- 
slavery  decree.  SO;  niilitary 
and  colonization  plans.  31; 
concentrates  army.  33;  at 
Matamoras,  93,  34;  places 
Bradburn  in  command  at 
An&huac.  38,  39;  and  San- 
ta Anna.  40.  42;  defeat 
at  Tampico,  41;  death,  42, 
43 

Milam,  B.  R.,  at  San  Antonio. 
66 

Mifion.  General.  Mexican 
leader,  8U3 

Molino  del  Rey.  slaughter  of 
the,  848,  849-40 

Monroe,  James,  boundaries 
determined  under,  1-2 

Montclova,  political  party  at, 
43 

Monterey.  Taylor  at,  198,  202, 
battle,  199-200 

Monterey  (Calif.),  Jones  at, 
116,  129 

Morfit.  H.  M..  on  mission  of 
inquiry  to  Texas,  9J-!)6 

Morris,  Thomas,  Senator  from 
Ohio,  on  independence  of 
Texas,  90,  91;  and  anti- 
slavery  question.  91,  94 

Murphy,  \V.  S.,  151-52 


ill 


h^ 


INDEX 


COO 


N 

NacopHorhen,  "Republic  «»f 
Toxim"  proclaimed  at,  t; 
laptureil,  3;  Edwards'*  col 
ony  near,  IS-U;  Edward* 
ReizeN,  13;  AuRtin  aiils  Mexi- 
can attack  on  EdwariU,  10; 
Texaps  attack  Piedrnii  at. 
43;  Gaines  at  n«3«).  00 

Napoleon  III  and  Mexico,  173 

Natchez,  public  mertinK  to 
deplore  Slonroe's  policy,  < 

New  England  and  annexation 
of  Texas.  134 

New  Mexico,  expansion  into. 
9fl;  war  in,  118;  Kearny's 
expedition  to,  106-97 

New  Orleans,  pro-Texas  meet- 
ing at,  l«ft 

New  Washington,  Santa  Anna 
at,  St;  burned.  Rli 

New  York  and  annexation  of 
Texas,  134 

Nullification.  40 

O 

Obregon,  Mexican  Minister  .it 

Washington,  18 
Oregon  question,  I'ii,  160-(!1. 

166.  174 


Padierna.  village  on  San  Angd 
road,  437,  2.S8.  239,  841 

Pakenham.  British  Minister. 
155.  158,  160,  \(H,  165.  167. 
174 

Palmerston,  Lord,  and  recog- 
nition of  Texas,  120-22. 
125;  succeeded  at  Foreign 
OflBce.  123;  succeeds  Aber- 
deen. 176 

Palo  Alto,  battle  at.  195-96 

Panic  of  1837,  102.  121 

Paredes   y    Arillaga,    General 


Mariano,    raises    revolt    in 
Mexico,  184 
Purra-*,  General  Wool  mar<'hei 

to.  197 
ParTotl,    W.    S  .    confidential 

agent  of  Polk.  170 
Peilrcgal,  the.  lava  ficM.   2.36, 

237.  240,  Hi 
Peel.  Sir  Robert.  Prime  Minis- 
ter of  England.  161 
I'eflu  y    Peftn,    Manuel  c'     lu, 
esfablish's  provisional  gov- 
ernment at  Qucrctaro.  251 
Pennsvlvaniu  and  annexation 

of  Texas,  134 
Perton  Viejo,  Santa  Anna  on. 

233 
Piedras,       Colonel,       Mexican 
leader.  23;  captured,  41,  43; 
attacked    at     Nacogdoches, 
45;  resigns  command,  46 
Pierce,  (Jentral  Franklin.  245 
Poinsett,     J.     R..     American 
Minister  to  Mexico,  18;  as  a 
diplomat,     10  20;     political 
improprieties,  21,  27-28;  ne- 
gotiates commercial  treaty, 
22-23;    receives   instruction 
to  try   to  purchase  Texas, 
27;  recalled,  28 
Point  Isabel,  Taylor's  base  of 

supplies  at,  104 
Politics,    Texas    <iut       n    in, 

04-05,  103 
Polk,  .1.  K.,  rciilected  Speaker 
of  House,  102;  Presidential 
ciinipaign  of  1844.  138,  168, 
171;  election,  177;  policy 
regarding  Mexico,  178  et 
.irq.,  104;  and  California, 
181-83;  war  message,  187- 
188;  and  Tavlor,  199-200. 
201;  Atocha  and,  189-90, 
226-27;  mistaken  diplomacy. 
227;  sends  Trist  to  Mexico. 
228;  and  Scott,  255;  opinion 
of  treaty,  256 
Ponton,  Andrew,  alcalde  of 
Gonzales,  61 


ifr 


I 


«70 


INDEX 


II 


f(  I 


Porffr.   Si'nator   from    Louin- 

iant,  opputcii  anDexittioii  of 

Tpxar  »l 
Prpxtitn,  W.  ('.,  on  annexation 

of  Ti-xa*.  01.  lOH.  im 
Priiwriiin    (warship),    IJpahur 

killrii  on.  IA9 
I'uehia,  Scott'i  objective,  «<l, 

tM;    Trill     reachei.     MO; 

marcb  frum,  tSU 

Quer^taro,  provisional  Mexi- 
can RoverDmeot  established 
at.  «5I 

Quintuple  Treaty.  li3-«4.  ISi 

K 

Reilv,  Jamr.t,  Texan  charge, 
US 

Rheff.  n.  H..  on  secession  and 
annrxatiun  of  Texas,  lOH 
rl  *rq. 

Rilcv,  General  HenncI,  at 
Padierna,  238 

Rio  (Irande  River,  Inited 
SiHirs  riaims  as  boundary  of 
Louisiana,  SO:  desire  of 
I'nited  Stales  to  buy  coun- 
try to,  ti,  87,  88 

Robinson,  J.  W,  l«9-30 

Robinson  Armistice,  144, 145 


Sahinr  (schooner),  ."JO 

Saltillo,  Austin  arrested  nt. 
M;  political  faction  at,  5:i; 
Taylor  at,  201,  SOii-o:},  ilO 

San  AKUstfn  de  las  Cuevas, 
Scott's  headquarters  u'l,  i'M 

San  Angel  road,  lighting  oti. 
237.  2;J!) 

San  Antonio.  Johnson  s  expe- 
dition from,  68,  ««;  Travis 
in  comnr.and  at,  7(l;  Mexi- 
can!  move  against,  70,   71; 


Mexican  array  raids,  til; 
second  raid,  ll;t;  capturr 
(1842).  li.'i-W.  Kft;  Mexi- 
can fiirliflcatio.!,  2.t(i;  Worth 
at,  Hi;  Mexicans  relreitt 
from.  2ti;  battle  of.  t'.l 
(noli-);  ne  uiio  H/'xar 

San  Felipe  de  Austin.  Austin 
founds,  4;  capital  of  Austin's 
c'olonv.  7-8;  convention  at, 
57  .18;  AuMin  at.  «0  «l; 
hurneil,  81;  Mexicans  enter, 
81;  Houston  abandons,  82 

San  (leroninio.  American 
troops  at.  2.S0.  240 

.San  Jacinto,  battle  of,  81-8fl. 
8U;  Jackson  foretells.  77.  80 

San  Luis  Potosi.  Santa  .Vnua 
rallies  force  at.  220 

.San  Meteo.  convent  of.  2t4-t.'5 

San  Patricio.  Grant  aud  John- 
sou  at.  70.  71,  72 

Santa  Anna,  in  repulse  of 
Spain  (182))).  20;  sliirtN 
re  volution, 40-4 1 ;  and  Ter;'in. 
40  M  ;  success,  42;  and  I'led- 
ras,  4'J;  feeling  in  f.-ivor  of, 
4.1,  41  43;  President  of 
Mexico.  .50;  Austin  and.  .50, 
.51;  Texuns  ]o^e  faith  in,  ,5.'i; 
reuctionury,  .5,'<,  5.5;  and  litmi 
questiou,  flO.  Zavala  enemy 
of,  5!»;  centralized  govern- 
ment under,  (SI;  commands 
Mexican  army,  70,  7.5;  at  the 
Alamo,  72;  popuiiition  flees 
before, 78;  at  the  San  Jueinio. 
80  rt  seo.;  saved  by  captors, 
97;  duplicity,  97;  and  Jack- 
.-,on.  OS.  99;  civil  war  with 
Y'ucatan,  118.  117;  returns 
to  power,  12.'!;  turns  a^iiin 
against  Texas,  147;  in  exile 
at  Havana  (1843),  IHO; 
Polk  and,  189-92,  200;  re- 
turns to  Mexico,  192;  against 
Taylor,  20;i;  at  Huena  X'istn. 
•I'Ol  rl  Kfq.;  a^Minst  Scott, 
2iO.  i33,  238,  2;)'J;  at  Ccrro 


'm 


ill: 


INDEX 


«71 


Santa  Knnn-  Cnntinuril 

(iortio.  KO-il.');  nPKotUtiAn* 
with.  fM  -3<,  KtO:  armiitti)  «• 
witK.  8|H:rrnf'w*np<>ratiiinK, 
iin,  at  (iiiN<i«luj)(>  iliilalK". 
liJl;  rmiftni  preniilenfy,  til : 
pxile.  iai  (nofr) 

Santa  F>,  l^ainnr'.i  np^dition 
aK»'n.tt.  IK;  Kpurny  at.  11)7 

Scott,  (ienrral  Winfipld.  roni- 
inanclit  Mexican  rxprtlitinn. 
Mi;  aiivatic«)i  in  rank.  tOi: 
(MTsonal  chararteristirii,  :<lfl- 
'^17;  anil  Santa  Anna.  HO, 
9MHi.  HH  W;  at  (Vrro 
(idflo.  UO  it:  at  Piiebla. 
ii*.  ii.'i;  and  Triat.  <<S-SI; 
IpttPr  to  Tritt.  qiioteil.  HO; 
HtratfRy  of.  SS.'S-.'Jfl;  at  Pn- 
Hierna,8f)H;nn  I^rc'xrournffr. 
<40:  on  San  Anxel  road.  HI, 
iU;  blunder,  US  ^^;  at 
Chunibuafo.  «»4.  «4«;  at 
Molino  del  Kry.  i\U;  at 
Chaptilteper.  8A0;  rPH'-hps 
Mexico  Ciiy,  4jI;  removed 
from  romraanil.  li.'i.^-SB 

Serennion,  108  el  irq. 

Sherman.  W,  T.,  at  Hiiena 
Vi.<<ta,  ^07,  Hi 

Shields,  (leneral  .Fames,  21.5 

Simpson,  Sir  George,  on  Sutter, 
XHi 

Slavery,  in  Texas,  45.  30;  in 
Mexico,  .MO;  anti-slavery  agi- 
tation in  United  States. 
IO,'<-0(;  annexation  of 
Texas  and.  104-01);  factor 
in  Texan  diplomacy.  HI; 
Quintuple  Treaty.  lM-<4, 
133;  British  feeling  against, 
1 J6;  in  District  of  Columbia, 
168;  tee  aho  Abolition 

Slave  trade,  British  and,  121- 
122 

Slidell,  John,  I'nifcd  States 
Minister  to  Mexi.o,  180.  183, 
189 

Smith,  Ashbel,  Texan  Minister 


to  Rngland,  ItS,  1.V1;  quoted, 
1.14.  137  SH 

St.iilh,  "De«f,"  Texan  Iradcr. 
MA 

Smith,  llenrv,  ReminiMfnr,  ■,, 
(|iioled,  .SO  .17,  12  43,  Mi 
4S;  diilrict  cc»mnii»«ii<iner  at 
Hra/orii«,  42;  Nwiuri///  fnr 
Tfiiii,  .»!;  leader  of  "war 
party."  .50;  elected  Presi- 
dent of  provisional  govern- 
ment, fl.T;  ilifTercMce  with  the 
Council.  «7  08 

Smith,  .1.  II  ,  r/r-  llVir  with 
Mexico,  cited.  213  (note), 
240  (n<ife) 

Smith.  (Jeneral  P.  K..  com- 
mands Amcri<-an  expe<litinn. 
230.  211 

Sol,  El,  Mexican  newspaper 
accuses  United  States  of 
complicity  in  Krednnian 
War,  18;  quoted,  31   32 

South  Carolina,  nulliHciilinn, 
49;  and  admission  of  Texas. 
lO.'i;  contest  l»elween  Ithelt 
and  f'alhoun,  108  rt  trq. 

Spain  attempts  to  reconquer 
Mexico,  20 

Sterne.  Adolphus,  story  of, 
,30-37 

Stevenson,  .\ndrew,  American 
anil)assar|nr  at  London,  122 

Sutter,  Captain  J.  A.,  182 

Sutter's  Fort,  182 

Swift,  Benjamin,  Senator  from 
\  erniunt.  107 


Tappan,    Lewis,    abolitionist, 

1.35 
Tappan    Committee.     136-39. 

141,  142,  1.55 
Tariff,  Mexican.  .38 
Taylor,  (ieneral  Zachary.  takes 

forces   to  Texas.    ISO.    188; 

.Santa  Anna  advises  invasion 

of    Mexico    by,    191;    "Old 


272 


INDEX 


Pi 


14  a 


^  '  ! 


Taylor,  Zachary — Continued 
Rough  and  Ready,"  103; 
forces  of,  193-94;  builds 
Fort  Brown,  194;  at  Palo 
Alto,  195;  advance  into 
Mexico.  196,  197-98;  cap- 
ture of  Monterey,  199;  Polk's 
opinion  of.  199-«00,  «0«; 
.'IS  a  general,  200;  disregards 
Washington's  advice,  201 ; 
subordinated  to  Scott,  202; 
Santa  Anna  against.  203; 
at  Buena  Vista,  204  et  »eq. 

Tcnorio,  Captain  Antonio, 
Mexican  officer,  57,  58,  50 

Tordn,  nee  Mier  y  Teran 

Texas,  "  Republic  of  Texas," 
2-3;  Austin's  colony,  B-8; 
as  consequence  of  Mexican 
colonization  laws,  8-10;  mi- 
gratior.>  to,  10-11;  Edwards's 
revolt  in,  14-16;  slavery, 
25,  30;  Convention  draws 
up  constitution  (1833),  50; 
and  secession,  63  ct  seq.\ 
declared  republic,  76;  recog- 
nition, 87  et  aeq.,  120-22; 
question  of  annexation,  98, 
\Q\eliieq.,  115.  116-18,  143- 
144;   settlement,    110;    suc- 

festcd  as  buffer  state  by 
England,  128;  becomes  State 
of  the  Union,  177,  178; 
boundary  question,  185;  bib- 
liography, 259-«0 

Texcoco,  Lake,  234,  238 

Thompson,  Waddy,  pro-Texas 
leader  in  House,  101,  108- 
109;  United  States  Minister 
to  Mexico,  126 

Travis,  W.  B.,  captures  Ten- 
orio,  58-59;  in  command  at 
San  Antonio,  70;  letter  an- 
nouncing siege,  71 

Treaties,  Annexation  treaty 
(1844).  154-55,  157,  161-62. 
164;  British-Texan  treaties. 
125,133;Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 
87,  254;  Quintuple  Treaty, 


123-24, 1S3;  Treaty  of  fom- 
raerce  and  Amity  with  Texan 
Republic,  118,  145;  Treaty 
of  commerce  with  Mexico. 
21-22,  23,  28,  29;  Treaty  of 
1819,  20,  21,  108;  Treaty  of 
Limits,  23,  28,  29;  Treaty 
of  1795,  21;  Webster-Ash- 
burton  treaty  (1842).  132, 
133 

Trist,  N.  P.,  envoy  to  Mexico, 
226,  228;  Scott  and,  228-31; 
negotiations,  253-54 

Twiggs,  (leneral  D.  E.,  at 
Churubusco,  245 

Tyler,  John,  breaks  with 
Whigs,  142;  message  of 
December,  1843,  160;  South 
Carolina  supports,  171;  reso- 
lution inviting  Texas  as 
Stale  signed  by.  177 

II 

Ugartechea.  Colonel,  Mexican 
commander  at  B6xar,  61; 
statement  to  Anglo-Ameri- 
cans, 63 

United  States,  and  Fredonian 
War,  18-19;  boundary 
claims,  20-21;  desire  to  buy 
Texan  country  to  Rio 
Grande,  22,  27,  88;  relations 
with  Mexico,  27  et  aeq.,  35; 
Texan  commissions  to,  65, 
87-88;  attitude  toward  war 
between  Texas  and  Mexico, 
75-76;  troops  on  Texan  soil 
(1836),  88-89;  Mexican  Min- 
ister withdraws  from,  90; 
question  of  recognition  of 
Texas  in.  91-92,  99-100, 
lUl;  European  predicament, 
92-93;  Texas  sends  Minister 
to.  98-99;  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Mexico  resumed. 
106;  question  of  mediation 
between  Texas  and  Mexico, 
115;  and  Great  Britain.  125. 


''ft' 


INDEX 


273 


United  States — Continued 
140;  intervention  t)etwepn 
Texas  and  Mexico  proposed, 
127-88;  International  cTisis 
of  1844,  140  el  »eq.;  domestic 
crisis  of  1844,  168  et  aeq.; 
enters  war,  178  ct  aeq.;  see 
also  Congress,  names  of 
Presidents,  Texas  question 
of  annexation 

Upsbur,  A.  P.,  Secretary  of 
Si.  141-43.  146.  148-53; 
kit    J,  153 


Valencia,  General,  at  battle  of 
Contreras,  238,  240,  241 

Van  Buren.  Martin,  Secretary 
of  State,  27,  93-94;  candi- 
date for  presidency,  94,  95; 
elected  President,  99;  against 
annexation  of  Texas,  157- 
158;  Benton  and,  164;  Adams' 
accusation,  180 

Van  Zundt,  Isaac,  Texan  Min- 
ister at  Washington.  144, 
140,  150 

Velasco.  Fort  of.  42 

Vera  Cruz,  Santa  Anna  at.  41; 
Santa  Anna  advises  United 
States  to  attack.  191;  as 
base  of  American  operations, 
201;  Scott  at.  218;  Trist 
goes  to.  228 

Viesca.  Agustin,  President  of 
Coahuila,  58 


W 


at 


Washington.       Captain, 
Buena  Vista,  207 

Washington  (Texas),  Texan 
Convention  at,  72;  Republic 
of  Texas  proclaimed  at.  110 

Webster.  Daniel,  Secretary  of 

i8 


State,  115.  123;  enemy  of 
Texas,  115,  145;  reply  to 
Bocenegra.  127;  and  Cali- 
fornia, 183;  against  treaty, 
25« 

Webster-Ashhurlon  Treaty. 
132.  133 

Wharton,  W.  F.,  Minister  to 
United  States,  98,  101,  102; 
commissioner  to  United 
States  from  Texas,  65 

Whig  party,  attitude  toward 
war,  106;  position  as  to 
Texas,  157;  Aberdeen  and, 
158-59 

White.  S.  E..  The  Forty-Mner.f, 
cited,  197  (note) 

Wilkinson,  General  James,  5, 
13 

Wilniot  Proviso.  256 

Woll,  General  Adrian,  Mexican 
leader,  113;  raids  San  An- 
tonio, 129 

Wool,  General  J.  E.,  march  to 
Parras,  197 

Worth,  General  W.  J.,  nt  Mon- 
terey. 198-99;  at  Vera  Cruz. 
218;  battles  of  San  Antonio 
and  Churubusco.  242-47 


Xochimilco.     Lake,    location. 
234,  236 


Yoakum.  Henry,  quoted.  13 
Yucatari,  civil  war  with.  118- 
119;  pacification  of.  147 


Z 


Zavala,  Lorenzo  de.  capture  of. 
59 


